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LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY:
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
By HAROLD D. LASSWELLt and MYRES S. McDOUGALt
A RECURRENT problem for all who are interested in implementing pol-
icy, the reform of legal education must become ever more urgent in a
revolutionary world of cumulative crises and increasing violence. Despite
the fact that for six or seven decades responsibility for training new
members of the "public profession" of the law has in this country been
an almost exclusive monopoly of a new subsidized intellectual 6Iite, pro-
fessional teachers of law, and despite much recent ferment and agitation
among such teachers, little has actually been achieved in refashioning
ancient educational practices to serve insistent contemporary needs. No
critics have been more articulate in lamenting this failure than the pro-
fessional law teachers themselves.' What they think they have done to
Visiting Sterling Lecturer, Yale La,; School; Director, War Communications Re-
search, Library of Congress.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This article was submitted befure Mr. 'McDou-
gal took leave of absence to become General Counsel of the Office of Foreign Relief and
Rehabilitation Operations in the State Department.
1. Still the best call to arms is HoHFELD, A VITA SCHOOL OF JUMsPnUDzIXcE A
LAw, Fu mra.=AwsL LEcAL CoxcETIOis (Cook ed. 1923) 332. The most useful syste-
matic survey is FACULTY OF LAw, CoLumrA UNVERSITy, Su.=uAry or STUDIES I:
LEGAL EDUCATION (Oliphant ed. 1928). Among other articles which we have found
helpful are Keyserling, Social Objectives in Legal Education (1933) 33 Cor. L REv. 437
(excellent criticism which has not yet received the attention it deserves) ; Steffen, Chang-
ing Objectives it Legal Education (1931) 40 YA=. L. J. 576 (useful for both criticism
and constructive proposals) ; Riesman, Law and Social Scicnce: A Report on Michael
and Wechsler's Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration (1941) 50 YALE, L J.
636 (incisive criticism and clear orientation toward policy) ; Clark, The Function of Law
in a Deiocratic Society (1942) 9 U. OF Cm. L Ruv. 393; Gelhorn, The Law School's
Responsibility for Training Public Servants (1942) 9 U. or CHL L. R-v. 469; Harno,
Disciplines in the Training of a Lawyer (1942) 22 B. U. L. REv. 254; Cavers, Ncw Fields
for the Legal Periodical (1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 1; Douglas, Educatioa for the Law
(mimeographed address given before The American Associativn of Cullegiate Schools
of Business, April 23, 1936) ; Bordwell, Experimentation and Continuity in Legal Educa-
tion (1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 297; Mecher, The Proposed Four-Year Law Curriculum
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legal instruction may be recapitulated as a transition from lectures, to
the analysis of appellate opinions, to confusion. Not atypical of the
common indictment are the words of one eminent self-critic: "blind, inept,
factory-ridden, wasteful, defective, and empty." 2
The major contours of our contemporary confusion have long been
plainly visible. Heroic, but random, efforts to integrate "law" and "the
other social sciences" fail through lack of clarity about what is being
integrated, and how, and for what purposes.' Lip-service is paid to the
proposition that legal concepts, institutions, and practices are instrumental
only; but the main organizing foci for determining both "fields" and
"courses," and arrangement within fields and courses, of a "swollen and
shapeless" curriculum are still time-worn, over-lapping, legal concepts
of highest level abstraction.4 Any relation between the factual problems
that incidentally creep into particular fields or courses, in a curriculum
so "organized," and the important problems of contemporary society is
purely coincidental; and all attempts to relate such fields or courses to
each other are frustrated by lack of clear social goals and inadequate cri-
teria of importance. The relevance of "non-legal" materials to effective
"law" teaching is recognized but efficient techniques for the investigation,
collection and presentation of such materials are not devised. From lack
of proper orientation, what appear to be promising ventures into "fact
-A Dissenting Opinion (1940) 38 Micn. L. REv. 945; Frankfurter, The Conditions for
and the Ahns and Methods of Legal Research (1930) 6 Am. L. ScuooL Rav. 663; Frey,
Sonc Thoughts on Law Teaching and the Social Sciences (1934) 82 U. o" PA. L. R'v.
463; Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawycr-School (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907; Gard-
ner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?-Sonrc Reflections (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 785; Gardner, Specialization in the Law School Curriculum (1933) 81 U. or PA. L.
REv. 684; Harsch, The Four-Year Law Course in American Universities (1939) 17 N. C.
L. REv. 242.
2. See Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education (1935) 35
CoL L. REv. 651, 653. Contrast the resurgent optimism of the same author in On the
Problem of Teaching 'Private' Law (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 775, an article in praise of
STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER (1939).
3. Katz, A Four-Year Program for Legal Education (1937) 4 U. OF CH, L. Rv.
527 writes with an intellectual modesty that borders on diffidence at 531: "We propose
to consider a little more consciously whether anything worth while can be said as to the
ends which law should serve." The shifting of courses in "moral and social philosophy"
from the college to the law school is not likely to give new direction to legal education.
A bolder attitude is taken and a more promising course on Law and Economic Organi-
zation is described in Katz, What Changes are Practical it Legal Education (1941) 27
A. B. A. J. 759.
4. Its framework is still largely that designed for the training of small-town prac-
titioners of nearly a century ago. Some changes have, however, been effected. Not
long ago a Connecticut judge complained that in the Yale Law School his son had
learned how to reorganize a railroad but had not learned how to replevy a dog. Ironli-
cally the son's first job was to assist in the reorganization of a railroad. The records
do not reveal that he has yet had opportunity to replevy a dog.
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research" produce relatively isolated and trivial results. Professing to
include, even as they transcend, purely vocational aims, mrest schools, by
ignoring skills in negotiation, personnel management, and public rela-
tions--equally essential today to caretakers of private clients and public
leaders-fail even to do a sound job of vocational training. Great empha-
sis is put upon "historical" studies, but too often these studies degenerate
into an aimless, literary eclecticism that fails to come to grips with causes
or conditions.' Despite all the talk of "teleological jurisprudence" and of
the necessity of evaluating legal structures, doctrines, and procedures in
terms of basic policy, there is little conscious, systematic effort to relate
them clearly and consistently to the major problems of a society strug-
gling to achieve democratic values.' Some slight integration of legal
materials with conventional business practice too frequently passes for
evaluation in terms of long-run policy. Indeed, occasional voices still
insist that law schools should have no concern whatsoever with policies,
goals, or values-that the only proper concern of law schools is method,
science disinfected of all preference.' Finally, even a majority of those
who subscribe to a conception of law as "continuously more efficacious
social engineering," are so obsessed by myopic concern with one institu-
tion of social control, the court, that they fail to focus upon newer and,
in many instances, more effective forms of organization, or to urge the
creative consideration of alternative methods of formulating and imple-
menting public policy.
3
5. Compare Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History (1941) 54 Hnv. L.
Rwv. 424; Holdsworth, Gibbon, Blackstone and Bentham (1936) 52 L Q. Rav. 46.
6. Thus HoHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351 writes: "I mean to include under criti-
cal, or teleological, jurisprudence proper the systematic testing or critique of our principles
and rules of law according to considerations extrinsic or external to the principles and
rules as such, that is, according to the psychological, ethical, political, social, and eco-
nomic bases of the various doctrines and the respective purposes or ends sought to be
achieved thereby." What we stress is that not only a "testing" of such rules and principles
is required but also a conscious pursuit of explicitly defined ends and systematic considera-
tion of alternative doctrines, procedures and structures as means to such ends.
7. One distinguished authority on Bills and Notes insists that a teacher who ex-
presses a social preference in the classroom should be fired. HEis preference is for law
schools that concern themselves with "law" only as a means to any policies, goals or values
and not with evaluation or deliberate choice of policies, goals or values. He justifies
devoting most of his classroom time to the exposition of the legal literature on the
grounds (1) that that literature discloses some of the rules established in the culture for
the discourse of lawyers, and (2) that some of the propositions in the literature are part
of the pattern of cues or signs to which non-verbal responses have been learned ky judges
and people generally.
8. It might be noted that not all experts on legal education in other countries are
flattering in their references to American legal education. See Deal, French Legal
Education and Some Reflections on Legal Education in the U. S. [1939] Wis. L. R L-.
473; Rheinstein, Law Faculties and Law Schools. A Comparison of Legal Education in
the United States and Germany [1938] iVs. L. Rcv. 5; Riesenfeld, A Compari son of
Continental ad American Legal Education (1937) 36 MicH. L Rav. 31.
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Proposals for escape from all of this confusion and inadequacy have,
of course, been legion. Too often, however, such proposals have tended
-by technologizing or gadgetizing the discussion at an early stage-to
get lost in minutiae, in what one commentator has irreverently called the
reverent modification of small particulars.9 Lecture versus case; large
class versus small class; seminars versus courses; group work versus indi-
vidual work; specialization versus "well-rounded" training; vocational
training versus cultural training; Bills and Notes (substitute any course)
in the second year versus Bills and Notes in the third year; prescribed pre-
legal training versus eclecticism; three-year curriculum versus four-year
curriculum-these and many similar questions have been raised like
quills on a startled porcupine. No thorough examination of educational
problems can ignore such issues. But they are not basic.10 To leap quickly
into the fray on one side or the other, without clarifying more fundamen-
tal issues, is to satisfy lust for controversy at the expense of enlighten-
ment.
A first indispensable step toward the effective reform of legal educa-
tion is to clarify ultimate aim. We submit this basic proposition: if legal
education in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the needs of
a free and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious, efficient, and
systematic training for policy-making. The proper function of our law
schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policy-makers for
the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values that consti-
tute the professed ends of American polity.
This end is not proposed as something utterly new or exotic. Indeed
most of the recent developments in legal education-from "sociological
9. See Riesman, supra note 1, at 637.
10. Simpson, The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School (1938) 51 HAav. L.
REV. 965, 973 thus announces some revision of the rites of the Langdell shrine:
"The revised curriculum of the Havard Law School attempts to harmonize
three different but by no means inconsistent principles. These are:
"'First: That everyone on the Faculty should be helped and encouraged to
develop the best thought that is in him and to put it at the disposal of students
to the fullest possible extent;
"'Second: That every student should receive a solid foundation of concep-
tions and methods in each of the great basic legal subjects-such as litigation,
crime, tort, property, contract, association, and government-with opportunity as
he progresses to pursue the fields of his special interest in greater detail;
"'Third: That the courses and their contents should be arranged, so far
as practicable, so that the student will proceed to the complex from the simple,
and that each course will throw the greatest possible light upon the rest.'"
Note the lack of emphasis in Principle I on student self-education, the emphasis in
Principle 2 on "legal technicality" as a basis for curricular organization, and the banality
of Principle 3. Contrast the broader vision of the same author in The Function of he
University Law School (1936) 49 HAIv. L. REV. 1068 when he faces no necessity of
appeasing colleagues.
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jurisprudence" to neo-Thomism "--have tended, with varying degrees of
explicitness, to move in this direction. None who deal with law, however
defined, can escape policy when policy is defined as the making of import-
ant decisions which affect the distribution of values. Even those who
still insist that policy is no proper concern of a law school tacitly advocate
a policy, unconsciously assuming that the ultimate function of law is to
maintain existing social institutions in a sort of timeless stali quo; what
they ask is that their policy be smuggled in, without insight or responsi-
bility. But neither a vague and amorphous emphasis on social "forces,"
"mores," and "purposes," nor a functionalism that dissolves legal abso-
lutism for the benefit of random and poorly defined ends, nor a mystical
invocation of the transcendental virtues of an unspecified "good life,"
can effect the fundamental changes in the traditional law school that are
now required to fit lawyers for their contemporary responsibilities. Their
direction is toward policy but their directives are at too high a level of
abstraction to give helpful guidance. What is needed now is to imple-
ment ancient insights by reorienting every phase of law school curricula
and skill training toward the achievement of clearly defined democratic
values in all the areas of social life where lawyers have or can assert re-
sponsibility.
It should need no re-emphasis here that these democratic values have
been on the wane in recent years. The dominant trends of world politics
have been away from the symbols and practices of a free society and
toward the slogans, doctrines and structures of despotism. The outburst
of racialism in Germany is but one of several profound recessions from
the ideal of deference for the dignity and worth of the individual. Where-
ever democratic attitudes have declined, institutions connected with de-
mocracy have weakened or vanished. In post-WVeimar Germany, as in
post-parliamentary Italy and certain other countries, elections have ceased
to be free and have become ceremonial plebiscites.-rituals of tribal union.
Balanced public discussion has given way to discussion directed by a
monopoly of government and party. The multiple-party system has yield-
ed to something called a "party," though in fact an "order." a privileged
monopolist of policy-making. In place of dynamic executive and judi-
cial balance, there has arisen extreme executive concentration. Where
institutions named parliaments yet survive, they are mummified into as-
semblies for the performance of rites of ceremonial ratification of execu-
tive decisions. Where there was a balance between centralized and local
authority and control, there has arisen extreme centralization. The bal-
ance between governmental and private organization is unhinged as the
tide moves toward the governmentalization of all organized life. With
the sweep of regimentation, the balance is lost between private zones of
11. See Kennedy, Portrait of a Realist, New Style (1941) 10 FonDntA, L REv. 196.
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living and the zones appropriate to official direction. The entire struc-
ture of open and competitive markets has been actively threatened by an
economic structure of closed and monopolistic markets. Processes of pro-
duction and distribution that were once carried on by bargaining and
pricing depend on negotiation and rationing.
These sweeping transformations in the institutional structure of world
politics may be summarized by saying that the balanced skill state has been
yielding to the bureaucratic state. This is a reversal of nineteenth cen-
tury trends. Despite local deviations, the over-all development of the
world was toward the spread of free markets and free governments, and
the resulting rise in influence of the specialist on bargaining, the business-
man. He shared power with other skill groups-the propagandist, whose
skill is the manipulation of symbols of mass appeal; the party boss, whose
skill is the negotiation of favors; the civil official, whose skill is adminis-
tration; the military men, whose skill is the management of violence.
With the eclipse of the balanced skill state, the bureaucratic state has
grown to behemoth dimensions. The line of development can be sum-
marized by saying that the business state, with its balance of skill, gives
way to the monopolist state, the propagandist state, or the party state;
and that, if militarization continues, the garrison state will come out on
top.1
2
Looking at the plight of freedom in the world today, can we fail to
ask how the policy-makers of a free society have come to experience such
catastrophic rebuffs? Through what deficiencies of skill or character have
they failed to keep the trend of world development in line with their basic
objective? Such chronic failure suggests that the policy-makers of recent
times have arrived at their decisions without a firm grasp on reality, and
that they have allowed their focus of attention to be absorbed with trivial
non-essentials. Long before the present storm, clouds of difficulty were
plainly visible. Yet decision-makers in business, government, and in all
branches of public life were either oblivious to these portents or remained
sterile and ineffective.
The question may be asked whether the lawyer can be held responsible
in any significant degree for the plight in which we find ourselves. For a
moralist, the question is whether the lawyer can be "blamed ;" for a scien-
tist, whether he is an important causal variable; for a reformer, whether
he can be acted upon to produce change. The answer to all of these ques-
tions is: most assuredly, yes. It should need no emphasis that the lawyer
is today, even when not himself a "maker" of policy, the one indispensa-
ble adviser of every responsible policy-maker of our society-whether
we speak of the head of a government department or agency, of the execu-
12. On the changing structure of world politics, see LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND
PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935); MANNHEIM, MAN AND SocIETY IN AN AGs OF RECON-
STRUcTioN (1940) ; Lasswell, The Garrison State (1941) 46 Am. J. Soc. 455.
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tive of a corporation or labor union, of the secretary of a trade or other
private association, or even of the humble independent enterpriser or pro-
fessional man. 3 As such an adviser the lawyer, when informing his pol-
icy-maker of what he can or cannot legally do, is, as policy-makers often
complain, in an unassailably strategic position to influence, if not create,
policy. It is a familiar story, too, of how frequently lawyers who begin as
advisers on policy are transformed into makers of policy; "the law" is
one of the few remaining avenues to "success" open to impecunious talent.
Successful practitioners of law often receive sufficiently large incomes,
from advice and investment, to become powers in their own right and
hence gravitate into positions of influence in industry. How frequently
lawyers turn up in government-whether as legislators, executives, or
administrators, or as judges (where they have a virtual monopoly)-is
again a matter of common knowledge. Nor can the policy-making power
of lawyers as executors, trust administrators, administrators in insolvency,
and so on, be ignored. Certainly it would be difficult to exaggerate either
the direct or indirect influence that members of the legal profession exert
on the public life of this nation. For better or worse our decision-makers
and our lawyers are bound together in a relation of dependence or of
identity.
One of the best indicators of the policy-making power of lawyers would,
of course, be a complete "job analysis" of the profession. Unfortunately,
such an analysis has never been made. 4 In its absence a listing of pro-
fessional activities which, though it is designed to emphasize the oppor-
tunities of lawyers to affect policy, is neither exhaustive nor of consist-
ent level of abstraction, must suffice:
Drafting, promoting, interpreting, and amending constitutions.
Drafting, promoting, and interpreting executive orders, adminis-
trative rulings, municipal charters, and so on, and attacking or
sustaining their constitutionality.
Drafting and interpreting corporate and private association charters,
agreements, dispositive instruments, and so on, and attacking or
sustaining their validity.
Deciding or otherwise resolving causes or controversies, and making
other decisions which affect the distribution of values, as judges,
executives, administrators, arbitrators, referees, trial examin-
ers, and so on.
13. See Rum-ymauRp, INPLEcNcE OF THE Anmmc= BAn AssoctTiono o; Puruc
OPiNION AND LEGISLATION (1937), for a chronicling of some of the more organized as-
pects of the influence of the bar on policy. CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER MATERIAS
ON THE LAc ProFEssioN (1938) is suggestive of the range of the la-wyer's activities.
14. For the beginnings see AixnFlcAN BAn AssocAuTio, TnE Ecoruo xcs or Tmz
LEGAL PRO FESSIO.N (Garrison ed. 1938) 28, 70; Bradway, A National Bar Survey (1936)
16 B. U. L. REv. 662; Clark and Corstvet, The Lawer and the Publie: An A. A. L. S.
Survey (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1272; Llewellyn, The Problem of Udone Legal Scrvice
(1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 38.
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Bringing to, or obscuring from, the attention of decision-makers the
facts and policies on which judgment should rest.
Advising clients on how to avoid litigation and controversies and on
how to make the best possible use of legal doctrines, institutions,
and practices for the promotion of their private purposes and
long-term interest. (Clarifying, inter alia, intentions as to prop-
erty disposition, business transactions, and family relations).
Consulting and negotiating with clients, businessmen, opposing coun-
sel, and decision-makers of all kinds.
Reading, digesting, and reinterpreting the decisions and reasoning of
past decision-makers of all kinds.
Guiding, conducting, and preparing for investigations and hearings
(criminal, regulatory, legislative, social-scientific, administra-
tive).
Preparing arguments, legal forms, witnesses (ordinary, expert),
trial briefs, and so on.
Selecting courts, juries, arbitrators, negotiators, and other decision-
makers.
Selecting clients.
Selecting clerks, associates and successors.
Preparing or supervising press conferences. issuing news releases,
preparing radio material, or newsreel material.
Developing influence through participation in civic and other public
activities (organizing and directing pressure groups, lobbying
propaganda, and other control procedures) and private soca-
bility.
Participating in professional organizations (organizations engaged
in selection, exclusion and training of members, and with the
maintenance of standards of varying degrees of ambiguity),
Contributing by investigation, writing and lecturing to legal and
social science (publishing facts and analyses of the relationship
between legal rules and human relations; reformulation of legal
rules).
It should be remembered, furthermore, in computing the sum of the
lawyer's influence, that its true measure is not to be found in the more dra-
matic occasions, such as constitution-making or legislation-drafting, when
such influence is exercised, but rather in the cumulative effect of multiple
thousands of routine, day-to-day, presentations of fact and deliverances
of opinion.
Yet, even if it be granted that lawyers are among the most influential
of the policy-makers of our society, one question still persists. Is the law-
yer not made of the same flesh, blood, eyes, and errors as other men?
Can lawyers be "blamed" for sharing-or be made to share less-the
compulsions and obsessions, the false hopes and egregious illusions, which
have been, and are largely still, common to his clients and the other
[Vol, 52: 203
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policy-makers of our society? The answer is that the lawyer does bear
a peculiar responsibility. The lawyer, it must be recalled, is a member
of a learned profession--of a skill group which has the temerity to make
a profession of tendering advice to others. It is his responsibility to
acquaint himself not only with what the learned have thought, and with
the historical trends of his time, but also with the long-term interests of
all whom he serves and the appropriate means of securing such interests.
For nurturing him in the necessary skills and information society offers
him a peculiarly long period of training and incubation; and, if that
period is filled with the proper experiences, he can-our whole educational
system is based on the premise-be trained for responsible leadership. To
no one else can clients and members of the public reasonably be expected
to look for that enlargement and correction of perspective, that critical
and inclusive view of reality, that is based on the disciplined exercise of
skills which the layman is not given the opportunity to acquire.
Few would contest that during this pivotal era in our history lawyers
have flouted both their opportunities and their obligations.. The blind
have been leading the blind. It is self-congratulatory falsehood to say that
recent catastrophes have come upon us like bolts from the blue, unfore-
seen by the eye of mortal man; unheeded prophets have foretold for years
what was coming unless appropriate moves were made in time."0
The war period is a propitious moment to retool our system of legal
education. America's huge plants for the fabrication of lawyers are prac-
tically closed for the duration; yet if the end of the present war in any
way resembles the termination of World War I, their doors will swing
wide to admit a dammed-up stream of returning soldiers who want legal
training. In the rush of conversion from war to peace the archaic conven-
tions and confusions of the past may win out over the vital needs of our
civilization and the doors may open to admit the unwary members of an
entire generation into a reguilded vacuum. War is the time to retool our
educational processes in the hope of making them fit instruments for their
future job.
15. Compare Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar (1934) 48 HAnv. L. RM. 1;
Douglas, The Lawyer and the Public Service (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 633; Jackson, The
Prodict of the Present Day Law School (1939) 27 Cu~r. L Rrv. 635; Clark, Legal
Education in Modern Society (1935) 10 TuuAm L. Rzm% 1; Berle, Moden; Legal Pro-
fession (1933) 9 ENcvc. Soc. ScIrEcES 340; Shea, Otrerowded?-The Price of Certain
Ree;wdies (1939) 39 Co.. L. REv. 191.
16. Cyclical conceptions of history with many pessimistic applications to the present
are summarized in 4 SoRoKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL Dv':zAmncs (1941). For a century
Marxists have predicted the coming crises of capitalism. Influential modern works are:
LmNIN, IMPEPIAUsM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPT.USIXS (1933); Gnoss~mu;, DAs
Axum.ULATIONS uix) Z!SA. .MEBRUCHSGESETZ DES KAPITALISTISCHE"N SYSrTZ IS (1929) ;
LuxEMBuRG, DE ArxuIThiATioN DEs VIAxTALs (1913); HiLu.rmi:, DAs FL:'A:lz-
xAPITAL (1910). Non-Marxist pessimism is found in SPFNGLr, DEu:is or r- VEST
(1926-28).
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What, then, are the essentials of adequate training for policy? Effective
policy-making (planning and implementation) depends on clear conception
of goal, accurate calculation of probabilities, and adept application of
knowledge of ways and means. We submit that adequate training must
therefore include experiences that aid the developing lawyer to acquire
certain skills of thought: goal-thinking, trend-thinking, and scientific-
thinking. The student needs to clarify his moral values (preferred events,
social goals) ; he needs to orient himself in past trends and future proba-
bilities; finally, he needs to acquire the scientific knowledge and skills
necessary to implement objectives within the context of contemporary
trends.
Goal-thinking requires the clarification of values. In a democratic
society it should not, of course, be an aim of legal education to impose
a single standard of morals upon every student. But a legitimate aim of
education is to seek to promote the major values of a democratic society
and to reduce the number of moral mavericks who do not share demo-
cratic preferences. The student may be allowed to reject the morals
of democracy and embrace those of despotism; but his education should
be such that, if he does so, he does it by deliberate choice, with awareness
of the consequences for himself and others, and not by sluggish self-
deception.
How can incipient lawyers be trained in the clarification of values?
Whatever the difficulties of communication, any statement of values must
begin with words of high level abstraction, of ambiguous reference. No
brief definition can convey to anyone else much of what the definer means.
Too many persons jump to conclusions about the meaning of terms, re-
gardless of the rules of interpretation intended by the speaker. At the
risk of misconstruction, we offer our brief statement of democratic morals.
The supreme value of democracy is the dignity and worth of the indi-
vidual; hence a democratic society is a commonwealth of mutual defer-
ence-a commonwealth where there is full opportunity to mature talent
into socially creative skill, free from discrimination on grounds of religion,
culture, or class. It is a society in which such specific values as power,
respect, and knowledge are widely shared and are not concentrated in
the hands of a single group, class, or institution-the state-among the
many institutions of society. This formula is not new. On the contrary,
it states the implicit or explicit assumptions of most of the traditional mor-
alists of democracy. But such a statement of democratic values-and this
is the point of our present emphasis-cannot be understood, or imple-
mented, unless it is amplified by rules of interpretation, of varying degrees
of generality, that show how observers of specific situations can validly
use the terms in describing concrete reality and promoting the occurrence
of relatively specific events in harmony with the definition. This task of
spelling out values in terms of consistent propositions of varying degrees
[Vol. 52: 203212
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of generality or of relating general propositions to operational princi-
ples, is a long and arduous process. But it is indispensable to clarity and,
hence, to the education of policy-makers.
Clarification of values, by relating general propositions to operational
principles in representative and specific contexts, must for effective train-
ing be distinguished from the traditional, logical, derivation of values by
philosophers. Such derivation-that is, exercises by which specialists on
etfhical philosophy and metaphysics take sentences that define moral stan-
dards and deduce them from more inclusive propositions or vice versa-
is a notorious blind alley. Divorced from operational rules, it quickly
becomes a futile quest for a meaningless why, perpetually culminating in
"some inevitably circular and infinitely regressive logical justification" for
ambiguous preferences." From any relatively specific statements of social
goal (necessarily described in a statement of low-level abstraction) can be
elaborated an infinite series of normative propositions of ever increasing
generality; conversely, normative statements of high-level abstraction can
be manipulated to support any specific social goal. Prospective lawyers
should be e-xposed, by way of warning and sophistication, to the work of
representative specialists in derivation; relatively little time should be
required, however, to teach them how to handle, and how to achieve emo-
tional freedom from, the ancient exercises.
Implementation of values requires, first, trend-thinking. This consid-
ers the shape of things to come regardless of preference.", His goals
clarified, a policy-maker must orient himself correctly in contemporary
trends and future probabilities. Concerned with specific features of the
future that are ever emerging from the past, he needs to be especially
sensitive to time, and to forecast with reasonable accuracy passage from
one configuration of events to the next. For this purpose he must have
at his disposal a vast array of facts properly organized and instantly
accessible. No one, much less a policy-maker, can do without expectations
about the future--expectations about the probability of a short or a long-
drawn-out war, of mounting or diminishing taxes, of rising or falling
standards of living. To think developmentally is to be explicit about these
anticipations of the shape of things to come. Every policy proposal and
decision, including our recommendations about legal training, turns in
part upon a picture of significant changes in the recent past, and expecta-
tions about significant changes in the emerging future. The nature of our
picture of recent trends, together with our interpretation of the principal
cross-currents of the near future, have been briefly indicated in our de-
17. See McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists (1941) 50 YAI L. J.
827, 835.
18. Thus one of the writers has tried to suggest the kinds of trends which "property"
lawyers should study. See McDougal in HANDEOOK, Associ~,, oF A=i-itnc n LAw
SCHOOLS (1941) 268, 273.
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scription of the wane of democratic values and of the unrealistic orienta-
tion of contemporary policy-makers. The results of trend-thinking must
continually be evaluated by the policy-maker in the light of his goals; the
task is to think creatively about how to alter, deter, or accelerate probable
trends in order to shape the future closer to his desire.
Implementation of values requires, next, scientific-thinking. While
trend information is indispensable, it is not sufficient to enable us to mould
the future. Trends have a way of changing direction; and often we can
contribute to these changes by the skillful management of factors that
condition them. A trend is not a cause of social change; it is a register
of the relative strength of the variables that produce it. We do not learn
about causal factors by passively observing trend; we must compare many
examples of trend before we can build up a body of scientific knowledge.
The laws and propositions of science state invariant interrelations. We
do not have scientific knowledge when we know, for example, that there
was a trend toward world war in 1939; it is only when we can, by com-
paring war periods, relate war to conditioning factors that we have science.
When we look toward the future our aim is not to draw a fatalistic series
of trend curves in the direction they have been moving in the past. To
extrapolate in this way is necessary, but it is a prelude to the use of cre-
ative imagination and of available scientific knowledge in deciding how
to influence the future. The very act of taking thought and of acting on
the basis of thought are among the factors that determine the future trend
of events. In a democratic society a policy-maker must determine which
adjustments of human relationships are in fact compatible with the reali-
zation of democratic ideals. Which procedures actually aid or hamper the
realization of human dignity? How can the institutions of legislation,
adjudication, administration, production, and distribution be adjusted to
democratic survival? What are the slogans and doctrines-in which con-
texts of experience-that create acceptance of democratic ideals and
inspire effort to put them into practice? In short, the policy-maker needs
to guide his judgment by what is scientifically known and knowable about
the causal variables that condition the democratic variables.
Effective training in scientific thinking requires that students become
familiar with the procedures by which facts are established by planned
observation. Most of our sources of information about human experience
are not deliberately created records. For the most part we must rely upon
whatever inferences can be drawn from "accidental" residues of the past.
In recent decades, and especially with the rapid expansion of the social
and psychological sciences, the observing of human conduct has become
progressively more technical and exhaustive. It is not too much to say
that the great contribution of modern specialists on the human sciences
is less in the realm of general theory than in the perfecting of method by
which ancient speculations can be confirmed, modified or rejected. From
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the laboratory of the psychologist, the field expedition of the ethnologist
and the clinic of the physician have come illuminating bodies of data; and
the procedures of observation invented in these special situations have
stimulated the development of ways of studying men and women under
normal circumstances in our own civilization. The effect of many kinds uf
human enviroment-in family, factory, school, army, prison, market-
have been subjected to careful scrutiny. The results are continually applied
and retested in the selecting of personnel in business, government, army
and other social structures. Systems of incentive (the granting of indul-
gence or the inflicting of deprivation) are explored for their efficacy in
raising production and reducing disciplinary problems. Modes of phras-
ing are pretested to evaluate their effectiveness as modifiers of buying, giv-
ing, voting. Throughout the length and breadth of modem society deci-
sions are modified on the basis of what is revealed by means of intensive
or extensive observation of human life, the procedures varying all the way
from the prolonged interviews of a psychoanalytic psychiatrist to the brief
questions of the maker of an opinion poll."
Acquaintance with various methods of observation not only furnishes
a sound basis for policy planning; it contributes directly to skill in the
practical management of human affairs. Another glance at the job analy-
sis of the modem lawyer set forth above indicates something of the range
of management problems with which he must grapple. Success calls for
skill in direct personal contact with client, partner, clerk, opposing coun-
sel, investigator, witness, jurymen, judge (to name sonic conspicuous
examples); likewise, there is need of skill in public relations (in the
handling of grand jury investigations, conducting trials, conducting legis-
lative hearings).
From all the emphasis which we have placed upon certain ways of
thinking, observing and managing, it should not be inferred that we pro-
pose to discard or neglect the traditional skills and knowledge of the law-
yer. It is the lawyer's mastery over constitutions, statutes, appellate
opinions and textbooks of peculiar idiom, and his skill in operating the
mechanics (procedure) of both governmental institutions (courts, legis-
latures, administrative boards, executive offices) and private associations
(corporations, partnerships, trade associations, labor unions, consumers'
cooperatives), that set him apart from, and give him a certain advantage
over, such other skill groups in our society as diplomats, economists, social
psychologists, social historians and biologists. But much of what cur-
rently passes for instruction in law schools is a waste of time because it
consists of the reiteration of a limited list of ambiguous terms cut asunder
from any institutional context that would set a limit to their ambiguities.
Thus, a student may learn that if discussion begins with "contract," it
19. Further details are given later in this article.
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must then proceed by rearrangement of certain meanings to be assigned
to a small list of well-known words, such as "offer and acceptance," "con-
sideration," "mistake," "performance," "condition," and so on; but he
knows very little unless he has also learned to complete the meaning of
these terms by reference to representative institutional contexts and im-
portant social values. What we propose is that training in the distinctive
core of the lawyer's repertory of skills and information be given a new
sense of purpose and new criteria of relevance. It is a fundamental truth
of practical and scientific psychology that purpose increases ease of learn-
ing; students can be expected to acquire more rather than less mastery of
legal technicality when the comparatively small repertory of key legal
terms is considered in relation to the goals and the vital problems and
processes of democracy, rather than in a formalistic framework, un-
oriented toward policy. The lawyer's traditional storehouse of learning
is already too tightly stuffed with legacies from the past to be thoroughly
mastered by anyone in a lifetime of devoted scholarship; a student must,
if he is not to choke on triviality, have extrinsic criteria of relevance.
There comes a time, as Mr. Justice -lolmes long ago remarked, when
energy can be more profitably spent than in the reading of cases. Given
a new sense of purpose and trained in the skills and information which
should be common to all policy-makers, the lawyer cannot escape becom-
ing a better lawyer. Schools which prepare themselves to emphasize such
purposes and to offer such training may succeed in becoming more truly
vocational even as they grow more genuinely professional.
For a quick review of the skills appropriate to lawyers who participate
in policy, the following brief table is appended. Later in the article it will
be explained in some detail.
SKILL TABLE
1. Skills of thought.
a. Goal-thinking.
The basic values of democracy: how derived, how related
operationally to concrete events.
b. Trend-thinking.
Past trends and future probabilities appraised according
to the degree of the realization and the distribution of the
basic values.
c. Scientific-thinking.
The variables that condition the democratic value-varia-
bles.
d. Legal technicality (the distinctive skill of the lawyer).
The command of the vocabulary, citations and procedures
that courts and other authoritative agencies expect from
counsel.
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2. Skills of observation.
a. Intensive procedures.
Observer devotes himself for a long time to a particular
person or situation and uses complex methods (detailed
personality studies; detailed studies of historical or cur-
rent situations).
b. Extensive procedures.
Observer devotes himself briefly to a particular person or
situation and uses a simple method (brief opinion poll in-
terview; cursory report on a situation).
3. Skills of management.
a. Primary relations.
Persons with whom one deals individually.
b. Public relations.
Persons with whom one deals as members of a large group.
So much by way of broad outline. It is now incumbent upon us to
spell out in more detail what we understand to be the values of a free
society, the variables that condition their appearance, and the ways in
which lawyers can be trained in the skills necessary to manage them with a
reasonable probability of success.
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND CONDITIONING VT ARIABLES
The cardinal value of democracy we have already specified as the reali-
zation of human dignity in a commonwealth of mutual deference. Let
us now specify in more detail what we mean by a society where the dig-
nity of man is proclaimed and practiced. What pattern of value distribu-
tion is characteristic of a free society? By a value we mean an object of
human desire. In our civilization, at least, representative values are power,
respect, knowledge, income, and safety (including health).
Three values may be named whose proper relationship determines wheth-
er we are justified in calling any group democratic. These values are
power, respect, and knowledge. Where the dignity of man is fully taken
into account, power is shared, respect is shared, knowledge is shared. A
society in which such values are widely shared is a free society. A free
society is by no means restricted to these values; it must, however, make
certain that other goal values are not incompatible with them. Within
the framework of shared power, respect and knowledge, many other
values may be sought, such as a high material standard of living.
Ve know that the degree of attainment of each cardinal value reacts
favorably upon the others. Wherever power is shared it is easier to main-
tain a sharing of respect and knowledge. Where respect is shared it is
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easier to share power and knowledge. Where knowledge is shared the
sharing of power and respect is simpler. In the same way that they inter-
act with one another, these democratic variables are conditioned by other
social factors. One of these variables is balance, in the sense of a balanced
distribution of income. One of the earliest discoveries of civilized man
was the necessity of avoiding extremes of riches and poverty if human
dignity is to be realized and maintained through the years in the life of
any community. Still another conditioning variable is regularity in the
tempo of social development. When the tempo of social change is erratic,
human beings have great difficulty in adjusting smoothly to their environ-
ment; they store up resentments that may discharge destructively against
themselves and one another. A third variable is realism, by which is
meant access to a stream of fact and comment that provides one with
needed clues to sound policy. No matter how well-intentioned the indi-
vidual may be or how thoroughly equipped with intellectual skill and
information, he is dependent upon the reports that reach him through
private and public channels of communication in making up his mind on
policy questions. A fourth important and very pervasive variable is char-
acter. A democratic society is most possible where democratic character
prevails; that is to say, where personalities develop with a minimum of
distortion. From our studies of personality development we know that
great reservoirs of inhibited rage distort human beings and diminish tl~e
probability of congenial and productive interpersonal relationships.
The foregoing list of conditioning variables does not exhaust the fac-
tors that may aid or retard the attainment of shared power, respect and
knowledge, but the list does deal with a cluster of the most important. If
we conceive of interpersonal relations as a continuing stream of events
through days, weeks, years and generations, we can think of our policy
problem as that of maintaining a proper equilibrium among component
parts of this perpetual flow. Such a value as power is shared in govern-
ment, business, church, in varying degree, fluctuating with the passage
of time. The magnitude of this variable, indexed by whatever criteria
are taken to be most appr9priate, increases or diminishes in relation to
the other variables we have specified.
The policy task of a free society is to put its own distinctive value-varia-
bles into practice and to control the factors that condition their attainment,
In addition, other value-variables can be selected to enrich the life of the
community." In choosing the following goals of democratic policy we
have been influenced by all of these considerations, combining the dis-
tinctive values of a free society with conditioning factors and with values
that may be sought regardless of the form of society.
20. Compare the comprehensive statement made in NAT. REsouRCFS PLANNING BOARD
REPORT, NATIONAL REsOURcEs DEVELOPMENT (1942).
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Distinctive Goal Vrariablcs
Shared Power. By "power" we mean participation in or the ability
to participate in the making of important decisions. When such participa-
tion or ability is general, there is democracy, in so far as the power varia-
ble is concerned. The term "power," as we use it, is equivalent to "the
function of government," which is not to be confused with the "institu-
tions called government." The power function-the function of govern-
ment-may be exercised not only by agencies called "government" by the
local population, but by private pressure organizations, business enter-
prises, churches and others. Moreover, we must be on guard against
accepting all simple choices as true decisions. It is convenient to reserve
the word "decision" for choices potentially or actually sanctioned by coer-
cion. When statutes lapse into desuetude, they have ceased to be decisions
in our sense of the word. Coercive sanctions are the "proper sphere" of
the state, traditionally conceived as an independent community organized
for making and enforcing policy.2  We do not reject this definition,
though we warn against confusing the institutions named government with
the agencies that perform the power function; the identity of the institu-
tions that exert power can only be determined by proper investigation,
and must not be taken for granted through verbal coincidence.
2
In reviewing the indexes that may be selected to determine the distri-
bution of power in a given community, we may proceed from the institu-
tions locally named "the government" to whatever private pressure asso-
ciations are in existence. In the United States, we begin with federal, state
and local government, and pass on to private pressure organizations that
are recruited from, or speak in the name of, the principal groups into
which the population is divided. From pressure organizations we pass
to businesses, distinguished according to degree of market control (mo-
nopoly, competition) and economic function (mining, agriculture, etc.).
Private associations may carry on economic functions though not organ-
ized as government or business; an example is the consumers' cooperative.
From the economic functions in private hands, we go on to consider all
the widely ramifying forms of cultural activity-religious, fraternal,
scientific, educational.
21. The traditional distinctions are in BURGESS, PoLrIcA ScIENcE ATD CO:.SrMu-
TIONAL LAW (1891); WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS Or P, Usc LAw
(1924).
22. Still another distinction may be made in passing: when we refer to "authority"
we mean forms; by "control" we mean facts. The authoritative rules of the code hrc!:s
may be belied by the facts of life. MfoRGANTHAU, LA an,.rirL i.s xOm.Ts (1934) distin-
guishes the "validity" of a rule from its "efficacy." Some serviceable categories of "pgv'er
are in TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY Or LAw (1939), especially c. 11.
See CATLIN, THE SCIENCE AND' METHOD OF POLITICS (1927) ; MmmIm, POLITICAL Pow.-E
(1934); RUssELL, Powva (1939).
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When organizations are scrutinized it is first necessary to examine their
formal set-up. Beginning with the state, we may declare it to be demo-
cratically organized if authority to change the constitution is vested in
the people, who may be authorized to act directly by referendum or indi-
rectly through delegates and representatives.2 ' The same standard is ap-
plicable to government, that is the institutions locally called government,
through which the state finds expression; government is democratic when
the majority can change officials or act directly on legislation. We are not
satisfied to take the formal rules laid down in constitutions and statutes
at their face value; we need to assemble indexes of the degree of popular
control in fact as well as in name. Election statistics provide pertinent
information. 4 The prevalence of what are called "elections" in despot-
isms reminds us that high percentages of electoral participation do not
necessarily signify majority rule; we must look beyond the figures to as-
certain the degree of coercion, and this calls for properly trained observers.
Election returns may reveal a very high degree of non-voting, and while
this may signify indifference or hopelessness about influencing important
decisions, it may be attributable to other causes. The vital point is to
discover whether voters (or non-voters) possess a genuine sense of par-
ticipation, whether they take it for granted that whenever they feel like
it they can make a difference in the decision-making process by utilizing
procedures legally available to them.2"
Another body of participation indexes describes the affiliation of gov-
ernment agencies with the constituent groups of society.20 To what extent
are high, middle and low income groups found in the agencies of gov-
ernment? 2 What is the relation of officeholders to the distribution of
population by sex, age, race, religion, nationality of origin, or occupational
skill? 28 Does the agency receive financial or other aid from special groups,
23. For the constitutional structure of the world on the eve of world depression and
world war, see DELPECH AND LAFERRnkRE, LES CONSTITUTIONS MODERNES (1928-34).
24. Data and analyses are in GosNEL., WHY EUROPE VOTES (1930) and TINOSTEN,
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1937).
25. For attitudes associated with non-participation in elections, the material found in
a pioneer study of the subject is still unexcelled: MERRIAM AND GOSNELL, NoN-VoTiNo,
CAUSES AND METHODS OF CONTROL (1924).
26. A classic of this type is, of course, BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRErATION OF THE
CoNsTuTuION (1913; with a new introduction, 1939).
27. See HOLCOMBE, THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF TODAY (1925), THE NEW PARTY
POLITICS (1933), and THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1940).
28. Specimen inquiries: EWING, THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1937
(1938); HERRING, FEDERAL COMMISSIONERS (1936); LASKI, STUDIES IN LAW AND Po0-
Tics (1932) ; UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES (1938) ; Cole, Italy's Fascist Bu-
reaucracy (1938) 32 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1143; Gerth, The Nazi Party: Its Leadership
and Composition (1940) 45 Am. J. Soc. 517; Heinberg, The Personnel of French Cabinets
1871-1930 (1931) 25 Am. Poi.. Sci. RE,. 389; Hyneman, Who Makes Our Laws? (1940)
55 PoL. Sci. Q. 556; Lasswell and Sereno, Governmental and Party Leaders in Fascist
Italy (1937) 31 Am. POL. Sci. RE,. 914.
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such as foreign governments or business groups? " If there is little par-
ticipation in office-holding by any specific group, do we find that mobility
is fairly high, in the sense that persons who start life in the low income
group, for example, often climb to the office-holding level? "
In considering private pressure organizations 3' we must raise the same
questions that we have posed for government, since we are interested in
both the forms of authority and the facts of control. Pressure organiza-
tions are private associations, such as parties, trade associations, and trade
unions, whose primary object is to influence community decisions. These
organizations may be distinguished from one another according to the
groups in whose name they speak, from whose ranks they recruit, or from
whom they draw financial support. We need to determine which organi-
zation is connected with the chief economic divisions of society. As said
above, economic divisions can be described according to economic func-
tion performed and according to the degree of market control. Another
closely related classification separates the skill groups.' Chemists and
engineers are among the professional groups whose skill consists in the
manipulation of symbols of things, and of procedures in dealing with
things. Lawyers and social scientists are also professional skill groups;
but their skill is the manipulation of symbols of interpersonal relations,
and of procedures for dealing with people. In our inventory of private
pressure organizations, we do not stop with economic and skill divisions;
each organization radiates into all the sex, age, race and other identities
recognized in society. As with government, we want the facts about in-
ternal forms of authority; and we want to investigate the intensity of
participation in control processes on the part of affiliated elements to dis-
cover the extent to which the organization puts democracy into practice.?
The foregoing questions apply to organizations in all the remaining fields
of private life, when we pass from pressure organizations to private eco-
nomic organizations, and from them to all remaining cultural organiza-
tions.3 4
In our discussion so far we have referred to the task of assessing the
degree of democracy in the internal affairs of any significant guvernmen-
29. A succinct introduction is Senturia and Odegard, Corrumtion, Political in 4
ExcYc. Soc. SciENcES (1931) 448.
30. See SoRoKIN, SOCIAL. MOBILITY (1927).
31. For recent information see BLAISDELL, TNEC REP., EoNo uc Powa A..D
POLITICAL Pnssm Fs, Monograph 26 (1941) ; PEARCE, TNEC REP., TRADE AssocIAroiM
SuRvEY, Monograph 18 (1941).
32. Consult LAssvELL, POLITICS; Wno GErs WHAT, Wr xv, How (1936) c. 6;
CARR-SAUNDERS AND WILSON, TH PRorrssiois (1933). See TAussG Ai.D JOsLvm,
At.mEIcAw BusiNEss LEADRs (1932); Schwvarz, Heads of Russian Factorics-A Socio-
logical Study (1942) 9 SOCIAL RESEARcH 315.
33. A recent study, representative of the best, is GAoCEau, THE POLITICAL LIFE O
rE ANPmc.&x MEDICAL AssocATioN (1941).
34. An enterprising attempt to appraise the state of democracy in an entire commu-
1943l
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tal or non-governmental organization. But that does not exhaust the prob-
lem. We must take external relations into account. With respect to any
one area of activity, every degree of organizational control may be found,
extending from exclusive control by a single organization to rivalry among
many. In world politics the relations among states are deeply conditioned
by the expectation of violence, the expectation that whether we like it
or not, adjustments will probably be made by acts of coercion ranging all
the way from light pressure to all-out war. There is no organized world
state; and the typical pattern of world politics has been incessant rivalry
among all powers, but particularly among a small number of great pow-
ers." Freedom is found when there is one world state which is demo-
cratically organized, or when every existing state is democratically or-
ganized, or to the degree that democratic states are able to prevent inter-
ference by despotic powers.
The pattern of great power politics applies to many areas of economic
activity. It is obvious that single economic organizations do not typically
dominate one particular product or service throughout the world, although
this state of affairs is closely approximated in peace times in nickel and
certain other commodities. The market for grain is structured interna-
tionally on a different pattern from the market for oil; and inside each
region, country and locality an enormous variety of set-ups prevails. Many
commodities are dominated by a small number of economic great powers,
whose rivalries may vary all the way from total conflict to total sham. 0
In determining the degree of democracy, indexes of the following kinds
are in point: degree of monopoly control; degree of internal democracy.
To the extent to which any participant-in a market can impose scarcity,
he is a monopolist who has broken down a genuinely competitive market
structure. He has politicized the market; scarcity power is among the
sovereign powers.
Viewing the world as a whole, it is evident that among the world's most
powerful organizations are cartels and trusts that strive for world control
of various markets Some private trusts and cartels add to the manipu-
lation of scarcity by peaceful means the imposition of scarcity by vio-
lence, sometimes privately through their police, sometimes indircetly
through the armed forces of the governments which they domin-
nity (Akron, Ohio) is JONES, LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY (1941).
35. A standard text outlining categories for the study of world politics is SCHUMAN,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1933). A remarkable attempt to formulate interstate relations
on a scientific basis is Richardson, Generalized Foreign Politics, BRIT. J. OF PsYCu.,
Monograph Supplement 23 (1939).
36. Consult LAWLEY, THE GROWTH OF COLLFCTIVE ECONOmy (1938) ; PLUMMER, IN-
TERNATIONAL COMBINES IN MODERN INDUSTRY (1938).
37. See the vigorous articles by Brady, Policies of National Manufacturing Spitzen-
verbinde (1941) 56 PoL. Sc. Q. 199, 379, 515; also BoRKIN AND WELSm, GERIMANY'S
MASTER PLAN (1943).
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ate, or which dominate then as instruments of total state policy.
In periods of total war, the network of interests that cuts across
boundary lines exhibits a comparatively simple pattern; two groups of
powers, each seeking to encircle the other, strive to establish totally inde-
pendent zones of authority and control. So far as shared power is con-
cerned, the general principle is to preserve competition or democratize
dominance. In practice difficulties arise from the reluctance of policy-
makers to clarify and enforce rules of market control in the areas under
their jurisdiction. With respect to markets, notably internal markets, it
may be possible to settle on workable rules of balance, to win support for
the slogans that incorporate these rules, and to organize the vested and
sentimental interests necessary to put them into operation. 5
Shared Respect. Beyond the voting and arguing relations involved
in the making of policy lie many other zones of human contact in which
the dignity of the individual is involved. Human beings are respected,
in our present sense of the word, when they are taken into consideration
by all with whom they come in contact in spheres of life beyond the mak-
ing of collective decisions.
Respect is shown in ways that may be called negative and positive. The
negative side is absence of interference with individual choice, the pre-
servation of large zones of self-determination for the private person. On
the positive side respect means equality of access to opportunity for ma-
turing latent capacity into socially valued expression.
We know that communities that share power do not always respect the
individual in the sense of reserving for him large areas in which he can
go his own way free from compulsion and prohibition. It is notorious
that small, tightly-organized and tradition-bound neighborhoods may
hedge the zone of individual expression within narrow limits. This is true
of some of the "peasant democracies" and of certain primitive societies
that have been reported by ethnologists." The history of sumptuary leg-
islation shows that democracies may even excel despotisms in the austerity
of the regime they prescribe for their citizens."  Our own principle is
that the presumption is against any proposal to pour the individual into a
38. On rules of balance see LAsswE, De.IucmAcy TimoUGH PUIuc OPNxoN
(1941) c. 10.
39. Perhaps a word of caution should be given against putting too much credence in
the picture of the savage caked with custom who was so movingly described in the earlier
ethnological reports. As our investigators have become more familiar with primitive cul-
ture they have been less impressed by its uniformities and more struck by personal mani-
festations. Contrast the point of view of W. G. Sumner and associates in Tin Sczr-;cc
op Sociy (1927) with that of Edward Sapir's students in LAiouA C, CULTUX A'
PRsoNALY (Spier, Hallowell, and Newman ed. 1941). None the less, the degree of in-
dividualization appears to be lower than in uur own highly variegated civilization.
40. For guidance to the history, see the articles on Blue Laws, Prohibition, Stntp-
tuary Legislation in ENCy. SoC. ScIEZcES.
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mould; the justification must be immediate and overwhelming necessity of
the community or clear evidence that men are affected destructively by
the prevailing degree of self-direction.
In describing the degree of respect, in the negative sense, that prevails
in a given community, certain indexes are pertinent, notably all that has
to do with prohibitions, restrictions and compulsions upon the way the
individual spends his time. The most extreme degree of disrespect for
autonomy is prescribing every move that is permissible by the hour, day
and week. In emergency situations, we must acquiesce in such stringent
rationing of human resources. But in less critical periods, the zone of
personal responsibility can be enormously extended without inflicting
damage on others.
Provision for equal opportunity often involves positive measures by the
community as a whole. This is notably true with regard to those persons
who suffer a temporary or permanent handicap and who cannot realize
their full potentialities unless special measures are taken in their behalf.
Special exemptions or facilities can be made available to the immature; to
the crippled, injured, and ill; to the unemployed and the recipients of low
incomes; to those who have received unfortunate early training.4' Equal-
ity of sacrifice is not equality of burden; the same burden weighs far more
heavily on the weak than on the strong. We must make at least a partial
application of the maxim, "from each according to his capacity, and to
each according to his need."
As indexes of mutual respect we must examine the extent to which
groups participate equally in contact with one another in the non-power
spheres of human relations. Scientific field workers know how to make
exhaustive inventories of the state of mutual respect among persons
divided according to age, sex, race, religion, skill, income, nationality of
origin, length of residence (and similar characteristics). Rates of inter-
marriage, access to economic activity, areas of residence, the giving and
receiving of social invitations, membership in clubs and cliques, the use
of courtesy forms (as in salutation) -these are among the facts of human
life open to systematic investigation.4" Besides the degree of equal par-
ticipation at any given cross-section, it is pertinent to know the facts about
41. For guidance to the history see the articles on Allowances, Charity, Child, De-
pendency, Disaster Relief, Family, Humanitarianism, Institutions, Public, Labor Legisla-
lion and Law, Maternity Welfare, Old Age, Pensions, Poor Laws, Public Welfare, Re-
habilitation, Social Work in ENcyc. Soc. SciENcEs.
42. For an exhaustive report on the division of a community into "classes" (respect
groups, in our terminology) see the six-volume Yankee City Series in course of publi-
cation by the Yale University Press, summarizing the work of W. Lloyd Warner and
associates. Also: DAvIs, GARDNER AND GARDNER, DEEP SOUTH (1941); DAVIS AND
DOLLARD, CHILDREN OF BONDAGE (1940); DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SoUTHMrN
TowN (1937); POWDERMAKER, ArTER FREEDOM (1939).
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social mobility. To what ex-tent are those who begin life in a low respect
position able to rise to more respected positions?
Shared Kizowledge. One of the basic manifestations of deference
to human beings is to give full weight to the fact that they have minds.
People need to be equipped with the knowledge of how democratic doc-
trines can be justified. They can not be expected to remain loyal to demo-
cratic ideals through all the disappointments and disillusioniments of life
without a deep and enduring factual knowledge of the potentialitie, of
human beings for congenial and productive interpersonal relations. As
a means of maintaining a clear and realistic appraisal of- human nature,
there must be deeply based recognition of the factors governing the for-
mation of human character. No democracy is even approximately genuine
until men realize that men can be free; and that the laborious work of
modem science has provided a non-sentimental foundation for the intui-
tive confidence with which the poets and prophets of human brotherhood
have regarded mankind. Buttressing the aspirations of these sensitive
spirits stands the modem arsenal of facts about the benevolent potentiali-
ties of human nature, and a secure knowledge of methods by which dis-
torted personality growth can be prevented or cured. Through the fur-
ther application of methods that have already achieved partial success,
we can provide instruments capable of putting into practice admonitions
of the moralists and visions of the dreamers. Without this knowledge,
the intuitions of genius are helpless; armed with this knowledge, includ-
ing knowledge of the means of further knowledge, moral intention be-
comes steadily more capable of fulfilling itself in reality. There is no
rational room for pessimism about the possibility of putting morals into
practice on the basis of what we know, and know we can know, about the
development of human personality.43 Any form of crippling predestina-
rianism, based on myths about "heredity," whether of an individual or a
race, can be brushed aside."
If democratic forms of power are to be full-blooded with reality, the
overwhelming mass of mankind must be provided with enough intellectual
skill to make a proper evaluation of policy goals and alternatives. These
skills include observation and analysis; and analysis implies intellectual
tools for the understanding of human relationships. Our basic knowledge
must be ever-expanding; this makes necessary an organization of scien-
tific work capable of providing more of what we need to know about
the factors that mould man and society. At present only crude indexes
are available to show the state of knowledge of our people. To some
43. In particular see FRomma, EscAPE homX Fnmmomi (1941) and Sullivan, Concep-
tions of Modern Psychiatry (1940) 3 PSYCHiATRY: J. OF Bio. AND PATH. OP It.nFpnu-
SONAL RELATIOxS 1.
44. See BENEDIcT, RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS (1940) for an authoritative sum-
mary of the difference between the science of "race" and the ideology of "racism:'
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extent we can rely on figures of literacy and of years in school; " more
subtle items are not yet described in convenient terms.
The Instrumental or Conditioning Variables
From the goal variables of shared power, shared respect, shared knowl-
edge we now pass to other factors that determine the degree to which
deference can be realized. Social processes are explicable as interacting
variables; social life is an ever-moving equilibrium. This applies to the
interrelationships of the key variables. They are all in a relationship of
ends and means to each other. Distribution of respect affects the distribu-
tion of power and knowledge; in turn the distribution of knowledge affects
the distribution of respect and power. More than that, we take it for
granted that these key variables are affected by the magnitudes of certain
other variables. In such a potential list we propose to select a few. They
are chosen because they are believed to be particularly important for the
development of policies capable of achieving and maintaining that inter-
relationship among the key variables that we call democratic. Among
the conditioning variables we have chosen the following: balance; regu-
larity; realism; character.
Balance. When we speak of balance we refer to the distribution of in-
come in any given community. By income we mean both monetary and
real-the flow of money and claims of all kinds, and of food, housing,
medical care, clothing, recreation, and so on. The distribution is relatively
balanced when there is a comparatively small number of rich and poor.
From the earliest days of systematic political speculation the importance of
balanced income for democracy has been explicitly recognized.4 Through-
out the history of Greek and Roman political thought there were con-
tinual reiterations of the danger to democracy of an unbalanced distribu-
tion of property.47 The classics of American political thought take second
place to no literature in the amount of emphasis placed upon this theme."0
Few political thinkers have been more acutely aware of the intimate de-
pendence of government and economics than the men whose active hands
shaped our basic institutions.
Despite the recognition given to the principle of balanced income, there
has been an extraordinary failure on the part of policy-makers and their
advisers to translate the principle of balance into operating rules applicable
45. See 1 PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, SOCIAL TRENDS
(1933) c. 7 and Judd, Education (1942) 47 Am. J. Soc. 876.
46. Even before Plato, Euripides stated the point with great clarity in 1 THE Sul,-
PLIANTS (Way's trans.) 238.
47. This recurring theme in political thought can be conveniently followed in Sabine's
compact and discriminating A HISTORY OF POLITICAL Tnoav (1937).
48. No. 10 of THE FEDERALIST is always in point. See Pargellis, The Tradition of
Liberty in England and America (1941) 65 ThE PA. MAG. 393.
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to given situations. In the United States, for example, there is practically
no literature that undertakes to stipulate the balances that are compatible
with or promote the expansion of production (and hence creation of new
income) and the preservation of democratic processes of government. But
it is a commonplace of politics that unless general ideas can be translated
into operating slogans and principles their effect on social life is greatly
weakened. There is little exaggeration in declaring that one of the most
flagrant instances of intellectual failure is the existing ambiguity with
which the problem is discussed.
It should be noted that discussions of balance often proceed in con-
trasting "mechanical uniformity" or "dead-level equality" with some other
pattern of income distribution. The idea seems to be that since formal
equality is ridiculous, there is nothing more to be said about alternative
patterns. We do not pretend to have formulated in our own minds a final
judgment about income distributions in the United States. especially since
existing reports evaluate income only in dollar terms that are by no means
the same as "real income." But certain suggestions with respect to ex-
tremes can be formulated. At one extreme there is the possibility of an
income maximum, or of rigorous removal by inheritance taxation of
power based on accidental family connection. At the other, there is the
urgent need of a minimum annual income for every family, to be main-
tained by special payments through the Government, if necessary. There
is also the possibility of free public education until early adulthood, with
payments being made to each student during these probationary years. 9
Regularity. By "regularity" is meant absence of erratic changes in
social development. Today men are only too aware of the enormous
crises of insecurity that have been accentuated by the failure of our pro-
cesses of production to expand at a fairly regular tempo. Instead, modem
states have undergone vast periods of prosperity, promptly followed by
devastating collapse." During the swings between prosperity and depres-
sion, states have sought to escape from internal difficulties by increasing
their impact upon the outside world. This clash of expanding and inter-
nally unstable states has bred crises of war and catastrophe, threatening
49. In arriving at proximate goals not too far removed from recent facts, it is neces-
sary to consider the data, relations and procedures set forth in such investigations by the
National Bureau of Economic Research as: BARiona, OUTm.X AND INCOME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1921-1938 (1942); KUZNETS, NATIONAL INcoxE AND ITS Coirasmoi., 1919-
1938 (1941). On the crucial significance of every form of balance for freed(,m, Fee MoscA,
THE RuLING CLkSS (Livingston ed. 1939).
50. On the facts about irregularity and the losses resulting from them, see Tuon
ANo MITcHELL, BusINss ANAIs (1926) and NATIONAL Rrsouncts Comm=irrn, TnE
SmRucrma OF THE AMERICAN EcONOmY (1939) Pt. 1. On the relation of acts called
"criminal" to economic fluctuations, see BoxGEa. CRIamNALITY Am Eco-oviuc Co:mi-
TIONS (1916). A particularly elaborate inquiry into crimes against property in Germany
is Schvarz, Krinnalitdt it. Konjunktur (1938) 3 IN-TmN. REv. or Soc. HisT. 335.
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the peaceful development and even the survival of forms of civilization
consonant with our ideals. 1 Human beings find it difficult to adjust
without destructiveness to such rapidly changing environments.
It must not be lost sight of that the internal structure of modern busi-
ness states has put a premium on policies that promote irregularity. The
economy of the United States, like that of Great Britain, has been an
export surplus economy. Such an economic order produces industrial
commodities in excess of the amount absorbed by the internal market.
The internal market is the area under direct political control, the home
market. The investors and merchants of relatively industrialized states
have continually extended the scope of their activities beyond the home
zone. These groups have, in recent times, curbed the admission of in-
dustrial imports in the home area while they continue to operate abroad
with surpluses obtained in the internal market.
The possibility of receiving capital returns and repayment from foreign
areas depends either upon the preservation of peace and the willingness
to receive imports or the winning of a war of conquest that brings the
capital equipment-such as mine machinery, public utilities and manufac-
turing plants- into an enlarged home zone. To the degree that home
peoples share in more values-more income, safety and deference-than
they would receive from alternative uses at home, they gain from foreign
investment. To the degree that such investment causes the home popu-
lation to lose income, compromise safety or endanger their power or
respect or other deference values, they suffer; the surpluses that they
send abroad are "gifts" and they may be said to operate a "gift econ-
omy." The fact of gift may be somewhat veiled by the terminology of
"investment;" there may.be comparatively little emphasis upon the fact
that full repayment is not received-it is neither expected nor indeed per-
mitted. 2 Steady inflation of the world price level, together with periodic
revaluation of monetary units, are among the factors that contribute to
transforming into gifts the exports that were once listed as foreign sales
accounts receivable, or as investments abroad. The consequences of this
outflow of industrial products are hardly as benign as the term "gift"
would imply. Zones of foreign trade and investment affect more than
the structure of world markets-they quietly alter the balance of power,
perpetually tilting the scale of fighting effectiveness on the side of Great
51. On state expansion and conflict see WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR (1942). For analy-
ses of fundamental economic sources of maladaptation, consult CLARK, Tin CONDITIONS
OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1940); MEADE, AN INTRODUCTION TO EcoNomic ANALYSIS AND
POLICY (1938); MOULTON, INCOME AND EcONO ic PROGRESS (1935); RoniwsON, ESSAYS
IN THE THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT (1937); WRIGIT, ECONOMIC ADAPTATION TO A CIIANG-
ING WORLD MARKET (1939).
52. Resistance to imports is revealed by protective tariffs and similar restrictive meas-
ures. Note especially the resistance of industrial states against receiving indemnities.
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Britain, or the United States, or Germany, or Russia, or Japan, or of
any combination of powers.
Within the structure of world business economies there are focal points
of intense pressure on behalf of ever more foreign trade and investment.
Banking houses gain underwriting profits from the flotation of foreign
loans and great manufacturing industries find it easier to expand the
market of established products than to diversify their offerings ol the
internal market. Whenever an economy passes into the hands of a mo-
nopolistic or militaristic ruling class that tries to keep the masses of the
population adjusted to a low standard of living as a means of reducing
labor costs of production, and of fostering the manufacture of military
and commercial export goods, the aggressive-expansionistic tenencies
of an economy are at a maximum. The outstanding recent examples, of
course, are Japan, Germany and Italy.
With one exception the industrialized or industrializing economies have
not solved the problem of operating a modern system of machine pro-
duction at a regular tempo. These problems have been postponed to an
unspecified future in which it was assumed that the world would be the
big market; and it was implied that some automatic and benevolent pro-
cess would introduce into the closed world market an internal balance
that had never been achieved or thought out for any "closed," "conti-
nental" or "empire" market. The only great state, with an independent
as distinct from an export surplus economy, is Russia; and it may be
some cause for foreboding that independence was achieved by means of
internal despotism (even though ideological aspirations remained human-
istic). Does this mean that one world market will evolve one world boss?
Or are there means of fusing the technical controls appropriate to an
independent economy with controls consistent with freedom? It is prob-
able that within any closed economy regular production can be attained
by proper monetary policy. So far, however, the focal points of initiative
in our business economies have not put the needed energy behind such
monetary measures.
Realism. By "realism" is meant access to a body of fact and com-
ment on the basis of which decisions can be made to implement effectively
democratic values. This is not only a matter of skill in thought and ob-
servation, for people of great intellectual competence are dependent upon
the information that actually comes to their notice when they are trying
to make up their minds on policy questions. One guarantee of realism is
the provision of proper balance between those who generally emphasize
one or another kind of alternative.3 What appears in the mass media.
53. Valuable for the analysis of public opinion remain ARoLD, THE Symros oF Gov-
ERNMENT (1935) ; DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS Pftonix.irs (197) ; Diccy, Lrerms o:
THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DaUBNG THE 19T Cm.-
T'Rv (1905) ; LiPPMAN, PUBLIC OPIxxO (1932) ; NNALL.As, HUmAn NATUrE I; POUTICS
(1909) and THE GREAT SoC=TY (1914).
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such as press, radio and film, must provide most of the facts and comments
in the light of which sound public judgments can be made. But the prob-
lem of realism goes far beyond the content of channels of mass communi-
cation. It includes the quality of material made available to decision-
makers at every level. Legislators, judges and juries, administrative corn-
missions, boards of directors, executive committees, must all make their
determinations on the basis of what comes to their notice.1
4
The fact that so many unrealistic decisions have been made in the past
suggests the importance of providing for a proper balance of fact and
interpretation in the future. There is no royal road to truth, but there is
reasonable probability of reaching truth when channels are open to
the free play of news and opinion, and not closed according to the special
prejudices of a few. The vitality of democratic processes, however, call-
not be assured by simple acquiescence in the idea that freedom to talk
will result in decisions consistent with the preservation of the democratic
system. We have seen too many republics make suicidal decisions to be-
lieve that passivity is enough. Obviously there was not enough affirnma-
tive effort in Weimar Germany to clarify the values and conditions ade-
quate to the perpetuation of the Republic. To the ideal of toleration there
must be joined energetic determination to find and disseminate truth over
falsehood, the better opinion over the worse opinion. Otherwise democ-
racy can perish by default.
It is technically possible to survey the media of communication to find
out whether those who have access to them obtained a balanced "diet" of
fact and opinion, or whether the members of some publics are condemned
to one-sided reporting and comment. ' We can safely say that democracy
is endangered wherever the sources are one-sided, and men are allowed to
freeze their convictions free from the hot discipline of exposure to con-
tradiction. Science and common sense are at one in emphasizing the im-
portance of certain factors that influence the quality of debate and final
judgment. Disclosure of source is important,"0 since one who is notified of
source is better able to evaluate probable freedom from bias and prob-
able competence. The quality of decision is imperilled when non-relevant
matters are allowed to. absorb and distract attention from realistic consid-
54. On the intelligence function see Lasswell, The Relation of Ideological Intelllence
to Public Policy (1942) 53 Ewrmcs 25. A penetrating study of the foundations of military
decision-making in France is Possony, Organized Intelligence; The Probem of the French
General Staff (1941) 8 SOCIAL RESEARCH 213.
55. Scientific procedures will be described later. On problems of policy see Catlin,
Propaganda as a Function of Denwcratic Governtment, in PROPAGANDA AND DIcTAToR-
SHIP (Childs ed. 1936).
56. See CHAFEE, FRE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) ; Riesman, Civil Liber-
ties in a Period of Transition (1942) PuB. POLIcy 33 and Democracy and Defanatilon:
Fair Gaine and Fair Comment 11 (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 1282; Smith, Democratic Con-
trol of Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure I (1942) 6 PuB. OPINION Q, 27.
[Vol. 52 : 203
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
erations. It is sound policy to protect the integrity of thought by exclud-
ing or nullifying the non-relevant. Some procedures of tho-sught and dis-
cussion aid in clarifying goals and alternatives.Y
Character. Character refers to the degree of integration achieved
by individual personalities. The democratic character is distinguished by
capacity to respect the self and others. It has been pi inted out by m, dern
psychiatrists that self-love is not to be confused with selfislness; indeed
that selfishness, or domineering arrogance, are evidence of sis-me lac: of
self-esteem." Within the last two generations the patient, i .jective study
of development during infancy, childhood and adt'lescence has entirmtlilusy
extended our knowledge of factors affecting the growth and deformation
of human personality. "  Whatever damages the child's respect for himself
gives rise to a chain of adjustments that may result in a character dan-
gerous to the individual and to his neighbors."' Such secondary attitudes
as the acceptance of democratic doctrine may be incorporated in persin-
alities whose basic structure is incompatible with the ideals of mutual
respect. Yet very well-integrated characters may live in societies where
caste differentiations are taken for granted and these personalities may
express secondary attitudes grossly incompatible with demo.cratic ideals.
In short, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the total structure
of personality and expression in any single sector, such as in the sphere
of secondary political attitudes. We know, however, that under stress
the underlying character formation exercises profound influence over the
conduct of the individual.
A very interesting and important pioneer investigation undertinik ti
probe the relationship between socialist attitudes and character f,,rmation
in pre-Nazi Germany." The study revealed a very large discrepancy
between the characters of many who called themselves socialist and the
political attitudes that they professed. This was a basic weakness of the
parties that sustained the Republic in Germany. In view of these cuinsid-
erations it is only wise foresight for any society that aspires toward de-
mocracy to use every means within its power to make sure that the per-
sons who come to adulthood possess characters whose hasic structure i.;
compatible with democratic values.
57. See Smith. Propaganda Analysis and the cicnce of Democracy ( 1941) 5 PUB.
Orixiox Q. 250.
58. See Fromm, SeIfishness and Self-Love (1939) 2 PsvcniA:rnv: J. or Bio. A. D
PATH. OF IBTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 507.
59. For the early years modern knowledge is authoritatively summarized for general
use in GESELL AND ILG. INFANT AND CHILD IN THE CmTLTL'rI OF TomyV (142). For
later epochs, COLE. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE (1036).
60. See, for example, GLUECK ,,ro GLI-FCK. Ox THOUt'SAD JUVENILE DEu,.QETNrs
(1934); HEALY AND BRO.NN ER. NEW LIGHT w, DELINQUENCY AND iTS TrEETnENT' (1936).
61. See Fromm, a manuscript report to be published.
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Non-disthictive Goal Variables
In addition to its distinctive values of shared power, respect and knowl-
edge, any democratic society can rightfully aspire to the achievement of
other values. The list that follows suggests with even briefer treatment
than was given the distinctive and conditioning variables, a few such non-
distinctive values.
Safety and Health. Among the variables non-distinctive of democ-
racy but almost universally sought can be placed safety and health. \Ve
might include them as subdivisions of the respect category, in the sense
that respect for individuality requires provision of safe, healthy environ-
ments. The present plan, however, gives this basic value sonic of the
prominence that it deserves and aids in keeping the category of respect
within manageable limits. We know that health and safety are not equally
distributed throughout the community but are often directly correlated
with income. Sickness is a poor man's burden, partly through exposure
to hazardous occupations, partly through inadequate hygienic training,
and partly through incapacity to command the best preventive and thera-
peutic help. 2 Because of the varying incidence of war, various parts
of the world differ greatly in safety and the hand of mortality presses
with special weight on some elements of the community."a
Comfort, Convenience, Taste. Without seeking to expand the dis-
cussion we may at least add comfort, convenience and taste as a reminder
that they need not be foresworn by democratic societies. As the general
material standard of living improves, it presumably affords members of
any community wider opportunities for gratifying themselves in new
and refined ways.
EXISTING CURRICULUM NOT ORIENTED TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
It should be obvious that our existing law school curriculum is not
adequately oriented toward achieving the distinctive values and condition-
ing variables of a free society. For the most part the organizing principle
still appears to be legal technicality; problems are defined and classified in
terms of overlapping legal concepts of high level abstraction rather than
in reference to social objectives. Concerned largely with the traditional,
conventional syntax of appellate opinions, the curriculum offers little ex-
plicit consideration of alternative social objectives, general or specific, or
of justifications for preference or preference priorities. Legal concepts
and doctrines, which in theory are instrumental only, are too often pre-
62. For guidance to available information see articles on Morbidity and Mortality
in 11 ENcYc. Soc. SciENCEs (1933) 3, 22.
63. On war see 3 SOROKIN, 10c. cit. supra note 16; WRIGHT, A SrDv OF WAR (1942).
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sented as if they embodied the prime democratic values of society, and
specific decisions are too often appraised or justified, not accurding to the
degree to which they implement these values, but exclusively in terms of
their supposed logical derivation from ambiguous definitions and doc-
trines. Little orientation is given in the historical and contemporary trends
that are most helpful in determining what problems are most important
and what objectives are most practicable, and in supplying the background
necessary to the formation of realistic judgments about such important
problems as do find their way-more often by accident than design!-
into the present curriculum. Scientific study of the factors that conditioin
the use of old, or the creation of new, social controls (doctrines, slogans
and structures) is almost non-existent. Finally, by reason of exaggerated,
even obsessional, emphasis upon legal technicality, the meth.ods of .tcial
control brought to the notice of the student are too much restricted to a
single institution-an institution whose role in the total princess of modern
life is of steadily diminishing relative importance-the appellate court and
the norms it announces.
Comprehensive and detailed documentation of the above criticisms is
no doubt superfluous. It is a matter of common knowledge that the main
organizing focii of our existing curriculunm are "contract," "pro qterty,"
"tort," "crime," and the "police power" of government-all much-favored
instruments of the laissez-faire society that is today so desperately navi-
gating the troubled waters of a hostile epoch. From these master cA sncvpts,
about which are organized our extensive introductory exercises in the
conventional legal syntax, stem a plethora of repetitive seotndary cours#.c
-such as Sales, Insurance, Credit Transactions. Bills and Notes-%% hich,
though they may grope after social values and institutional contcxts, sel-
dom have the temerity to throw away the blinders of their organizing
principle of legal technicality. Cutting across the same factual proiblems
with which these introductory and secondary courses so inadequately dal
are certain other courses, such as "equity" or "trusts," which offer exer-
cises in parallel syntaxes inherited from a court system that no longer
exists, or such as "wills" or "conveyances," which take their name and
topical organization from certain common legal instruments and their con-
tents. Add a few courses on the rules that are supposed to govern the
allocation of power among courts and the rules of fair combat before
courts, with, perhaps, a course or two on "administrative procedure" osr
"legislation," plus a few faint allusions to "international law," and the
contemporary law student's feast of reason is complete. Small wonder
that a distinguished faculty not long ago concluded that it makes little
difference in what order the feast is served to the student or the student
is served to the feast.C
4
64. See FACULTY or LAW, COLUMsBIA UNIVERSITY, Op. cit. supra nte 1, at 53.
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The assumption back of a curricular organization in terms of legal
technicality-an assumption long since explicitly repudiated by most law
teachers-is, of course, that the body of conventional legal doctrine at once
provides comprehensive and well-ordered coverage of the important prob-
lens of our society and embodies our preferred values for the handling
of such problems. Thus, if a student thoroughly masters such concepts
as "offer and acceptance,' ''consideration,' 'conditions," "11ist ake."
"fraud," "duress," "impossibility," and "legality," lie will know, it is as-
sumed, what agreements are important in our society, how they affect
the distribution of values, and to what extent they will be enforced under
what conditions and how. Whether, while mastering these concepts, lie
focuses his attention on agreements to climb flagpoles or on international
cartels is largely immaterial-institutional contexts and modes of adjust-
ment or control other than agreement within such contexts are irrelevant.
So also if a student masters the syntactic mysteries of "liability," "aiat-
omy of fault," "negligence," "contributory negligence,' "absolute liabil-
it), "..nuisance," "trespass,' "proximate cause,' 'intent,' 'motive,' and
"malice," the assumption runs that he will be able to handle the redistribu-
tion of "unintended losses" in our society in a way that will promote deno-
cratic values irrespective of whether the damage is caused by animals,
automobiles, blasting, defective sidewalks, rotten housing, defective con-
sumers' goods, or industrial accident; institutional contexts are once again
largely irrelevant and problems of prevention must be left to the tillers of
other syntax. Similarly, the organizing focii of the "property" courses
are such concepts as "easement," "profit," "license," "covenant," "servi-
tude" or "land contract," "deed," "delivery," "covenant of title" or "re-
version," "possibility of reverter," "right of entry," "remainder," and
"executory interest," and not such goals as the provision of healthful
housing, in well-planned communities, for all citizens at prices that they
can afford to pay or the promotion of the cheap, secure, and speedy trains-
fer of land, without adventitious restraints having no basis in policy, or
the appraisal of doctrines and practices about the transmission of wealth
from generation to generation in terms of their effect oin a balanced dis-
tribution of claims in society. Even the so-called public law courses are
still organized with too much deference to "separation of powers, "juris-
diction," "due process," "equal protection," "interstate commerce," "police
power," "tax power," "spending power," "war power," "public purpose,"
and "public use." Struggles between governmental units and private
groups are isolated from their institutional contexts, and academic inves-
tigations into the "public control of business" seldom sweep through all
the important businesses and relevant controls or are explicitly oriented
toward a full and optimal use of resources.
The traditional language of lawyers and the conventions of judicial eti-
quette indeed lend spurious plausibility to the assumltion that underlies
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most of our existing curriculum. The accredited language contains a series
of symbols of identification that are available for use in referring to par-
ties who invoke hierarchies of normative statements purporting to specify
which relations ought to obtain among such parties when certain factual
statements can be assumed to be true and can he subsumed under certain
other legal definitions and doctrines. What is comnionly called "the law"
can, thus, be defined as a syntactic system of propoSitions composed tof
terms that are supposedly defined, plus some admittedly indefinable terms,
whose modes of combination are governed by certain postulates and rules.
In venerable fiction this system, like that of a science or a theology, is
internally consistent and complete in its reference: from its central ternis,
definitions, and rules, all possible relations can be deduced. If X is a speci-
fied entity, X then bears a certain relationship to another entity, Y, or, in
more sophisticated form, there is a whole series of interrelatioinships gfiv-
erned by prescribed rules. If Y performs a specified act, he becomes an-
other entity, Y', and his relations to X are defined by still other rules. Such
is the pattern. Courts are confronted by parties who make use of this tra-
ditional terminology in describing themselves and the happenings on which
they base their claims. Such parties declare that they are "sureties," tsr
'guarantors of collection," or "accomnmodation indorsers," or "residuary
legatees," or "remaindermen," and that such and such a defense is "per-
sonal" or that such and such an interest is a "contingent remainder" and
hence "destructible." They ask the courts to apply other identifying terms
to the remaining parties to the controversy, and, hence to adopt the rule
that is laid down in the authoritative books for governing the interrela-
tions of "entities" so defined. Politely responding to the losers in their
own terms, courts allow or disallow the claims advanced by the varit-uu
parties and justify-and perhaps partly guide-their decisions by invok-
ing the traditional language. Allowing the claims of certain parties, it
labels them according to the appropriate identification terminology and
declares that its'decision is consistent with certain authoritative statements
governing such entity relationships. It need occasion no surprise that text-
writers, digest-compilers, and curriculum-makers largely work within tli
framework.
That "the law" consists of a closed, automatic, syntactical system is, as
has been suggested above, an assumption too obviously belied by the facts
for many to give it conscious credence today."' Most of the key ternis
and propositions of the legal syntax are, admittedly, hittoloical in the
sense that they take whatever meaning they have from relations betiweecn
sign and sign; " they cannot be given meaning in terms of empirical
65. For an excellent statement of the traditional view, see the Intr,.ductiun in BLF.r
A TREATISE ON THE COXFLCr OF L.tws (1935).
66. For an explanation of the distinctiuns here made see Murris, Flsuidatite:s f. th,
Theory of Signs in 1 INTERNAT. ExCYC. 41F UxNIED ScIENcE (1'938) NO. 2.
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events of behavior (relations between signs and objects) except by ref-
erence to the very judicial responses which they are supposed to predict
or justify. 7 But here all resemblance to a true syntactical system ends.
The terms and propositions of the legal syntax are neither internally con-
sistent nor comprehensive in their reference. They are, on the contrary,
inconsistent, ambiguous, and full of omissions. It was Mr. Justice Car-
dozo who aptly remarked that legal principles have, unfortunately, the
habit of travelling in pairs of opposites." A judge who must choose be-
tween such principles can only offer as justification for his choice a pro-
liferation of other such principles in infinite regress or else arbitrarily
take a stand and state his preference; and what he prefers or what he
regards as "authoritative" is likely to be a product of his whole biography.
Should a judge, so beset by antinomy, decry "high priori" solution by
existing principle and seek the help of more humble induction from pre-
vious cases, he does not escape his dilemma. Consciously or unconsciously,
if he keeps within the legal syntax, he must beg the very question that lie
has to decide. The point has been well made by Oliphant and Hewitt: 01,
If the principle . . . 'induced' is no broader than the sum of the
previous cases which it summarizes, it obviously does not and cannot
include the case to be decided, which, by hypothesis, is a new and an
undecided case, and, hence, can form no part of the generalization
made from previous cases only. If it does not include the case to be
decided, it is powerless to produce and determine a decision of it.
If it is taken to include the case to be decided, it assumes the very
thing that is supposed to be up for decision."
67. What empirical observations can be made to determine whether a mortgagee has
"title", or whether a defense claimed by a surety is "personal" or "real", or whether a
partnership is an "entity", or whether a right of way is a "license" or an "easement", or
whether a covenant "touches and concerns", or whether a remainder is "vested", or whether
a group of donees is a "class" or whether "title" under a power of appointment comes
from the donee or the donor? Does the mortgagee get possession because he has title
or does he have title because he gets possession? Is the surety denied a defense because
it is personal or is the defense personal because the surety is denied it? Is the partner
an agent because he is a partner or vice versa? Is the promise of a "right-of-way" revoca-
ble because it is a license or is it a license because it is revocable? Does the covenant run
because it touches and concerns or does it touch and concern because it runs? Is the
remainder alienable because it is vested or is it vested because it is alienable? And so on.
What, furthermore, is the clear and consistent reference of words like "title," "personal,"
"vested," and so forth, to either major democratic values or any sub-values? What place
have such symbols in a system of policy norms? As Cook has pointed out in Scentific
iethod and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303, at 305, we may say that "all gostaks are
doshes" and that "all doshes are galloons" and conclude with strictest logic that "all gos-
taks are galloons" and still not know what we are talking about.
68. For documentation see CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) and
Oliphant and Hewitt's Introduction to RUEFF, FaoM THE PUySICAL TO THE SOCIAL ScI-
ExcEs (1929).
69. Id. at xix.
[Vol. 52 : 203
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Facts in controversy do not neatly subsume themselves under legal con-
cepts. A judge or other arbiter must create his minor as well as his major
premise; in putting similarities and taking differences, in eliminating the
irrelevant and emphasizing the relevant, he must make policy choices.
Legal syntax alone-it is no news-does not and cannot dictate deci-
sion.70
Contemporary legal scholarship has, therefore, largely abandoned the
once prestigeful effort to reduce the vast corruscation of traditional legal
learning to beautifully terraced unified statements, geometrically laid out
with no overlapping, erosion or gaps. In the main modern scholarship
works in one of two directions. Certain iconoclasts content themselves
with rather fruitless exposes of existing imperfection and present "the
law" as a chaotic mass of confused and more or less meaningless state-
ments. Other and more ambitious investigators set themselves the task
of attempting to determine what courts and other decision-making bodies
do, as opposed to what they say they do. Their aim is the legitimate scien-
tific goal of prediction. After making precise summaries of what courts
have done in the past they look into the future and forecast what courts
will do when confronted with certain affirmations of facts and various
patterns of legal language. Such studies enlarge the scope of legal train-
ing and bring it in closer relation to the living reality of the judicial pro-
cess. They escape the stereotype of law as a body of completed rules about
entities and the almost equally naive and sterile iconoclasm of imagining
that words have no significance whatsoever in forecasting judicial con-
duct. In the name of prediction they have often gone far enough to pro-
vide courts with more concise formulae for reconciling past inconsisten-
cies than the courts have been able to create themselves and hence, much
as business forecasters affect the stock market, predictors have shepherded
judges toward the fulfillment of prophecy. Yet this recent emphasis on
prediction, however laudable it may be, cannot be said to have brought
about important changes in the classification or presentation of legal ma-
terials in textbook or casebook. Organizing focii remain all too often
in the frame of legal technicality; prevailing methods of investigation
continue at the level of loose impressionism; and, least heartening of all,
the scope of permissible inquiry does not necessarily include the most sig-
nificant variables affecting judicial response.
Seriously undertaken, the goal of forecasting judicial behavior poses
formidable problems to the legal scholar. The less lie is preoccupied with
the symmetry of legal syntax and the more with prediction, the less he
continues in the role of logician to the state and the more he must become
a man of science. As scientist, it is his task to account for the occurrence
70. See Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1924) 10 Coiar. L. Q. 17. Compare
Fuller, Wlliston on Contracts (1939) 18 N. C. L. REv. 1 and Patterson, Logic in the
Law (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L REV. 875.
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of a selected category of events-to wit: judicial conduct. To account for
such conduct he must take into consideration all variables that may sig-
nificantly determine it. Every resourceful practitioner knows that judicial
conduct is affected, not by rival phraseology alone, but by such factors
as the nature of the value in controversy, the position of litigant and judge
in the structure of society, the personality characteristics of judges, parties,
counsel, witnesses and juries, and the method of conducting cases. The leg-
al scholar who would predict the future course of decision must equip him-
self with skills appropriate to the task of evaluating variables, and this
means that to his traditional knowledge of legal technicality it is impera-
tive to add naturalistic skills of observation and analysis. As scientist, the
legal scholar will conceive that the response of any court is affected by
two sets of factors: environmental and predispositional. By environ-
mental factors is meant what goes on when cases are tried; predisposing
factors are how matters stand before the case is opened. Briefs, oral
arguments, testimony and exhibits are typical environmental factors (E).
The biases of the judge against the very rich or the very poor, the white
or the black, the commerce clause or the opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
are all part of the predispositions (P) with which the judge approaches
the trial, and, in conjunction with E factors, determine his response (R).
The final response of the judge is "yes" or "no" to a value claim; hence
he indulges or deprives the parties to a litigation. If we had scientific laws
of judicial decision they would relate given classes of R to E and P. More
strictly, such scientific propositions would state the probability of R' (a
specified type of decision) to R" (another type of decision). Truly scien-
tific propositions of this nature can only rest on data of observation. Scien-
tific prediction is based on the expectancy that past relations among varia-
bles will continue, and that when a given list of variables occurs in the
future, their interrelations can be foretold on the basis of proper analysis
of observations made on them in the past. The ordinary forecast is a
vaguely qualified assertion, or prophecy, that a given concrete event will
in fact take place; that is, that a certain judge will decide a specific case
for the defendant or the plaintiff. Strictly speaking, such a forecast is
not a scientific prediction, even though it may be arrived at partly as the
basis of scientific knowledge. Propositions that formulate scientific pre-
dictions are statements of the probability that if E and P are so and so,
R', not R", will occur.7
Despite the verbal support given to the idea of prediction, existing in-
vestigations have not moved very far along the path of science. Even with
the vigorous and outspoken encouragement of a few pioneers (like Walter
Wheeler Cook and Underhill Moore), scientific habits of thought are still
71. On the theory of science, see COHEN, REASON AND NATURE (1931) ; REicnEN-
BACH, EXPERIENCE AND PRxDICrION (1938) ; Nagel, Principles of the Theory of Probabil-
ity in INTERN. ENcyc, OF UN FIED SCIENCE (1939) No. 6,
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largely alien to the training of legal scholars. Little has been done either
to make clear the nature of the assumptions involved in any prediction or
forecast of judicial response, or to construct the theories and develop the
techniques of fact-finding necessary to discover and to interrelate the more
significant variables in the environment and predisposition of courts.
Some inkling of the true complexity of the task of framing predictive
rules, or of making concrete forecasts, may be gained from the following
outline, which is no more than a rough, preliminary categorization of
some of the principal variables which may affect the response of a court
or other authoritative agency to a controversy.
7
M
Claims Presented. The competing claims presented by the parties tu the
court (or other agency) : who they are, what they demand, from -whom,
and why they think they are entitled to their demands.
Objective Facts. The facts which give rise to the controversy as an
objective, non-participant observer who utilizes all available sources may
determine them. The observational standpoint here must be kept clear. It
is not that of the parties; their view appears as "claims presented." It is
not that of the court; the judge's view of the "facts" is part of the re-
sponse to be explained on the basis of the total context of environment
and predisposition. The perspective here is that of the disinterested, scien-
tific observer trying to predict human behavior.
In deciding what to accept as "objective facts" about the original dis-
pute, two sets of sources are available; namely, allegations made during
the trial, and information from other places. It should be noted that the
prediction studies may be made on the basis of one or broth sets of data.
The observer may limit himself to making a critical comparis in of every-
72. This outline is in part a condensation of one previously used in a criticism of
Volume III of the Restatement of Property. McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tra-
dition versus Clarification and Reform (1942) 55 HAv. L. REv. 1077. Many of the sen-
tences should be in quotation.
Whatever the potentialities of the table for predictive, scientific purposes, it has
some advantages for expository purposes over the usual dichotomy between "legal con-
cepts" and "operative facts." The word "operative:' as indicated in the text, conceals
three different observational standpoints, that of the parties, that of the court, and that
of an objective observer; in deciding what facts are "operative!' a court must smuggle
in its own response to the facts as an objective observer would report them. The addi-
tion of "policy norms" focuses attention, furthermore, upon the variable which is pre-
sumably most significant in contemporary society.
One of the writers has found the table most helpful in exploding the theoretical dif-
ferences between such concepts as "license," "easement," "profit," and "estate," and be-
tween "legal" and "equitable" interests and in discussion of such complicated topics as
"delivery" of deeds. Its usefulness in clarifying the illusory character of the traditional
distinctions between the various categories of future interests was sought to be demon-
strated in the article above cited in this note. For further citations on the method of mul-
tiple-variable analysis see that article at 100, n. 7, and Hxcxs, MATmELus Alm Murnoas
oF LEGAL REsEagcH (3d ed. 1942) 35.
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thing that was offered in court; obviously, he may arrive at a picture that
differs from the one accepted by the judge, which is included in the R of
the court. If the observer has access to other information about the orig-
inal dispute, he may accept a picture of reality that diverges even more
from the view of the facts assumed by the judge.
Two distinct, though related, scientific problems may be studied-one
concerned with the response of the parties, and the other with the judge.
We have already made it clear that we are interested in how the court
responds to "claims presented" and to the "objective facts." We may also
explore what kinds of disagreement are taken before courts, rather than
other tribunals, which calls for data about the predispositions of persons
at the time they became involved in disputes. Our knowledge of causal
connections is much greater if we can follow the entire sequence that be-
gins with the occurrence of a disagreement. Thus we can hope to pre-
dict the probable response of courts and other agencies to probable kinds
of objective situations.
Legal Norms. These are the conventional justifications of decisions
which judges have become conditioned to give to losing counsel and
higher courts,"3 and are the syntactical propositions that appear in legal
textbooks and appellate opinions. Most often they are in words found in
the peculiar and distinctive vocabulary of lawyers, like "vested," "con-
tingent," "executory interest," "title," "delivery," "touch and concern,"
"privity," "relation back," "personal defense," "due process," "equal
protection," and so on. Typically they point to no identifiable social goals;
they are, as indicated above, tautological in the sense that they can be
given meaning only by circular reference to the very behavior which they
are usually supposed to justify and predict.
Legal norms enter into scientifically conducted precision studies at
several places. The R of the court is partly describable by taking note of
the legal norms that are invoked or rejected in support of the decision.
Legal norms also enter in the P of the judges; it can be shown that courts
in different jurisdictions are predisposed during a certain period to rely
upon different doctrines. Forecasts need continual revision as judicial
predispositions change; every R of the court immediately becomes part of
the P of its future response.
There is yet another way in which legal norms are involved in the pre-
dictive studies; they enter into the E of the judges when they are invoked
as part of the justification of the "claims presented." If the spokesmen
of the litigants invoke doctrines against which the court is unfavorably
disposed in support of a claim, no doubt the court will reject the claim, or
at least the probability of such a response is greater than if the claimant's
counsel made use of discourse toward which dispositions were favorable.
73. See Moore and Sussman, The Lawyer's Law (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 566.
[Vol. 52: 203
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
In forecasting the outcome of specific litigation we may ask which claim-
ant is likely to be best represented by counsel who are informed about the
P of the court on doctrinal points. This problem, like the question whether
a given disagreement will be carried before a court at all, is separable from
the narrow task of studying the response of judges, since it calls for an
explanation of the response of the claimant. In assembling data about
legal norms for use in prediction studies, therefore, we must carefully
indicate whose norms they are supposed to be, whether of the judge be-
fore or during trial, or of the claimant before or during trial. Besides
those who participate directly in the proceedings, many others-ranging
from the general public to specific elements within it-my take a hand
in invoking legal norms; and what they say becomes part of the environ-
ment, whenever it is brought openly or privately to the notice of anyone
connected with what goes on in court.
Policy Norms. These are propositions about how values ought to be
distributed, including those to which we have given special mention, like
power, respect, knowledge, safety and health, comfort and convenience.
Sometimes the norms are invoked or rejected in propositions of high level
abstraction; often they are condensed into slogans; and frequently they are
implied by the specific endorsement of concrete measures. As with many
legal norms, statements of policy concern prediction studies when they
are made by judges or claimants before or during proceedings. Further-
more, they may impinge upon the environment of all participants when
they are invoked by the public at large or by specific sectors of it.
Other Norms and Statements. In addition to legal and policy norms,
statements are often made, supported or rejected, that appeal to such sup-
plementary norms as authority, reason (or logic), evidence, nature (and
science), faith, tradition or administrative convenience.
Personality and Value Position. What judges and juries do is "human"'
in the sense that it is affected to some extent by the impact of personalities
upon one another. There are many patterns of personality and the inter-
action of an aggressive claimant, counsel or witness upo n judge and jury
may produce different results than when submissive types are involved.
Besides the factor of personality we must take into account the constella-
tion of factors that link participants to the value structure of society.
Powerful and respected people interact upon one another and upon weak
and disreputable persons very differently than the poor react to the poor
or the middle class groups respond to one another and to those above and
below them in value position.
Judicial or Administrative Structure and Procedure. The result of liti-
gation is affected in varying degree by the set-up of courts and related
structures and by the procedures actually used.
Skill. We now come to one of the most subtle variables that determines
"law in action"; namely, skill. This is a matter of taking advantage of
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the opportunities afforded in any situation for the achievement of ends
by the most economical means. Not only do counsel invoke legal, policy
and other norms and statements in influencing the court; these factors are
presented in a certain pattern of interrelationship. Personality and social
types may be brought to the notice of the court in ways that strengthen the
total impact made on the judge.
Properly adapted, this scheme may be used to include all data required
to lay a scientific foundation for prediction. At present, however, the
actual content of law school instruction has been relatively little influenced
either by the urge to foretell or the skill to predict scientifically. It may
be noted that when scientific search for rules of prediction gains the upper
hand, legal syntax ceases to occupy the center of attention. Legal norms
furnish only part of the data necessary for the formulation of prediction
rules. A law school curriculum, organized around scientific prediction,
would be compelled to re-evaluate the significance given to legal techni-
cality. Does this imply, however, that prediction should be accepted as a
sound principle of curricular reconstruction? It is true that in the search
for predictive rules, values are given some consideration when policy
norms are noted; but the search does not begin with clarifying value
goals. The point of departure is a controversy, and the most prominent
initial variable is "claims presented." When attention is directed to other
variables, value objectives are de-emphasized; hence goal considerations
are subordinated in prediction studies. Too much stress on prediction
inhibits creative approaches by the student to policy questions; scientific
formalism can be as sterile, in so far as the implementation of democratic
values goes, as legal technicality, especially if scientific inquiry is chiefly
directed toward the forecasting of judicial behavior. In predicting deci-
sions, as in explaining any response, there is no end to the number of
factors that may be taken into account, or the degree of technical refine-
ment to which the gathering and processing of data may be carried. A
vast amount of work on the courts may result in comparatively meagre
contributions to policy, since it may be doubted whether the opportunity
of courts to redistribute values is currently as great as that of legislatures,
or of their administrative and corporate creatures. The student who would
affect the distribution of values and hence make an influential impact on
society must not only bear in mind his policy values, but must try to evalu-
ate and command every control necessary to reach his goal. Imagination
should not be too quickly turned toward winning arguments in court or
passively forecasting the outcome of litigation, before the previous ques-
tion has been raised-whether avenues of action other than those provided
by the court may not serve the long-term policy needs of a client. Effective
policy-thinking must be manipulative, originative, evocative, creative. It
cannot substitute the calculation of an endless fan of possibilities for dis-
ciplined and imaginative attention to actualizing the most favored possi-
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bility. Unlike logical or scientific thinking, policy-thinking is not primarily
contemplative and passive; it is goal-thinking and provides criteria for
the selection of arguments as well as for the control of other pertinent
factors. It is developmental, unifying preference and probability.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, we must unequivocally
reject both the principles of legal technicality and of scientific prediction
as criteria for reconstructing a curriculum for training lawyers to put
democratic values into policy.
NEW PRINCIPLES OF CURRICULAR ORGANIZATION DIRECTED
TowARD POLICY
At the outset of our positive statement of principles and recommenda-
tions, let us make it perfectly clear that we have no hesitation in accept-
ing the traditional assumption that it is imperative for the student to ac-
quaint himself with the established legal syntax. For many generations
to come it will be indispensabe to persuasive communication. There is,
furthermore, no royal road to its mastery. Just how many cases, read for
how many hours, discussed for how many hours, described in how many
examinations, can turn out a student adequately equipped for the success-
ful manipulation of legal doctrine and procedure? Certainly no one can
successfully demonstrate an exact answer to this question. Nevertheless,
we are not entirely in the dark. It is possible to find out how many cases
are usually discussed in the various years of a student's work in modem
law schools of good standing. The contents of the casebooks provide
a clue. Suppose we agree that during his period in law school a student
must gain the command over legal technicality that comes from having
read and discussed with varying degrees of intensiveness X thousands of
cases. The question then becomes by what principles should law teachers
select and organize these cases.
Life, like "the law," is, of course, a "seamless web." For any event
the causal factors are so many and so interdependent that, strictly speak-
ing, it is impossible to tear any one episode from the web of human ex-
perience in which it is embedded and treat it in strict isolation from the
configuration of which it is a part. Yet classify we must if we are to
cope with the "big, booming, buzzing confusion" about us and direct it
toward our purposes. Our present major purpose is to promote the adap-
tation of legal education to the policy needs of a free society. Therefore,
our first principle is that all legal structures, definitions, and doctrines must
be taught, evaluated, and recreated in terms of the basic democratic values.
Not only the legal syntax but also all legal structures and procedures must
be related to the larger institutional contexts, the factual settings, that
give them operational significance.74
74. For a systematic analysis of the larger context, see Malinowskd, Culture in 4
ENcyc. Soc. SciENcs (1931) 621 and The Group and the Inditidual in Functional A:Ia-
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We are not so foolhardy as to assume that we can uno ictu make the
study of the whole social process which is prerequisite to locating every
activity in its appropriate context. Nor do we assume that we can get
complete consensus upon the values we have stated as the basis of demo-
cratic values, or that these or any other values can be neatly segregated
for teaching purposes into water-tight curricular departments. What we
do affirm is that it is possible to map our seamless web of activities into
teachable contexts for the better understanding and eventual promotion
of our preferred events (values) and that the events which we teachers
prefer should be made as explicit as language can make them. The par-
ticular abstract symbols which we have chosen to state our preferences (a
"commonwealth of mutual deference") are not indispensable; the im-
portant point is that we have not been content-nor do we propose to
advocate being contented-with either the neglect of goal statements or
the failure to lay down definitions and exemplifications by means of
which terms whose initial meaning is ambiguous can be brought into
referential relation to reality. We have already undertaken to specify, at
least in a preliminary way, how our key terms are to be understood. They
have been given relatively explicit meaning in terms of their relation to
people, and so defined they express representative values of our culture.
In the light of further experience we may wish to reconsider or re-
define these symbols or values. But-and here we take our stand-
unless some such values are chosen, carefully defined, explicitly made the
organizing focii of the law school curriculum, and kept so constantly at
the student's focus of attention that he automatically applies them to
every conceivable practical and theoretical situation, all talk of integrating
"law" and "social science," or of making law a more effective instrument
of social control, is twaddling futility. Law cannot, like golf or surgery,
be taught only as technique; its ends are not so fixed and certain. What
sis (1939) 44 Am. J. Soc. 938. Compare Hamilton, Institution in 8 ENCYC. Soc. ScaExcEs
(1932) 84; Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 CoL. L. Ray. 1. Malin-
owski's broadest generalization is, perhaps, that an "institution" is always comprised of a
group of people working on a material base, with definite traditions, and organized with
reference to a task or purpose which satisfies certain basic or derived needs. His primary
concepts are charter (unifying and validating norms), rules (administrative detail), per-
sonnel, material equipment, activities, function and needs (basic and derived); all these
he defines with great precision and in great detail.
Some have suggested that students can be taught legal analysis in one course or year,
how to apply this analysis to "vital" problems in still another course or year, and how
to synthesize social perspectives in still a third dose. The curriculum of one influential
law school is in fact being reorganized along these lines. It would appear doubtful, how-
ever, whether the process of evaluation can be so segregated. To give legal syntax opera-
tional significance it must, as we have seen, be related to institutional contexts and values.
See MARSHALL AND GomEZ, CURRICULUM-MAKING IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES (1936);
Green, Relational Interests (1934) 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 1041, (1935) 30 id. at 314 and
(1936) 31 id. at 35.
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law "is," and hence what should be taught as "law," depends primarily,
as we have seen, upon the ends preferred. It is not necessary, of course,
to have a functional organization of materials for a teacher to disseminate
a functional attitude; many teachers today achieve some good results by
ridiculing the materials or casebooks with which they work. Truly effect-
ive education for policy-making must, however, strive for more than the
cultivation of attitude. Its curriculum must offer skill, including infor-
mational background and appropriate drill as well.7'
Several new principles of curricular organization have already been
sufficiently tested in American law schools to suggest great promise. The
first may be described as organization in terms of the needs of selected,
influential policy-jmkers, such as business managers, government officials,
and labor leaders; existing courses on business units, public control of
business, and labor law reflect this principle with varying degrees of con-
sistency. A second principle-still only slightly used-is explicit organiza-
tion in terms of specified social values or clusters of values; Michael and
Wechsler's casebook on criminal law is perhaps the most successful exam-
ple of this principle put into practice.76 Still a third principle, traditional
to the American law school curriculum and probably indispensable to any
reconstruction, is organization in terms of emphasis on particular shills;
procedure courses, designed to supply the information and drill necessary
to operate judicial machinery, are in one sense classic applications of this
principle and indicators of its effectiveness. It is not inconceivable that
a curriculum thoroughly integrated in terms of these three principles-
influence, values, and skills--could lay a basis for effective training in
policy-making. Designed to achieve values, through influence and by
skills, it offers at least a beginning formula. Let us now explore in more,
though necessarily impressionistic, detail what is involved in the full
utilization of each principle.
Influence Principle
First, consider organization in terms of the needs of influential policy-
makers. Two principles are useful in this connection: selection accord-
ing to maximum influence and selection according to representative influ-
ence. In our society the most influential policy-makers include some gov-
ernment officials, party leaders, business owners and executives. Courses
75. Compare the emphasis of an outstanding contemporary professional educator in
KILATIcx, R EI.AEING THE CURRICULUM (1936).
76. See MICHAEL AND VEcHSLER, CRImINAL LAW iD IXs A D. NISTMATioz: CASES,
STATUTES AND ComXmENTARSms (1940); Reviewed by Riesman, loc. cit. supra note 1.
Other books which might be mentioned, without our purporting to offer a definitive list,
as tending strongly in this direction are: Ga.rEE, CASES ON Tonrs (2d ed. 1939) ; HAviG-
HURST, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1934); JAcoBs, CASES oN DomEsTic Rmrxious (2d ed.
1939); POWELL, CASES ox¢ TRusTs AND ESTATES (1932).
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can be arranged according to the problems that confront them, problems
connected with maintaining and extending their special values and of in-
tegrating their special skills with the general values in which they partici-
pate as members of a free society. Policy questions also confront the indi-
vidual whose position in the value structure of society as a whole is quite
modest. Most humble individuals are small property holders, spouses and
the like, and legal courses, such as Family Law, can be construed to deal
with the range of questions that confront them.
Policy selections need to be made in the light of facts about the struc-
ture of society. By the structure of society is meant basic practices in
creating and distributing values. In the examination of any society, a
list of values for purposes of analysis may be chosen. We have mentioned
among others power, respect, knowledge, income, safety. This list is not
designed to reflect a general theory of human motivation; we do not as-
sume that everybody wants the same values with equal intensity all the time
or that many people from time to time do not want values different from
the ones named in the list. These values were selected only because they
are widely sought by persons brought up in our civilization and there is
widespread interest in their amount and in how they are shared.
Power, as we have indicated, means participation in the making of im-
portant decisions. If we examine American society as a whole from the
standpoint of shared power, we find that it is convenient to divide the
country into six broad social divisions according to their degree of par-
ticipation. At the top of the power series stand the policy-makers of
monopolistic and basic businesses. Next in the series, and during war time
of particular importance, stand public officials. Farther down the line are
the competitive businessmen. Lower yet stand the bulk of the profession-
als and skilled labor groups that find employment in industry and com-
merce. The lowest tier is composed of farmers and unskilled laborers.
Even in a rough over-all sketch of the distribution of power in society
it is important to subdivide according to the type of skill by virtue of
which the leaders at any level retain their positions of privilege and lead-
ership; namely, the skill in propaganda, skill in violence, and skill in the
management of goods and services. All leaders possess one or more of
these skills in high degree. In civilian societies particular prominence is
given to those who are masterful in symbol manipulation and in the man-
agement of goods and services (the managers include bargainers, party
administrators, government administrators). Even in peace times, how-
ever, the prevalent expectation of external and internal violence allows for
a substantial participation in leadership by some who are recruited from,
or remain anchored in, army, navy, air and police services. 71 In the light
77. Professor Bruce L. Smith, with the aid of Dr. Rudolph Modley, has set forth
the broad social divisions in the United States in a chart published in the Public Opinion
Quarterly, June, 1941.
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of this perspective on the distribution of power in our society, we may sug-
gest a series of law courses devoted to the needs of influential and repre-
sentative persons in each of the major divisions and skills.
It is not difficult for a law student to identify himself in imagination
with the problems of a definite policy group. He easily conceives of
l imself as a legal adviser to a huge corporation or to one of the most
important departments or agencies of government. He can readily pro-
ject himself into some of the recurring situations in the lives of persons
of modest status. The business units, public control of business, and labor
law courses in our existing curriculum only faintly reflect the possibilities
of this principle of organization.
There are, however, certain disadvantages in the organization of
courses from the perspectives of particular policy-makers. Students may
tend to stereotype their assumptions about the continuity of the social
structure with which they become acquainted. Concerned with promot-
ing the aims of particular groups, they may lose sight of the long-term
general interest. Emphasi - needs to be put upon training students how
to persuade the policy-makers of specific interests to formulate a line
of policy consistent with the long-term general interest. The important
decisions of our society are, furthermore, often compromises between
conflicting influential groups (such as government and business) and
not the dictates of one group only. It is the direction taken by these com-
promises that so profoundly affects the general interest. Hence it is
advantageous to shift the focus of student attention from the angle of
specific groups of influential policy-makers to the consideration of how
specific value goals can be achieved by society as a whole. In this way
the mind of the student is kept free to assess the adequacy of existing
ideas and practices for the attainment of significant policy results.
Value Principle
Let us, therefore, turn to the principle of curricular organization in
terms of specified social values or clusters of values. Here there are
several possibilities. Courses could be organized more or less haphazardly
about certain important contemporary problems of relatively low level
abstraction-such as civil liberties, social security, full employment, demo-
cratization of business, democratization of government, healthful hous-
ing, conservation and full utilitization of resources, farm security, more
medical care, food and clothing to more people, protection of consumers,
protection of investors, more realistic channels of communication, cheap-
er and better administration of justice, free education to the extent of
ability, and so on 7 -- without any attempt to run through such problem
courses any consistent generalizations of high level abstraction based on
78. See McDougal, loc. cit. supra note 17.
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some explicit theory of social dynamics, or to harmonize specific values
with a general theory of democratic values. Were enough problems taken,
it would be possible to achieve a fairly complete, though repetitious, cov-
erage of social processes and legal syntax. Such an organization would
have much to commend it over the present principle of legal technicality.
In our view, however, the ultimate aim of those who seek better prepara-
tion for policy-making should be an attempt to achieve a curriculum or-
ganized on the basis of a realistic and comprehensive picture of the struc-
ture and functions of society, joined with the best knowledge now
attainable of the dynamics of social process, and oriented toward the im-
plementing of a consistent and explicit set of democratic values.
Non-systematic Application
To illustrate further the potentialities of even the haphazard aiming of
legal doctrines, procedures and structures at specific social goals, let us
refer briefly to what is now called the "field of property." "' Take the cus-
tomary introductory course. Such organizing focii as "nuisance," "cove-
nants," "easements," and "equitable restrictions" (and their functional
equivalents allowed to go by default to other "fields") could be replaced by
the specific goal of implementing the definite, intelligible, and generally
accepted norms of community planning experts for building stable
and livable urban communities. In such an organization the "nuisance"
cases would serve only to demonstrate the interdependence of all land uses,
the utter anarchy of modern cities, and the ineffectiveness of any
judicial handling of the problem. Covenant, easement, and equitable re-
striction cases could be used to show both the inadequacies of private
agreement to serve the public interest and its continuing indispensability,
under existing public controls, to individual security. But with these legal
technicalities the course would just begin. For achievement of its set goal,
it would have to sweep many newer and more effective social controls.
Some indication of the scope it would require may be gathered from a
brief outline, which begins at the level of local administration:8 °
A. Techniques for expanding planning area. Contemporary func-
tional activities have completely burst the arbitrary bounds of
existing governmental subdivisions. Means must be devised to
79. See McDougal, Summary and Criticism of Answers to Question 8 of the Property
Qtestionnaire in HANDBOOK, AsSOCIATION OF AmERicAN LAW SCHOOLS (1941) 268. In
the discussion that follows we draw heavily upon this statement, though a number of new
suggestions are added.
80. Any serious effort to implement the kind of post-war planning now being urged
by a host of public and private agencies must require major changes in our existing legal
and administrative structures, procedures and doctrines. Yet little or no work is pre-
sently being done by universities, government agencies, or private interests to prepare
recommendations for such changes.
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make integrated planning, and governmental control, coe-ten-
sive with geographically, socially, and economically integrated
areas.
1. Extension of old boundaries (automatic on achievement
of certain conditions; legislative vote; extraterritorial
powers, . . .).
2. Consolidation of old units.
3. Interstate compacts.
4. Public authorities or public-private redevelopment cor-
porations, crossing state lines, etc.
B. Techniques for establishing and maintaining physical design and
permissible uses of area. Past controls have failed not only be-
cause of unrealistic planning but also because of a lack of inte-
grated administration of available controls and of a failure to
exercise such controls to their constitutional limits.
1. Zoning. How can this device be made more effective
both for controlling new development and for recon-
structing areas already built up?
2. "Planning laws." Can affirmative measures be worked
out to supplement the negative measures of police
power regulation?
3. Subdivision control. What new controls can be devised
for both quality and quantity?
4. Private covenants. Can administrative machinery be
designed to make these more efficient and secure in-
struments in both the private and public interest?
5. Future street reservations, parks, etc.
6. Community purchase of land. How can this method
of control, used so successfully in Scandinavia, be
adapted to this country?
7. Institutional structure. How can all the powers devel-
oped above best be integrated for administration? How
can long-term planning best be introduced into a short-
term political structure? How devise a Special Land
Court to determine all land-use controversies?






Should we add, in the course now under consideration, to the goal of
livable communities, the further goal of providing healthful and cheap
housing-in lieu of the traditional landlord and tenant antiquities of
"rent," "caveat lessee," "implied covenants," "independent covenants,"
1943]
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"6constructive eviction," and so on-the scope of our course becomes even
more extensive. A beginning should, of course, be made in the landlord
and tenant syntax to demonstrate once again the inadequacies of legal
doctrine and judicial control alone to serve the desired social end. With
this emancipating exercise completed, attention could be turned again to
newer and more effective controls. The following outline, still at the level
of local administration, may suggest some of the possibilities."'
A. Techniques to provide adequate housing.
1. Public authorities. How high up the income-scale will
"public purpose" permit such authorities to build?
2. Urban redevelopment corporations-privately owned
but publicly regulated. Which of the many schemes
being proposed by various interests offers the most
promise? How can sufficient inducement be offered
to such corporations? What of the host of resulting
legal problems?
3. Stimulation of private building. Tax and credit con-
trols, rationalization of construction industry, lowering
cost of land, etc.
B. Controls of condition of premises.
1. Compulsory repair, vacation, demolition.
2. Revision of building codes.
3. Consolidation of municipal departments (building
inspection, health, fire, etc.).
C. Controls of the price of shelter.
1. Rationalization of building industry.






1. Improved recording system.
2. Uniform condemnation procedure.
3. Improved mortgage and tax foreclosure, etc.
The vision of such a course should, however, extend much beyond the
level of local administration. To implement an effective national program
-- or indeed even an effective local program-it will be necessary to focus
the students' attention upon inquiries at state, regional, and federal levels
as well. Thus:
81. For elaboration see McDougal, Book Review (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 526 and
outline of legal questions in CONFERENCE oN UReANSa!, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Greer
ed.), THE PRoEm& oF THE Crizs AND TowNs (1942) 42.
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A. At the State Level. What changes must be made in state insti-
tutions and laws to enable local communities to exercise all the
powers recommended above? How can the planning function
best be located in the structure of state government? How allo-
cate powers between state and local planners and administra-
tors ?
B. At the Regional Level. How can institutional machinery for
making important decisions at the regional level best be set up?
By interstate compacts? By public authorities like the T. V.
A.? By governors' conferences? By federal administrative
agencies? And so on.
C. At the Federal Level. What federal institutions and laws are
required to promote an effective and consistent national policy
and yet preserve local enterprise? Wqhat in detail should be the
conditions of the grant of federal funds? How resolve all the
attendant legal (constitutional and otherwise) problems?
Indeed, since use of land and other resources for housing purposes is
a part of our "whole economy" and affects and is affected by all other
economic activities, such as rates of saving and investment and extent of
employment, it is possible that certain other general controls for expand-
ing our whole economy-such as, government spending and subsidies of
all kinds, lowering of interest rates, rationalization of tax policies, remov-
ing tariffs and other trade barriers, freeing technology of patent restric-
tions, enforcing anti-trust laws, international organization to reduce ex-
pectation of violence, and so on-may be even more important for secur-
ing cheap and healthful housing than many of the more specific controls
outlined above. Though a course which included all of these controls
would quite obviously exceed the bounds of management, there is no rea-
son why students should not be kept sharply aware of their relevance.
Suppose-to vary our illustration from the introductory property course
-- we substitute for the traditional organizing focii of "streams," "sur-
face waters," and "underground waters" or "natural flow" and "reason-
able user," the goal of the best use and conservation of our water re-
sources in the interest of the consumer. Appellate opinions might be used
to demonstrate that the physical, engineering, and utilization unities of
a drainage basin (every use affects every other use) are such as to make
imperative the unified development of its water resources for all uses,
including flood control, soil conservation, power production, city supply,
industrial use, irrigation, navigation, and recreation. In the course of this
demonstration it would also become evident that no distillation or purifi-
cation of property or tort or any other doctrines can give courts designed
to settle a wide variety of individualistic disputes by broad social norms,
the necessary staff training, experience, and powers to carry out the
affirmative, multi-purpose programs which both public and private inter-
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ests require. The scope of the course would, accordingly, have to be ex-
panded to include such other controls as state and federal flood control
measures, the New England mill acts, the Western water boards, the
state pollution control boards, the Federal Power Commission, interstate
compacts, the federal-state soil conservation districts, regional authori-
ties like the T. V. A., federal developments like that in the Columbia River
basin, rural zoning, and rural public works of all kinds.
82
Take, again, the orthodox second year course in property. Sometimes
called Conveyancing and sometimes Vendor and Purchaser, it is built
about the instruments of "contract" and "deed" (or only one of these 1)
and the doctrines that courts have sprayed about them. Suppose an inquir-
ing student were to ask himself what it is that the courts and legislatures
are trying to do in these cases. He might answer: to promote the cheap,
secure, and speedy transfer of land. Why are they interested in cheap,
secure, and speedy transfer of land? To promote, of course, the maximum
and most efficient utilization of one of our most valuable resources. Why
are they interested in such utilization? To promote, of course, industrial
production, more healthful housing, better planned communities, more
farm production for the benefit of both farmers and consumers, and so
on. Having thus obtained a set of policy norms, of varying degrees of
abstraction, to appraise the judicial and legislative practices he is studying,
he might then ask a very fundamental question. Why do we need two
pieces of paper, both a "contract" and a "deed," to transfer a parcel of
land? Ships, automobiles, and shares of stock require no such double-bar-
relled ceremony. If he is told that there must be a period of time between
"agreement" and "transfer" during which the vendee can make certain
that the vendor has what he is promising, he may wonder why there should
be so much uncertainty or insecurity about what a purporting vendor of
land has. By the time he discovers that this is because we recognize very
old interests in land, because some of these interests are not even required
to be recorded in public books, and because the public books are kept by
the accounting system of the country storekeeper of a hundred and fifty
years ago, he will, of course, be deeply enmeshed in the whole institutional
context of that exclusive group of monopolistic, dilatory, and costly spe-
cialists, which includes brokers, appraisers, recorders, title lawyers, and
insurance company executives. It might even occur to him that the trans-
fer of land is not actually becoming more speedy, secure, and cheap, but
rather more dilatory, complicated, and expensive, and that these complica-
tions serve no social purpose to which he cares to subscribe. Though he
might not prefer liquidity of land as a value in itself, he certainly would
not subscribe to non-liquidity that was not directed toward some specific
public purpose. Such an inquiring student might wonder, further, why a
82. See McDougal and Runyon, Book Review (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1502.
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course on the transfer of land should be confined to our most "individual-
istic" transfers only. He might think that, if he is to be adequately pre-
pared for all the functions he is to perform in a society whose collective
features are ever more prominent, he should have sonic drill in the modes
of acquisition practiced by public utilities, governmental units, and pub-
lic authorities of all kinds.
Take, for a final example from Property, the way Possessory Estates,
Future Interests, N\tills, and Trusts are commonly taught. The completely
complementary possessory estates and future interests are often divorced
for separate courses. "Legal" interests and "equitable" interests are
treated in contamination-proof compartments as if they had no relation
to each other. The formalities for the creation of these interests are taught
in one course and the social limitations on their creation in another. Legal
technicalities are the organizing focii throughout. Suppose our inquiring
student asks what this is all about. He will discover that the courts are
here concerned largely with the instruments by which one generation
transmits economic power to the next, sometimes through "future inter-
ests" reserving a certain aniount of dead-hand control, and sometimes
escaping a little taxation or avoiding a few creditors' claims. By what
norms should he appraise the practices of courts in handling these instru-
ments and toward what ends should his own activities be directed? The
answer is difficult because the requisite scientific studies have not been
made. It is probable that the practices for transmitting power from gen-
eration to generation which we presently tolerate do contribute to our
growing inequalities or over-concentration of wealth. Such over-concen-
tration is, of course, inconsistent with our basic democratic values and it
impedes the proper functioning of our economic structure. But an exact
determination of what we should do about it would require considerable
study of how inheritance claims are distributed in our society and have
been distributed in other societies and how such distributions have been
correlated with the distribution of such major values as power, respect,
and knowledge. It is possible that we would conclude that a certain
amount of inheritance should be tolerated for individual security; how
much may depend upon the availability of other ftnctional equivalents
such as insurance or governmental "social security." For the present,
in any event, the student must assume that society will tolerate, perhaps
even encourage, the private transfer of substantial amounts of wealth
from generation to generation. One norm he can set up, however, for ap-
praising the doctrines, procedures and structures by which this transfer
is to be effected is that the transfer should be at the least possible social
cost and should result in the least possible adventitious disappointment
of the reasonable expectations of presumptive beneficiaries. From such
a perspective he will see that most of the traditional syntax of this "field"
are not only superfluous but positively harmful. He can demonstrate that
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the classic categories, now hopelessly ambiguous, of future interests are
disappearing under gradual judicial attrition and should be made to dis-
appear even faster. He can point out that practically the only difference
between "legal" interests and "equitable" interests today is in the ana-
chronistic verbiage; they are functional equivalents. The practical prob-
lems are the same, the variations in the donor's language are inconse-
quential, the donor can make the same reference to beneficiary, time, and
condition; no policy reason can be advanced for invoking a difference in
result merely by utterance of a different symbol, and the responses of the
courts are in fact largely the same. The chief function of the surviving
language, that of categorizing the various interests and of dilotoniz-
ing them into legal or equitable, is to mislead unvary or unsophisticated
courts into harsh decisions. He might even suggest that the venerable
Rule against Remoteness now serves little more than this same function
of confusion and that what small limitation it does impose on family
dynasties might be better achieyed by taxation.
Similar reorientations of other traditional "fields" could undoubtedly
be suggested by those who are versed in their mysteries. It would be pre-
sumptuous for us to make the attempt. We may, however, in an effort at
further exemplification suggest some of the initial questions which should
be asked about various representative courses. The following are selected
almost at random:
Contracts. What are the important agreements of our society? How
can we put these agreements in institutional settings that will enable us
to assess the effect of the enforcement or non-enforcement or other polic-
ing of these agreements on the distribution of major democratic values?
What is the effect on such values of our present modes of handling such
agreements? What are the methods of adjustment other than agreement
among various component parts of society, and how are they interrelated
with agreements?
Torts. \Vhat are the important injuries, intended or unintended, recur-
ring in our society? In what institutional contexts do they occur? Ilow
does our present handling of these injuries promote or retard major demo-
cratic values? How.could the prevention of injury and the lessening of
loss to society as a whole be realized as a goal in addition to the goal of
readjusting the redistribution of loss among specific individuals? \Vhat
controls, other than judicially administered tort doctrines, can be devised
for handling; for example, automobile accidents or injuries from defec-
tive residential structures? How can "libel and slander" be handled in a
way that will promote respect for civil liberties and realistic reporting and
comment in the channels of public communication?
Business Units. What is the effect on the tempo and balance of society
of providing the present variety of methods by which persons who wish
to engage in speculative activities can limit their possible loss and slough
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it off on the unsuspecting or the timorous? If it is socially desirable to s i
encourage entrepreneurs, should not the loss be socialized directly thro ugh
government provision of capital by means of taxatit oi ac irding to ability
to pay, rather than indirectly and haphazardly Iy present niethlids? I Is ow
can business managers be made more responsible to investors. fail$ sr. ci n-
sumers, and the public interest? What are the relative advantages ani dis-
advantages in terms of technological efficiency of aggregates 4if business
capital of varying size in various industries? How can these aggregate"
be brought to and kept at their most efficient size? Of all the lonsine~s..
of our society, which are the most important? \Vhat arc their pI mer
structures? How is this power used to affect the distribution of values?
What controls are available, and what can he invented. to denit icratize this
power?
Equity. What useful purpose is served by putting this rag-bag tif stuff
between two covers?
Conflicts. How does this illusory syntax actually distribute power
among the courts of different states? Does it allocate power to the courts
most competent, in different kinds of controversies, to prniiote demos-
cratic values? Can less costly and litigious allocations be devised?
Insurance. Why link "fire" and "life" insurance? What is the func-
tion of each? What is the effect of the existing system oif "distributing"
loss upon the value position of various groups in the nation? Are these
results "rational" in terms of democratic values? If the nitost general
function of insurance is to make certain by present relinquishients a
future flow of stable and adequate income, shiiuld ntit the functitin ht
performed by government, since its taxing pow er can bave the requiretd
relinquishments on ability to pay? What are the interrelations of "pri-
vate" insurance and "social security" in a democratic system?
Taxation. Can the social and economic effects of taxatitin he apprai,-ed
and taught in a "general" course on taxation, or must the effect tif tax
controls be meaningfully considered as an incident iof elabirate factual
inquiries into the processes of society? Should the tax c urse lke cinducted
simply as a "skill" course in ways and means o f collecting intiney (or of
avoiding its collection) and the policy implications of tax nianipulatiosin
relegated to richer contexts?
International Laze. How can we build international organizatit-ins at,
effective for promoting democratic values everywhere as we have built
for strategy, munitions, and shipping? Ho w, in detail, can we build such
organizations for the promotion, on an international scale, of full emloiiy-
ment. full utilization of resources, technolit ical development, ratitonal fis-
cal procedures, trade, democratization of business po-wer, and related pur-
poses? In the place of international cartels that restrict production, htow
can we substitute international-development organizations that increas •
production for the benefit of consumers everywhcre? Ihim can we iniplc-
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ment our relinquishment of war as an instrument of national policy and
form an international institution authorized to determine aggressors?
What are the modes of constituting a world state?
Enough by way of illustrating the kinds of preliminary inquiries re-
quired by a more or less haphazard aiming of legal institutions, prac-
tices and doctrines at explicit social goals.
Systematic Application of the Value Principle
Let us now turn to a brief examination of curricular organization in
terms of a more systematic statement of values and a more explicit theory
of social dynamics. This problem we have anticipated by our formulation
above of the values of a free society and of the principal variables upon
which the attainment of such values depend. It is far from fantastic to
assume that effective courses may be explicitly organized about these ma-
jor democratic values and variables. Consider the following basic courses
(no great importance is attached to the order in which they are listed)
1. Law and control.
2. Law and intelligence.
3. Law and distribution.
4. Law and production.
5. Law and character.
6. Law and community development.
1. Law and Control. The scope of this course is the study of power,
the investigation of how power is distributed, and of how legal syntax,
procedures, and structures affect, or can be made to affect, this distribu-
tion. Its purpose is to offer a realistic survey of the people or agencies
who are actually making the important decisions of our society and of the
controls available to keep their power responsible, hence shared. It is
convenient to examine the facts of power in reference to the institutional
groups found in society; hence the course begins with what is commonly
called government; from government, the transition is made to private
pressure organizations, and to business and non-business private associa-
tions.
Concerned as it is with government, much of the traditional content
of courses on constitutional law finds place here. Included are cases that
bear on the determination of "the meaning of the Constitution" with re-
spect to the apportionment of authority between federal and state gov-
ernments, and among all the agencies of government at each level. So
far as the sharing of power is concerned, many special problems deserve
special attention, such as the legal devices available to the Federal
Government in seeking to correct tendencies toward autocracy and des-
potism in the franchises of individual states.
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In addition to problems from the general domain of constitutional law,;
are parts of courses in municipal corporations where the problem is to
determine lines of authority between state and local agencies. Here, in
particular, it is important to consider the legal doctrines available to re-
adjust governmental areas. With changes in population, with increasing
distinctions between work place and residence place, problems of adapt-
ing the many kinds of governmental districts to one another are among
the most pressing technical problems of government. These issues greatly
affect the balance of power among different regions of the country, and
among various kinds of economic and other cultural groups.
This course includes some of the topics found in public international
law, particularly the concepts relating to the role of "sovereigni" and "half-
sovereign" states, and doctrines of government intervention. Under the
rubric of control will come cases that clarify doctrines governing the in-
ternal distribution of power in private pressure associations. The problem
of access to membership in an association is peculiarly acute whenever the
association exercises dominance over the distribution of values, as do cer-
tain business cartels, trade unions, and trade associations. The issue is
particularly important when groups are able to entrench themselves in pri-
vate organizations by various methods of coercion. In recent times this
problem has been put in the foreground as a result of the efforts of Nazi-
controlled and Communist-controlled factions to dominate fraternal,
benevolent and other organizations nominally set up for cultural ends.
This course will include the structure of formal authority and of ef-
fective control within corporations, partnerships and personal profit-
seeking enterprises. Degrees of control over personnel and policy by va-
rious classes of shareholders are in point here. This involves part of the
material found in courses on corporation law or "business units." \fter
examining private pressure and business organizations, attention will le
given to the control problems that arise in non-profit economic associations
and in other private groupings for non-economic purpose.
2. Law anzd Intelligence. The problem here is how more people can
be given access to, and skill in interpreting, the facts necessary to deci-
sions that will promote democratic values. The realism of the decisions
made by the officers or members of any organization depend in no small
measure on the quality of the intelligence that reaches them, and the degree
of skill with which they are equipped to think. This raises the whole
question of the control and the freedom of channels of communication.
When we examine the question we find that legal devices have already
been used in order to improve the factual basis of judgment. One require-
ment for an adequate stream of intelligence is disclosure of source, the
disclosure of all who have anything to do with directing the flow of com-
munication. The practices of registration and labelling have been partially
adapted to the problem, so that statements of ownership and circulation
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must be made available from time to time, and advertising matter must
be plainly labelled as such.
Besides the disclosure of source, positive means of obtaining access to
the media of communication are essential, if public opinion is to be influ-
enced by minority statements of fact and purpose. Several legal devices
have been partly adapted to this problem. In some instances the govern-
ment has itself assumed the cost of circulating controversial statements.
This is the effect of the Congressional mailing privilege, and of the dis-
semination at public expense in certain states of party electoral platforms.
Since freedom of speech involves freedom of access to public attention,
topics connected with the use of public property for political meetings and
demonstrations are relevant here.
Still a third aspect of the intelligence function is access to facts that
interested parties try to conceal (in addition to their identity). Although
legislative bodies may have relatively unlimited powers of subpoena, the
scope of their investigations are blocked by several legal considerations,
notably by a narrow interpretation of the words used to describe the pur-
pose of the inquiry. It falls within the scope of this course to explore
the arsenal of legal attack and defense available to governmental agencies
in the exercise of their investigative functions. Also in point are the
alternatives available to courts of various jurisdictions to obtain infor-
mation, including the barriers involved in confidential communication.
Another requirement of proper intelligence is competent decision-malk-
ers. It has long been notorious that some courts and administrative
agencies are so poorly equipped and poorly skilled by experience and train-
ing that it is ridiculous to expect them to exert effective control over pri-
vate utility companies. In setting up a judicial and administrative system,
one of the positive tasks is to locate jurisdiction at a point where adequate
facilities can be brought to bear on problems.
In the conduct of debate and of hearings, certain procedures enhance
the probability of a realistic outcome. From this standpoint it is relevant
to scrutinize the means by which the attention of the group is protected
by the exclusion of the irrelevant (as in the application of many evidence
rules), or, if total exclusion is impossible, how protection is found by the
nullification of the non-relevant. That all parties to a litigation should
have the benefit of counsel is a tacit application of the rule that the effect
of mere professional skill on decisions should be nullified by being equal-
ized on all sides. A more positive aspect of procedure is the clarifying
of goals and alternatives; still another is provision for the discovery of
new truth. The latter problem carries us over to the study of the set-ups
most favorable to enlarging the stock of scientific knowledge available to
society. When we consider private pressure organizations, the same ques-
tions must be systematically canvassed as for government. Already many
legal devices have been invoked for such purposes as forcing disclosure of
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records to members. Private business organizations are affected by legal
means affecting the stream of intelligence at the disposal of prospective
investors, and of the shareholders of going concerns. Parallel problems
can be taken up for the remaining types of cultural organizatii oi.
3. Law and Distribution. We have laid down as one of our major
policy objectives the achievement and protection of balanced income. The
purpose of this course is to examine the effect of legal syntax. procedures.
and structures upon property distribution and to consider their potentiali-
ties for the attainment of varying states of balanced distribution. The
course begins with a study of the present distribution of income, of the
correlations between this distribution and the distribution of other values,
and generally of the factors affecting distribution. Consideration will then
be given to alternative distributions, their probable consequences, and the
compatibility of these consequences with major democratic values. Once
preferred distributions are designated or assumed, the course can begn t,
consider the great variety of controls relevant to redistribution, such as
taxation, government spending, credit manipulation, tariff policies. c,,n-
trol of corporate device, patent revision, changing rules of descent and
inheritance, price controls, abolition of restraints on employment, criminal
penalties for too obvious shearing of sheep, changes in bankruptcy laws,
anti-monopoly activities, and so on.
The authority to tax, for example, is peculiarly relevant here, since it
is theoretically possible to mold the pattern of income distribution by the
appropriate use of the tax power. At any given time, however, we are
confronted by many devises by which exercise of the tax power in the
interest of balanced distribution are nullified in practice. For this reason
it is necessary to devote patient attention to the fate of various tax provi-
sions of federal, state and local units of government. In point here is the
thorny problem of double taxation, not only among the several jurisdic-
tions within a given nation but by several states of the world. We find a
continual struggle between the specialists hired by tax reducers and spe-
cialists hired by tax enforcers, and one function of this course will he to
get abreast of the current state of this perpetual tug-of-war. In recent
times, for instance, we have seen legal syntax connected with the trust
made use of extensively in tax evasion.
4. Law and Production. The problems centering around production
concern regularity and volume. It is apparent that this is one of
the continuing and crucial problems of a machine econumv. How-
ever, regularity is not the only consideration pertinent to the pricess
of production. It is evident that we are also interested in the volume of
various types of products. Although the word "production" is made use
of to describe man-hours and materials expended, the term covers many
diverse operations. There are great differences in the attitude of workers
and management when they are engaged in producing instruments of war
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than when they are at peace. Attitudes differ when heavy machinery or
luxury goods are being made. Some processes of production are deeply
respected by those who participate in them, while others have no emo-
tional satisfactions whatever. To cover all of these diversified situations
by the term "production" is a very preliminary use of the word; sub-
specification is immediately needed.
In this course we pay particular attention to the role of money in rela-
tion to the technical processes of production. Modern analysis of the
monetary (including the credit) system has disclosed the enormous cumu-
lative effect of seemingly isolated transactions upon the ebb and flow of
economic activity. When an invested dollar is backed by a saved dollar
there can be steady expansion of total production. However, there are
many technical devices whose effect is to destroy any constant relationship
between dollars saved and dollars invested and to create a pyramiding of
money that rests upon no foundation of saving. This process can give rise
to enormous booms, but such booms cannot be sustained indefinitely and
end in crash. The fabrication of dollars is often obscured by the technical
operations involved, the most striking example of which has been a sys-
tem of financing business through commercial banks. When a bank re-
ceives a deposit it assumes a liability to return the money. If it did no
more than "warehouse" the depositor's dollars, retaining them as a 100%
reserve until called for, it would make only the money charged the de-
positor for the performance of this custodial service. When the bank
loans out dollars that it has received to businesses, savings are trans-
formed into investment and the income of the bank is increased by the
interest charged on the loan. Commercial banks, however, have been
permitted to enlarge their profit-making opportunities by the use of pro-
cedures enabling them to create dollars. This is what happens when a loan
is granted in the form of a deposit, since the bank is now able to loan
out some of the deposit that it has just created; and the pyramiding may
go on until an enormous discrepancy prevails between the saved dollars
and the number of "invested" dollars circulating. It has been proposed
that the warehouse function and the investing function should be clearly
segregated in different types of institutions and made subject to rules
that keep the flow of dollars invested in stable relationship to the dollars
saved in the economic system as a whole. This is but a single example
of the complex technical processes of modern institutional life with which
we are especially concerned. In this context it will be necessary to ap-
praise not only the consequences of the banking system but of securities
markets, exchanges, government budgets, currency regulations, import
and export of capital, and the like.
8 3
83. Professor Eugene Rostow has developed courses on (a) The Control of Competi-
tion, given three or four times in various forms at Yale, and (b) The Control of Indus-
trial Fluctuations, given in part in Chicago in 1941, and listed for Yale in the Spring of
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5. Law and Character. The plan of this series of materials is to con-
sider factors affecting the distribution of respect in society. In studying
the relation of legal syntax to respect we will evaluate it from the point
of view of increasing or diminishing the zone of individual self-deter-
mination. Included here are many of the limitations on the procedure
of public officers designed to protect the individual from arbitrary acts.
In so far as the traditional remedies for many torts are designed to dimin-
ish the amount of interference by persons or groups with one another,
they will be relevant in this course. When we use the word "interference"
we refer to actions affecting an individual that are regarded by him (and
accepted by the courts) as limitations upon his freedom of choice.
A more positive side of respect is equality of opportunity, and many
legal doctrines are designed to facilitate, or can be used to expedite, the
realization of equality. Laws against discrimination on grounds of age,
sex, race, religion, provenience in obtaining access to education or jobs,
fall in this category. One positive facet of respect is the exempting of
persons from burdens that they are less qualified to bear than some others
in the community, and the placing of special burdens on those capable of
carrying them. (Equality of sacrifice, it may be said again, does not mean
equality of burden. In the interest of equality many legal arrangements
grant exemptions to children, women, sick, crippled, or defective people).
As a means of aiding character formation, special provisions are often
made to affect the rearing of children. The aim of many of these provi-
sions is to protect the growing child from the character distortions that
result when the personality is treated disrespectfully (such as rules to
protect offspring from the stigma attached to illegitimacy).
6. Law and Community Development. This is a course which cuts
across all our major values and variables. Its frame of reference is the
relation of legal syntax, procedures, and structures to the utilization of
resources in communities of varying size. The areas range from neigh-
borhoods to village and urban nucleii, to regions, to the broader geographi-
cal areas of the world. In modem times the problem of providing some
degree of direction for the use of land and other resources for population
groups has become increasingly urgent. The need is most acute in relation
1942. The first course was an effort to study the economic literature on the subject of
competition and to use it in analyzing a complex mass of data, given in cases, statutes,
administrative reports, etc., concerning specific markets for coal, oil, milk, steel and other
commodities. The second course was designed on the same pattern to analyze the chief
legal institutions of use or potential use in controlling general fluctuations in employment:
the banking system, the securities markets, currency laws, international exchanges, as
well as more general economic arrangements for controlling wages, prices, etc. Some
experimental materials of this kind were published in Chicago in 1941. The two courses
together were designed both to cover aspects of the problem of economic polidy as a
whole, and to present an 'integrated conception of a positive economic program for
democracy.
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to community and regional planning. Whenever a problem of community
development is in the foreground, the fundamental point is to be clear
about the pattern of life that it is proposed to facilitate. Given our prefer-
ence for a democratically functioning society, by what legal devices can
we give direction to the growth of communities along lines consistent with
these ideals?
It is evident that community planning brings into the focus of atten-
tion all of the ends and means that we have considered. Certainly the lay-
out of homes and work places exerts a profound effect upon the degree
to which democratic character is achieved by the rising generation and
the extent to which democratic ideas are put into practice by the older
generation. One of the major sectors of this problem concerns the use
of legal doctrines and new institutions as means to the achievement of
ever-expanding standards of individual health and safety, of individual
comfort, convenience and taste. In this context is found most of the tra-
ditional content of courses in property, but the syntax of property is given
significance in relation to the problems here set forth and much new mate-
rial is covered. Some indication of the possible scope of such a course
has been offered in the discussion of community planning and housing
above.
In all the foregoing courses a continuing theme is the relation of the
problem at hand to the stage of crisis or inter-crisis prevailing in the
nation as a whole. In the crisis of war, every problem must be seen in a
somewhat distinctive framework. There are the enormous adaptations
involved in conversion from peacetime to wartime production; and at
the end, there are the special problems of "conversion back." Hence one
of the considerations governing the choice of cases throughout will be to
exhibit problems that arise in crises of varying degrees of intensity and
duration.
Skill Principle
It remains to discuss the third principle of reorganizing the curriculum,
the skill principle. The second, or value, principle is the one we have em-
phasized most, although the first, or influence, principle deserves a larger
place than it now has. The immediate problem is to what extent we shall
take skill into consideration.
In a sense all courses in the law school exemplify the skill principle,
since they provide the student with command of legal technicality. Though
we proceed on the assumption that the skill principle in this sense must
be applied in whatever curricular changes are introduced, we have asserted
that the choice and arrangement of legal technicality should be made from
the standpoint of influential groups or key values. There are, however, cer-
tain clusters of legal syntax that should be considered separately if we are
to avoid tiresome and wasteful repetition. The traditional courses in pro-
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cedure have already been instanced as the classical application of the skill
principle, in this more limited meaning. Their function is to train the
incipient lawyer how to choose a court for settling his dispute and how to
operate a court once chosen to get the result he wants. Obviously both
the "jurisdiction" and the "mechanics" of courts affect the distribution
of each of the values in which we are interested, especially power, and
are bound to come in for a certain amount of attention in our specific
analysis of values. But the details of court procedure and structure are
worthy of special courses. The operating lawyer sees his alternatives of
action in this way: Who has authority to settle my dispute? Who of this
group is most likely to be predisposed in my favor? How can I operate
on him to get the results I want? By what verbal incantations and the
like do I get in and out of the scope of his authority?
It is common knowledge, however, that a lawyer who wishes to oper-
ate successfully on his environment does not confine himself to the courts.
Inuential decisions are not restricted to judges. Skill training that stops
short with the traditional procedure courses leaves the potential policy-
maker hopelessly inadequate for modern conditions. For he must be pre-
pared to work with-and on-legislators, executives, administrators, arbi-
trators, negotiators, and other responsible persons. It is incumbent
upon law teachers to make plain to the student not only that there
are different ways of settling disputes but many ways of getting
results other than by disputation."4 As a lawyer moves away from acts
84. Compare Assistant Solicitor General Cox, Wartine Interpretation of Legisative
Orders, mimeographed address to Society for the Advancement of Management, August,
1942:
"We lawyers are frequently-and many times justly-accused of having
negative minds. Too often we are disposed to search out and magnify the reasons
why something necessary can not be done rather than to seek the means whereby
it canl be done. The counsel's office is the bottleneck of progress in many a gov-
ernment agency faced with the urgent job of putting a new policy into effect
or carrying out a directive from Congress.
"The responsibility of the government lawyer in time of war is, abuve every-
thing else, the affirmative one of finding ways and means by which the decisions
of the policy-makers can be most promptly and effectively fulfilled ....
". .. Our lawyers must be sufficiently bold and imaginative to explore this
new realm of freedom-to discover -what the law can do as well as what it can
prohibit."
For further indication of what is required here see FRAm-rurr, TuE PULnuc Am Ir.
GovnaN_-.-r (1930); GALLOWAY AND AssociATEs, PLANNING Ma AursucA (1941);
LAN"DIS, THE ADmiSTRATivE PRocEsS (1938); NAT. Resounces Co=.nrree, Tim
STRucrRE OF THE A.ERICAN Ec OMY (1939) Pt. 1; Gray, Tit Passing of the Public
Utility Concept (1940) 16 J. oF LAND AND P. U. Ecox. 8; Lilienthal and Marquis, The
Conduct of Business Entcrprises by the Federal Gov'mment (1941) 54 HAiv. L Rev.
545; Rostow, Book Review (1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 169; Tugwell, The Superpo-
litical (1940) 5 J. Soc. PHI.osoPHy 97.
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that impinge directly on a court, his distinctive skill in handling legal
technicality loses application and he is compelled to rely more fully upon
general policy skills. If the lawyer is to operate on a par with others he
cannot afford to foreswear these skills. The years spent in going to law
school impose handicaps no less than advantages if they insulate the stu-
dent from opportunity to acquire or perfect the exercise of the modes
of thinking, observing and managing that we call general policy skills.
To a limited extent the existing curriculum looks beyond the doctrines,
procedures and structures of the court system and calls the attention of
students to other processes by which controls are made operative in mod-
ern civilization. Most of these ancillary courses, however, go but a little
way toward providing a unified factual picture of the process of dispute-
settling and result-getting in our society. Entirely too much concerned
with the syntax of "interpretation," and over-cautious in abjuring "pol-
icy," 85 courses on legislation rarely come to grips with the fundamental
problem of how to get statutes enacted for achieving specified purposes.
In control over funds, in power to create new structures and procedures,
and in authority to prescribe policy norms of the broadest scope by utiliz-
ing words that refer to identifiable social goals, the legislature ranks among
our most strategic agencies; its comparative neglect by the law schools
can hardly be justified in a democracy. Surprisingly enough, courses on
the executive are conspicuously non-existent. Whatever attention is be-
stowed upon the modern executive is imbedded in the interstices of con-
stitutional law. The potency of the executive for waging war suggests
that equal potency might be achieved with adequate safeguards for the
waging of peace. Still over-apologetic about the growth of the adminis-
trative function and excessively worried about the "nature" of that func-
tion, established courses on "administrative law" seldom succeed in hav-
ing a sufficiently sustained orientation toward important factual contexts
to make the syntax with which they deal meaningful; moreover, they sel-
dom give explicit and creative attention to how "administration" can be
adapted or even further extended for the better promotion of democratic
values. Only an occasional catalog carries an occasional seminar on arbi-
tration, despite the enormous potentiality of this procedure for reducing
wasteful litigation. The "public authority" or "public corporation," fast
emerging as one of the most significant agencies of our time, probably
with a great international career ahead of it, receives scant notice.
Most of the material describing power processes in our civilization can
be furnished to the student in the proposed course on "law and control."
But every agency engaged in preventing and settling disputes evolves de-
tailed doctrines and procedures; hence skill courses on the existing opera-
tion and possible improvement of each structure should be offered. In
all such courses the minutiae ought to be mastered first, followed by criti-
85. See Hurst, Content of Courses in Legislation (1941) 8 U. op Cmu. L. REV. 280.
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cal thought about how the detailed modalities of the structure-whether
court, legislature, executive, administrative agency, or public corporation
-may be molded into more perfect instruments of democracy. The lat-
ter frame of reference follows the value rather than the skill principle;
but there is nothing that forbids compatible principles from being applied
in the same course. The influence, value and skill principles are not mutu-
ally exclusive; properly understood they supplement one another. Al-
though we rely upon the value principle to provide the broad frame within
which an improved curriculum can emerge, we are not estopped from ex-
ploring every fruitful combination with other principles.
In the foregoing discussion of principles the main emphasis has been
upon mastering the legal technicality needed for the professional practice
of law; at the same time, the objective has been to relate this distinctive
skill to the goals and the general skills appropriate to the maker of policy
in a society that affirms its devotion to the dignity of man. We assume
that "courses" will continue to be the pedagogical framework in which
most of the law school instruction will be carried on. We are not opposed
to supplementary means of reconditioning the law school environment
into a more efficient instrument of pedagogy-indeed, we shall presently
make some proposals looking in this direction-but we regard the pattern
of classroom instruction as too firmly rooted in our culture to give way in
the immediate future. Moreover, it is entirely possible to work within
this frame in transmitting policy attitudes and techniques. Individual law,
professors can reset the modest parcel of legal technicality over which
they have catalog control in such a way that it contributes directly to the
aims we have been stating. Adventurous law faculties can revamp the
traditional compartments in accord with the principles of value, influence
and skill here made articulate; but the heart of the matter is not the re-
christening of courses but the changing of aim and emphasis.
The resetting of legal technicality in a policy-potent framework is an
enormous task for any law professor who has the temerity to consider
the gaps in his own equipment, and the skills most appropriate to the relat-
ing of legal syntax to the larger factual context with which it unceasingly
interacts. During the years of transition toward a policy-training law
school, it will be advisable to provide special guides to aid the student in
orienting himself. We have already provided a brief synopsis of the skills
to be commended for inclusion in the training progran of the future law
school. In the skill table we set out, besides legal technicality, other skills
of thought, observation and management to which we may now give more
extended attention.
Skills of Thought
The mastery of habits of thought and talk can be facilitated by insight
into the nature of the tools themselves. Insight is something more than
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the enrichment that comes from learning and relearning the terms, doc-
trines and citations of any established field of law. Insight means aware-
ness, not puppet learning; and one means of enabling the student to objec-
tify his thinking about thought and language is to provide him with knowl-
edge of the rapidly expanding sciences that deal with these two indispen-
sable processes. We understand legal technicality better when we know
wherein it resembles or diverges from other forms of expression. These
distinctions are all the more pertinent, since in his professional career the
lawyer cannot confine himself to the "Yea, Yea," and the "Nay, Nay,"
of the legal idiom. Whether he addresses client or juror, the language of
legal technicality gains clarity and impact in the framework of other forms
of communication.
In recent years our knowledge of the process of thought and comniuni-
cation has advanced by leaps and bounds, and new insights, properly cor-
related and kept up to date, should be made accessible to the student. 80
Several frames of reference are often unwittingly invoked by those who
purport to state the "law"; and until these differences are explored, con-
fusion is compounded.
Consider, for a moment, the following statement uttered by a law teach-
er who is expounding a case, a legal adviser who is arguing with a client,
or an advocate who is addressing the court: "This is the law (followed
by a statement of a 'doctrine')." This statement may be treated as a sum-
mary of past statements made by sources who are treated as qualified
spokesmen (authorities). It may also be taken to refer to future events,
predicting what certain authorities will say (even though there is doubt
about what they have said in the past) ;8 or it may be construed as a
declaration of preference by the professor, adviser, advocate-a statement
of what the speaker thinks the law should be even though the authorities
(before or after) dissent. 8  If this last construction is put upon the
words, the speaker may affirm that he is misunderstood, since he did not
use words that categorically convey preference; nevertheless, the listener
may believe that the speaker lays himself open because so many talkers
do in practice say "the law is so and so" when what they mean-in the
sense of what they say if challenged-is a preference for the law to be so
and so. Under some circumstances the statement goes beyond a simple
preference and becomes a volition to do whatever is feasible to get the
"should" accepted as an "is."
86. Consult OGDEN AND RICHARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING (4th ed. 1936), with
Supplementary Essays by Malinowski and Crookshank; also Sapir, Language in 9 ENcY,'
Soc. Sc. (1933) 155, Communication in 4 id. (1931) at 78, and Symbolism in 14 id.
(1934) at 492.
87. Obviously the aim of those who accept the "prediction theory of law" is to arrive
at future reference statements that will be confirmed by the event.
88. The "normative conception of law" arrives at such statements, if the speaker
takes responsibility for the norms invoked by him.
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Hence if we take the statement of the "law" at face value we may find
it ambiguous; and we can call it uormativc-anibiguo us, because the word
"law" is used, and "law" is a word that refers to norms, even though
it is unclear whether the norm in question pertains exclusively to the
speaker, whether it is shared by the speaker with others, or whether,
though a norm of others, it is not the norm of the speaker at all. Common
sense experience emphasizes the enormous role of such normative-ambigu-
ous statements in the discourse that purports to expound "law" or "ethics"
or "Divine Will." "That is right (morally)" is a sentence open to all the
doubts raised about the "this is the law" sentence; and "this is God's
Will" is no whit less ambiguous. By evoking such word sequences a
speaker may conceal his own preference or volition on contentious mat-
ters and increase the attention paid to what he says by enunciating norms
whose sponsor appears to transcend the speaker."0
If we seek to gain objectivity toward our flow of thought-and every-
body's flow of language---it is helpful to practice using technical categories
for classifying the phenomena in question. We have already suggested
that some statements may be described as normative-ambiguous; and
there are other useful distinctions to be drawn according to whose norms
are understood to be involved. Thus, "I think the law should be so and
so" plainly involves the maker of the statement; it is a normnative-dcnand
statement. "The judges of that period held that the rule was so and so"
is a remark about the norms of others; it is ncturalistic-normatihe. The
"fact" statements in litigation are iuturalistic.
Many normative statements refer to internal relations among a group
of propositions. Assertions that purport to formulate a legal doctrine
may be examined in connection with the entire family of statements that
are taken to be the "law of contract," or the "law as a whole," in a given
period or jurisdiction. The internal relations among these statements are
consistency, economy and degree of generality (universality-particularity) ;
statements about these relations are syntactical. A well-developed syn-
tactical system is composed of propositions utilizing a limited list of key
terms combined according to postulates and rules. The law is but one of
the well-developed syntactical systems in our civilization; every theology
is such a system." Where the meaning involves not the internal rela-
89. The "illusion of universality" is cultivated by ambiguousness. For this and simi-
lar distinctions see AI.roRr, SocIAL PsYcHOLoGY (1924).
90. A valuable contribution to our understanding of the likenesses and differences
of modem and ancient logics is KaPP, Ganaic FOUND.T0iNS OF TrAnirxo.AL LOGIC (1942).
Note particularly the treatment of the syllogism in Chapter 4. For a succinct statement
of syllogistic logic: Treusch, Thc Sylloghsm, in HALL, READINGS In JURIsPRn.mca
(193S) c. 12. For modem "postulationalist" logics: CARs'AP, I,;TrhoDcrit:. To SmmANTICS
(1942); KonzvBsKi. SCIENcE AND S..NITY (1933); T. Asi:r,. INmorcno: ro Loatc
(1941) ; USnENKO, THE PRoBLmss oF LoGic (1941) (a criticism). A "psycholoistie"
logic is DE.EY, LoGIc, THE THEORy oF INQumY (1938).
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tions of a body of propositions, but the external references of a state-
ment, we are dealing with the semantic dimension of thought and lan-
guage. The statement that Judge So-and-So made such and such remarks
is a semantic proposition; the statement that certain of his remarks con-
tradicted one another is syntactic.
We are now in a better position to detect the many frames of reference
that may be more or less wittingly invoked by those who purport to state
a legal doctrine. To the degree that a given statement affirms that some-
thing was said in the past, or will be said in the future, it is semantic. To
the degree that it characterizes the interrelations of past or future state-
ments according to consistency, generality and economy, the statement is
syntactic. It may be that the formulation of the legal rule is accomplished
by declarations of approval or disapproval on the part of the statement-
maker or of determination to block the recognition of the rule; these are
normative-demand, not naturalistic-normative.
All of the distinctions made thus far have to do with the coutcnt of
statements rather than their causes or consequences. If we assert that the
court accepts a certain rule out of deference to a cited authority, our re-
mark purports to explain the judge's conduct. In this instance the explana-
tion offered is to impute to' the judge a conscious or unconscious bias.,"
Other types of explanation may, however, be invoked, as when we say
that Judge So-and-So favors the corporations because he comes from an
upper income family."- In this case we are connecting conduct with posi-
tion in the social structure. The foregoing statements have been causal;
and statements about consequence may also refer to personality or social
context. We may forecast that a ruling will annoy a certain justice on
the bench of a higher court, or predict that the ruling made by the court
will hasten the concentration of wealth. When we undertake to relate
what is said to its causes or consequences, we are indulging in pragniatics,
as distinguished from seinologics (which is content). All pragmatic state-
ments are naturalistic.
Most of the "fact statements" offered in court belong to the realm of
semantic discourse. The counsel, however, has latitude in selecting and
presenting this material on the basis of his estimate of the pragmatic
probability of acceptance by judge and jury. Statements put forward as
"fact" are continually scrutinized syntactically in order to expose or cover
up lurking inconsistency.
On examination it appears that most of the language used in presenting
claims to the court is syntactic in nature, since it applies a system of
closed categories of identification to all parties involved in the controversy,
91. A general bias toward absolutism was asserted in FRANi, LAW AND THE MOD-
ERN MIND (1930).
92. Such interpretations are stressed in Marxist literature. See BouDIN, GovERMNT
BY JUDICIARY (1932).
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and invokes normative standards in justifying specific demands. The
norms of claimants often run through a wide gamut of legal, policy and
other standards; but at every step of the proceedings the counsel governs
his choice of syntactical propositions by his forecast of their pragmatic
effect on the trial and appeal court. The heavy freight of citation that
appears in every brief is semantic (naturalistic-normative) to the degree
that it asserts the fact that authorities have enunciated norms; assertions
about the interrelations of doctrines are syntactic. We know that a parade
of citations is often designed to gain the pragmatic end of acceptance by
bulk.
For the most part opinions written by appellate judges flow within the
established banks of legal syntactics, though they are not infrequently
characterized, if not distinguished, by forthright declarations of prefer-
ence, sustained by norms of policy or theology. In some jurisdictions it
appears that a seat of authority promotes the flow of normatively am-
biguous discourse.
What we have been referring to as "legal syntax" is a short way of
talking about language that purports to state the "law"; on closer exam-
ination an example of legal syntax may turn out to be normative-ambigu-
ous, normative-demand, or naturalistic-normative. Following some cur-
rent usage, the entire science of statement analysis may be called senioic;
statements about content are semologic; statements about cause and effect
are pragmatic. Semologic falls into syntactics and semantics. a
In our proposals to recast the curriculum we do not recommend specific
courses on thought and language, but rather the preparation of materials
that can be kept readily available to the law student during all the years
of his training. The incentive to master the tools of thought and language
should be continually reinforced by a word-consciousness cultivated by
teachers in the classroom. As a guide and companion to many of the skills
valuable to the law student, it is advisable to prepare and keep up to date
through constant revision a collection of materials that may be called "The
Skill Book." Such a volume would contain reprints, original articles by
experts, and unpublished research; it would give "who's who" informa-
tion on authors.94
The categories just developed can be explicitly related to the forms of
thinldng mentioned above as goal, trend, and scientific. The statement of
a goal that is endorsed by the statement-maker is normative-demand; so,
93. "Semiotic," "pragmatic," "syntactic," and "semantic" are used in appro.mnately
the senses here indicated by Morris, loc. cit. supra note 66. Morris does not suggest a
convenient term for "content;" hence we have used "semologie to round out the system.
94. In the "who's who" of the science of thought and communication, America's
great pioneer, Charles S. Peirce, will be outstanding. Other significant figures will be
Carnap in Austria, Tarski in Poland, Couturat in France, Whitehead and Russell in
England.
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too, are explicit acceptances of more inclusive norms tinder which it is sub-
sumed, or particular applications that are deduced from it, Assertions
that a given statement of goal is consistent with a certain norm are not
necessarily normative-demand; the speaker may not himself prefer the
norm in question. Normative-demand statements may fall into the prefer-
ence or volition type ("I accept democratic values"; "I will work to clarify
and execute democratic policy").
What we have previously called skill in derivation is proficiency in syn-
tactics with special reference to arranging propositions in which affirma-
tions of the democratic values occupy a place. It is the same type of skill
involved in legal technicality, save that the lawyer operates with norms
imputed to an authority that is assumed to be binding on certain courts,
while the authority for moral and other norms may be indeterminate. In
connection with derivation, it should be noted, furthermore, that proficien-
cy has little bearing on which values are accepted by the statement-maker.
After all, the values of a given individual are acquired in the interaction
of original nature and the cultural environment in which lie grows tip.
What may be accomplished by a sophisticated process of derivation is in-
sight; and by means of insight our actions may be more efficiently inte-
grated toward realizing values. When we "take our values for granted"
we may not only make mistakes, but find ourselves at a disadvantage in
the articulate defense of our values when we meet anyone who doubts
or rejects them. Part of the lawyer's training should be familiarity with
the thought and speech of those who are currently invoked as authorities
in controversies over value. Hence a place will need to be found in the
Skill Book in which are described prevalent modes of legitimizing demo-
cratic or anti-democratic values.
9
Trend thinking, in contradistinction to goal thinking, is conspicuously
naturalistic in form, characterizing as it does the structure of past and fu-
ture events. Affirmations of approval or of determination to do everything
possible in order to increase the probable occurrence of future events are
not trend but goal statements. The thinker or speaker may assign varying
95. See, -e.g., DucAssz, PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENCE, ITS MATTER AND MET1OD
(1941); FRANK, BETWEEN PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY (1941); PERRY, GRNERAL TIEoRY
OF VALUE (1926); Dewey, Theory of Valuation in 2 INT. ENCYC. OF UNIFIED SCIENCE
(1939) No. 4. On the democratic values see ANSHEN (ed.), FREEDOM (1941) ; DEWEY,
THE ETHICS OF DEMtOCRACY (1888); FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS (1937); JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY (Padover ed. 1939) ; KALLEN (cd.), FREEDOM
IN THE MODERN WORD (1928) ; LASKI, DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS (1933); LINvSEY, Tim
ESSENTIAUS OF DEMOCRACY (1929); MERRIA.t, TnE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW
DESPOTISM (1939); MILL, ON LIBERTY (1854) : TAWNEY, EQUALITY (1931). Conveient
guides to democratic theory are CoxER, RECENT POLITICAL THOUGHT (1934); MERRIAM
AND BARNES, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES, RECENT TIMES (1924). See also CAR-
GILL, INTELLECTUAL AMERIcA (1941); GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DFMoCRATIc
THOUGHT (1940) ; PARUUNGTOX, MAIN CURRENTS IN AmERICAN THOUGHT (1927-1930).
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degrees of probability to the occurrence of the events referred to; indeed
he must arrive at such estimates if he is to think and act on the basis of
the alternatives that the future seems to hold in store. When the speaker's
estimate of probability is left vague, the statement is naturalistic-ambigu-
ous. When probability is assigned by the speaker the degree may be high
or low; or it may be wholly uncertain: "America's balance of govern-
ment and business will outlive totalitarian forms of state and society";
"Private enterprise is doomed"; "I have no opinion as yet about the future
of private enterprise."
Scientific thinking, too, is naturalistic in the sense that all propositions
are looked upon as confirmd or confirmable by data. The language of
science, however, includes both direct statements about events and state-
ments about these statements. The first are the sentences embodying data
and the second are concepts, definitions, rules, laws and hypotheses. Propo-
sitions that state interrelations among variables are hypotheses; they are
laws when they receive a sufficiently high degree of confirmation by data.
In accounting for the behavior of courts we have specified a number of
variables whose interrelationship is a potential object of scientific investi-
gation. Claims presented, objective facts, legal norms and all the other
factors enumerated can be connected with the description of reality by
specifying the indices that a given observer is authorized to accept as evi-
dence of the variable's presence, direction and magnitude. It is apparent,
therefore, that while the generalizations of science are confirmed or con-
firmable by data, and therefore rest upon a body of semantic propositions,
the semantic statements are composed of units whose definitions and rules
of combination are part of a syntactic system.06
Certain distinctions cut across goal, trend and scientific thinking; all
statements may be given contemplative or manipulative form. A goal
may be phrased in passive, contemplative form when one says, "Let us
assume for the moment that we want to increase by 107 the segment of
the population called middle class." Goals may also be phrased manipu-
latively, actively: "We want a healthy middle class, and that means ex-
panding the middle class sector of the population 10%, in the immediate
future." A trend is formulated in a contemplative manner when we say,
96. Scientific relations may be formulated in terms of factor X and factor Y, or
systemically. Variables compose a system where changes in any one of them regularly
bring about changes in the others that maintain the characteristic pattern of the variables
as a whole. Biological processes have been fruitfully considered from this standpoint;
the physico-chemical components of the blood stream, for e.'ample, constitute a system.
If one of them alters in magnitude, the others change enough to maintain the integrity
of the whole. This approach to social processes is advocated in MAYo, HUMAN Pr o0-
LEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION (1933). For sociological theory, the "one factor-
one result" pattern of thought is stated in DuRxHF.am, Tri RuLs OF SOCILOGICcAL
MErHOD (1938 tr.). An eample of its application is RANULF, JEALOUSY OF THE GoDs
AXD CRIMINAL LAW AT ATHENS (1933-34).
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"We will now consider the possibility that free private enterprise is rap-
idly moving toward extinction." A more affirmative, manipulative mode
of referring to trend is: "The extinction of free private enterprise is proba-
ble in the immediate future." Scientific propositions may be couched in
contemplative, inactive style, when we say, "X varies as a function of Y
and Z." The same relations may be stated as principles, not as laws, when
we say, "To increase the amount of X, diminish the quantity of Y and
increase the quantity of Z." It is plain that most of the sentences that
phrase responsible decisions are likely to be phrased manipulatively; on
the contrary, initial, tentative and speculative attitudes will be in more
contemplative form. For various pragmatic'reasons even the statements
embodying fixed determination may sometimes receive contemplative ex-
pression.
This carries us to the need of distinguishing the method from the form
of thought. By method of thinking we mean an operation that is carried
on with insight for the express purpose of problem-solving. Manifestly,
it is not appropriate to speak of a method of thinking when the process is
dominated by unanalyzed and unexplored hunch. The sequence in which
different patterns of thought are taken up by the problem-solver may
affect the probability that he will arrive at realistic solutions. Many prob-
lem-solving operations go wrong through failure to clarify goal, or to
evaluate trend and scientific data. The deliberate use of each pattern of
thinking for the purpose of facilitating the total process is the configura-
tive method of thought. 7 Practical classroom teaching in the law school
will be at its best when it stimulates versatile modes of attack upon any
problem; and supplementary guides to the study of specific techniques of
thinking will be valuable if they contribute to insight.
Skills of Observation
Insight into the process of thought are not sufficient to provide the law
student with the orientation needed for policy-thinking. No matter how
well-equipped the individual is for goal, trend and scientific analysis, his
elaborate machinery must work on relevant factual material. As class-
room instruction is progressively revised, the student will be exposed to
97. LAsswELL, WORLD PouLTICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935) c. 1 and Person,
Personality, Group, Culture (1939) 2 PSYCHIAmY: J. OF BIo. AND PATH. OF INTIER-
SONAL RELATIONS 533. To think or talk in "equilibrium" terms is to use "variables,"
whether in a one-to-one or a systemic pattern. Thinking or talking may also be "devel-
opmental," in the sense that terms are employed that refer concretely to events. If, fol-
lowing CAIRNS, THIE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1941), we choose the term "order"
to indicate the frame of reference for legal studies, and consider the variables that affect
it, our mode of thought fits the equilibrium mould. If we consider the post-war pros-
pects of war in Germany, our starting-point is developmental. In the same way we may
begin with, or stress, syntactic or semantic statements.
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more facts about the world. However, it will be necessary for the class-
room to maintain a high degree of concentration upon drill in the hand-
ling of legal technicality. When, in connection with specific cases, the
facts are in the foreground, the outline of the social system as a whole
may remain too far in the background. As a corrective of the many dis-
tortions of perspective that come from specialization, it will be wise to
make available to the law student a guide to social trends, a body of mate-
rials to be continuously consulted in the course of his educational and
subsequent professional experience. We have already outlined the justifi-
cation of factual knowledge of trend, since we have put a great deal of
emphasis upon the rational choice of goal, and the disciplined choice of
method, on the basis of insight into the structure of the situation in which
it is necessary to operate.
As a means of making the point more explicit, we include a provisional
outline of a possible "Trend Book." 1s To some extent the outline has
grown out of trial and error in teaching and policy advising relationships.
The book, it will be noted, is divided into five major divisions, of which
the first, having to do with population, provides basic information about
the density, distribution and biological characteristics of the people of
America and of the world. The second division is taken up with trends in
the utilization of resources. It brings together information about how
people spend their time in production and about the volume and efficiency
of output, the level of consumption, the degrees of depletion of potential
resources, and the intensity of inventiveness in relation to the exploitation
of natural advantages. The plan is to describe each trend, first in terms of
such technical measures as "man hours," or "per capita physical units,"
and then in monetary terms, such as "dollar value of output" or "dollars
received." Summaries are made of the fluctuation of price levels and of
general economic activity.
The third part deals with the distribution of values among various
groups in society. The main breakdown is according to deference, income
and safety. Deference is the general term for the distinctive values of
power, respect, knowledge. The fourth division of the "Trend Book"
summarizes information about changing methods of getting social results.
Here the lines of division are according to the main instruments by which
the human enviroument can be modified. To some extent results are ob-
tainable by the manipulation of symbols, as when counsel argues before the
court, which reach the public through news releases and interpretative com-
ment. Besides the manipulation of symbols, results can be achieved by the
skillful handling of goods and services. In this connection we keep track
of boycotts, barter and other arrangements for using economic means for
policy ends. Violence, of course, stands out as a method of overwhelming
9. See Appendix to this Article.
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importance today. By diplomacy we mean the use of official offer and
counter-offer, agreement and non-agreement, as a means of getting results.
In this connection we review the practices of mediation, arbitration, con-
ciliation, adjudication, legislation and similar procedures, whose relative
significance fluctuates from time to time and place to place. In connection
with the treatment of each of these methods it is convenient to give atten-
tion to the structural characteristics of the specialized agencies most con-
cerned with them. Here is where details will be found about the structure
and operating procedures of courts.
The fifth and last division gathers together trends relating to the value
position and methods of groups whose members are rarely if ever gath-
ered in an all-inclusive organization. In the fifth division such topics
are considered as the changing place of class, skill, personality and atti-
tude groups. Much of the pertinent information can be cited by cross-
references made to the preceding parts of the "Trend Book." However,
there are or can be summaries of the change in the total situation of
various components of society, and these will be assembled in the fifth
division.
In general, our view is that the material brought together for the use
of law students ought to provide them with a concise, inclusive, reliable
answer to such fundamental questions as these: I-ow are population
characteristics changing? What are the trends in the use of basic re-
sources? What trends are exhibiting themselves in the distribution of each
significant value in society? What are the changes in the degree to which
different methods of influence are relied upon? What are the trends af-
fecting the value, position and methods of each of the important groups
of which society is composed? 0'
Valuable as the trend data are for the education of lawyers and policy-
makers, they by no means exhaust the helpful material. The student
needs a guide to the best sources of information and analysis about the
major fields of national policy. At the present time there is a growing
agreement on the convenience of dividing total policy into the fields
99. In the outline we have referred under each main topic to one or two sample charts
or tables. These are intended to give a greater sense of reality about each of the sub-
categories and to underline the advantages that come from making our knowledge of
social trends available in the compact or graphical forms that have been carried to such
a high state of perfection in recent times. This is the "age of visualization." There is no
more effective method of conveying relative magnitudes than by means of charts, graphs
and maps.
One result of preparing a "Trend Book" is to disclose gaps in knowledge of significant
relations. Our world is still poorly informed about itself, and a continuing inventory of
basic trends will reveal the spots where investigation is needed. The questions raised
by alert law students will, in many instances, lead to the making of special requests to
the census bureau and to other fact-gathering agencies.
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of strategy, diplomacy, economy and ideology. In the reconstruction of
the law school curriculum according to influence, value and skill princi-
ples, special emphasis upon value patterns must necessarily lead to fa-
miliarizing the student with the considerations involved in total policy.1°0
In order to give a more unified view of policy, it is advisable for the stu-
dent-at some point in his training-to concentrate upon well-rounded
assessment of national policy from the ideological, diplomatic, economic
and strategical standpoints. For this purpose it may be wise to arrange
for a series of seminars, available to students in their last year, on each
of the four fronts of policy. This idea may be made somewhat more
definite by sketching the possible scope of such seminars.
Seminar on Ideology. One function of this seminar will be to give spe-
cial consideration to the state of democratic ideology in relation to chal-
lenging ideologies at home and abroad. Part of the work will be to con-
sider the syntactical structure of major ideological systems, a procedure
that has already been discussed in connection with goal thinking. At the
same time, however, it will be necessary to describe the actual facts about
the ideological state of the world and of the chief trends that have been
manifesting themselves in it, together with the possible lines of future
development. The well-qualified student will want to have first-hand
acquaintance with the most authoritative expositions of major ideologies,
prepared by scholars or by persons whose power position in the world
entities what they say to particular consideration.1"' Within recent years
there have been important advances in the scientific methods of studying
ideological systems."0 2 In particular there has been avid study of the effect
100. Policy thinking, as remarked above, is more manipulative than contemplative;
it is pointed toward possible action in the emerging future. For a masterly enposition
see MANNHEIM, MAN AND Socm=r IN AN AGE OF REcONSTRUiTOn (1940) Pt. 4; see
also LYND, KNOWLEDGE Poa WHA ? THE PLACE or SocMA. ScmcN I m Mtn c& u CuL-
TUnE (1939).
A general science of "order" can be developed along the lines proposed by Cairns;
it would call for the "laws" of order and the "principles" of preserving order. Our pres-
ent concern is with part of the proposed field; we want to develop the laws, principles,
and practices of "democratic order." Another way to formulate our standpoint is to
say that we are concerned with a special field within the general science of values. The
general science may be christened "general political science" if desired; then the name o4
the special science becomes "the science of democracy" (distinct, for enample, from the
science of despotism or anarchy).
101. Besides the pro-democratic statements referred to above, the student will want
to familiarize himself with the positions taken by Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini-and equiva-
lents-together with their intellectual progenitors, expositors, and amplifiers.
102. Notably PAR-To, THE MIND AND SOCIETY (tr. 1935) ; IIANN-rnw, IOLOSGY AND
UTopiA (tr. 1936). On the backgrounds of modem thought consult C~ALYix, PoLIc.A
LIBERTY, A HisTORY OF THE CONCEPTION IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND MOaD=s Tnms
(1941); CuRTis, CvrwrAs Dsi (1934-37); 'McILv.IN, TE GOw\TII or POLrICAL
THOUGHT IN THE WE T (1932).
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of organized propagandas upon the spread and restriction of rival sys-
tems. 108
Seminar on Diplomacy. The function of diplomacy is to protect and
expand values by means of negotiation. In recent times the term "diplo-
macy" has been limited for the most part to the conduct of external
relations of states; but there is also internal diplomacy, the process by
which the individuals and group spokesmen of society come to terms with
one another by various forms of negotiation.
Successful diplomacy is possible only where there is awareness of the
changing power position of persons and groups at home and abroad.
Hence the seminar on diplomacy must examine trends in the power of
modern states and of the significant groups within them.1' 4 By examining
historical instances of diplomatic negotiation, it is possible to evaluate the
degree to which the technique of negotiation can itself become a significant
factor in achieving the policies appropriate to democratic goals.10 To
some extent books are available to interpret recent and prospective lines
of world development.Y' Indispensable data about the internal structure
of American and of other societies have been assembled by many schol-
ars.'0 7 Specialists have concentrated upon specific factors or groups of
factors that interplay in the total power process.'0
103. Examine for instance, ASHTON, THE FASCIST, His STATE AND HIS MIND (1937);
BORKENAU, WORLD COMMUNISM (1939); HEIDEN, HISTORY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM
(1935); LASSWELL AND BLUMENSTOCK, WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA (1939);
ROSENBERG, HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM (1934). General guides to the literature of propa-
ganda are FARAGO AND GITnTER, GERMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (1941) (annotated
bibliography); LASSWErL, CASEY AND SMITH, PROPAGANDA AND PROMOTIONAL ACTiVI-
TIES, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1935).
104. For the diplomatic picture see B~tis, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITEu
STATES (1936) ; LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND ALIGNMENTS, 1871-1890 (1931) and
DIPLOMCY OF IMPERIALISM, 1890-1902 (1935) ; STEIGER, A HISTORYr TF HE FAR EAST
(1936). On transformations in the social structure of the great powers, consult FoRD
(ed.), DICTATORSHIP IN THE MODERN WORLD (1939); MICHELS, UMSCHICHTUNGEN IN
DEN HERRSCHENDEN KLASSEN NACH DEM% KRIEGE (1934); NEUMANN, PERMANENT REVo-
LUTIoN (1942).
105. See such detailed studies as FAY, ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR (2d ed. 1930);
SCHMITT, THE COMING OF THE WAR (1930).
106. See BURNHAM, MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1941); LEDERER, STATE OF TIHE
MASSES (1940); NoMAD, REBELS AND RENEGADES (1932).
107. On Germany see NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, THE STRUCTURE AND PRAcrIC OF
NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1942) ; on France, FERRE, LES CLASSES SOCALES DANS LA FRANCF
COTEMPORAINE (1934) ; on England, CARR-SAUNDERS AND JONES, SURVEY OF THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF ENGLAND AND WALES (1927); on China, WirrVOGEL, NEw LIGHT ON
CHINESE SOCIETY (1938) ; on Japan, LEDERER AND LEDERER-SEIDLER, JAPAN IN TRANSI-
TION (1938); in general, WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT u. GESELLSCHAFT (1924) 122, 603.
108. On geographical factors, for example, see WHITTLESEY, THE EARTIH AND TIIE
STATE (1939) ; also an appraisal of Geopolitik by WHiTTLESEY, COLBY AND HARTSHORNE,
GEAN STRATEGY OF WoRLD CONQUEST (1942).
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Semnhar on Economy. The task of this seminar is to evaluate the pos-
sible contribution to total politics of the skillful handling of goods and
prices. Basic data, of course, will concern trends of economic develop-
ment in America and throughout the world."" At the same time it will be
necessary to become familiar with the systems of economic thought that
are exerting significant influence on the assumptions and actions of influ-
ential groups throughout the world.'10
Seminar on Strategy. Strategy is concerned with the use of armies,
navies, air force and police as instruments for the attainment of selected
policy goals. The purpose of the seminar is not to turn out future gen-
erals or admirals but to prepare policy-moulders for realistic evaluation
of the testimony of whatever experts must be relied upon in the calcula-
tion of when, and how most effectively to use violence in defending and
advancing the basic aims of policy. Such a seminar will concern itself
with trends of fighting potential, with changes in the doctrine of war,
with innovations in the organization of the armed forces as well as the
technology of fighting.'
In connection with the work of each seminar it will be expedient to
provide for the continuous criticism of current writing and speaking on
the subject of America's policy. In this way the student will become more
intimately acquainted with "who's who" in the private and public dis-
Since we have used the term diplomacy to include all processes of agreement, the
inner front of diplomacy includes the structures and procedures by which offers are made
and accepted. In point, therefore, are studies of the courts in action, like Ctrxm Am
SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADmINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937); also, investiga-
tions of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, collective bargaining, and administrative
determination. See, for example, MILLIS, Hoxv CoLEcrIva BA GAINInG WonKs (1942).
109. See BErR, A HIsOaRY OF THE BUSINESS MAN (1938); BRucr, SOcIAL AND
EcoNoMIc HISTORY OF GERMANY (1938); DAY, Ecoxomic DEIEOPIoEur n Europa
(1942) ; Emmxv, STRATEGY OF RAW MTATERIAnLS (1934) ; GILF LLEN, SocioLOGY OF INvt-
aioN (1935); GRAS, HIsToRY OF AGRICULTURE IN EURoPE AND Amirtca (2d ed. 1940);
HAYNES, TIs CHEMICAL AGE (1942); LIEmANN, CARTELS, Cocr Ns, AND TusTs
(1932); NAT. RESOUrCES Comitrm, TECHNOLOGICAL TRNDs AND NATIONAL PoLICY
(1937); PiGou, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR (rev. ed. 1940); SwiEzy, Smucruna
OF NAzI ECONOMY (1941); VON WALTERSHAUSEN, Dm ENsTEuIu.N DEn WLTWvR-
scILLT (1931). See also HANsEN, FIsCA POLICY AND BusiNEss CYCLES (1941);
KEYNs, THE GERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 'MoNEY (1936).
110. Consult BUcK, THE POLITICS OF MERCANTILISMT (1942); Dicn:;so::, Eco:aMI-
or SOCIALISM (1939); Svwimzy, THE THEORY OF CITALI sT Drmwm.oMET (1942).
111. See BRODIE, SEA PowiR IN THE MACHINE AGE (1941); MITCrELL, OuLINEs
OF TRE WoRLDs MirrARY HISTORY (1931); RowAN, TERRoR I; ouR TI E (1941);
SLo=TzEI, THE WoRn ARMAMENT RACE, 1919-1939 (1941); SPAuLDING, NICIo.R;
ND RGHT, WARFARE (1925); SPYA, AMERIA.'s SrEGY IN Wonw Potatoes
(1942); VAGTS, HISTORY OF MIrrAmsM (1937); WENm, BATTLE Yon THaE NVonLD
(1941).
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cussions in the course of which policy-makers arrive at the proposals they
endorse.
1 12
It is evident that the frame of reference of the policy seminars is pri-
marily manipulative, in the sense that the minds of all participants are
pointed toward the deliberate pursuit of goals that are persistently being
clarified. As indicated before, the chief advantage of shifting the focus
of attention from classroom preoccupation with legal technicality is that
students can gain by shifting their frame of reference back and forth
from details to context and from one mode of thought to another-and
supplementary-one. With a knowledge of legal technicality well ad-
vanced, it will be possible for the student toward the end of his career in
the law school to canvass the larger outlines of the situation in which he
must presently find a more active and responsible place.
Whether the student is confronted by data purporting to deal with
goal or trend, he is continually faced with the task of evaluating every
statement in the light of its probable relationship to reality. Insight into
the structure of reality is a never-ending process and every detail of the
educational experience of the student can be justified only insofar as it
contributes to this all-encompassing need. Yet there are certain forms of
special experience that enhance the capacity of anyone to evaluate the
truth-value of what is told him. Throughout his professional life the
law student will deal with a continuing stream of experts on nearly any
conceivable topic. As a policy-maker, he will be particularly concerned
with what the specialists have to say about the processes of society and
about the formation of human personality. Policy considerations, as we
cannot too often reiterate, are "human" considerations the moment we
put at the apex of our value hierarchy the celebration and realization of
the dignity of the individual.
To some extent it will be possible to furnish law students with guides
to the procedures by which qualified specialists obtain their data, together
with the conceptual and technical processes by which they rearrange their
observations. One part of the Skill Book may, for instance, include handy
descriptions of the techniques used in collecting social data. Sometimes
a procedure calls for prolonged contact between the observer and the
individual or the situation under survey. The scholar who writes
the professional or private life of Blackstone, or makes a study of
112. The field of total policy can be considered as a whole, not only in reference to
ideology, diplomacy, economy and strategy. The larger structures involved in all of these
processes can be examined. This is the place at which the general laws and principles
of governmental organization are relevant (the analysis of legislation, the executive,
administration, adjudication and control). In recent times the strategy and tactics of
administration have received special attention; see, for example, METCALF AND URw K,
(eds.), DYNAMic AomlixskATrxox (1942); ROETHLISDERGER, MANAGEMENT AND MORALE
(1941).
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some living personality with whom he is in prolonged contact, stands at
one end of a series of data-gatherers; at the other end are interviewers
who ask a brief list of questions of persons whom they have never met
before and never expect to see again. Obviously the biographers are
making use of far more intensive procedures than the poll-taker. Differ-
entiations in intensiveness, however, do not turn exclusively upon the
length of time that the observer devotes his attention to any one indi-
vidual or situation. Intensiveness is a function of the complexity or sim-
plicity of the method utilized in recording and processing data. The
writer who is equipped to examine personality from the standpoint of
modern psychology, psychiatry and sociology is making use of a much
more complex method for deciding what details are data than the man
who operates within a framework of "common sense." "I The contact of
the poll-taker with an individual subject is very brief, yet it may be part of
a division of labor in which elaborate mechanical and statistical considera-
tions have been involved in constructing a satisfactory sample of the
population; and the individual interview results may be processed in con-
nection with hundreds or even thousands of other interviews taken con-
currently or during several preceding years."'
It is not only convenient to distinguish observational standpoints ac-
cording to their degree of intensiveness-extensiveness, but we need to take
account of the degree to which the scientific observer modifies the situa-
tion that he undertakes to describe. What happened to Blackstone during
his lifetime cannot be changed by anybody who writes about him in the
twentieth century; but the picture gained of a living figure by a man who
sees him every day may be modified by the characteristics of the two per-
sonalities. We may call the observers who have no direct contact with
the persons or situations that they describe collectors,"5 distinguishing
them from all who are in direct contact with the phenomena they investi-
gate. Even those who are in direct contact do not necessarily exert the
slightest degree of influence over the phenomena; a spectator 11 who is
buried in the grandstand does not modify the spectacle if lie behaves like
everyone else. Intervie-wers,"1 on the other hand, make people conscious
113. A book like ALEXANDER AND STAUB. THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE: AND THE Pun-
LIC (1931), is especially full of insight into deeper personality structure.
114. See GALLU AND RAE. THE PuRsE or Drmocmsc (1940); Ronwsouz, StrAw
VoTas (1932).
115. Observational standpoints are summarized with reference to political science in
Lasswell, The Developing Science of Dcmcracy in THE FTrUE or GO=V-MN T IN THE
UNITa STATES (White ed. 1942) c. 2.
116. Child behavior is often studied by observers who are not seen by the children.
Some technical procedures developed in these researches are summarized in Arrington,
Time-Sampling Studies of Child Behazior (1939) 51 PsYcnoi.LoicA. Mo o, mrus, No. 2.
117. See BINGHAM AND Moo, How To ITERvrw (2d ed. 1931) ; Roz nusEnmS.,
DIcKsoN AND WRIGHT, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939) c. 13. See also Monmo.
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that they are being studied, although false inferences may be made about
particular purposes. Participant-observers " are those who give no clue
that they are studying anybody for any purpose whatsoever, although
they are bound to influence to some extent the persons with whom they
live.
Skills in Management
We will now consider some of the more active skills of dealing with
people, whether individually or as members of groups, that the lawyer
needs. There are limits on what the law school can provide in this direc-
tion, and most of what can be done must be outside the classroom. To
some extent it is useful to acquaint the student with methods of observ-
ing people, since it is impossible to improve proficiency in understanding
others without picking up pointers about the self. One function of the
body of materials we have called the Skill Book can be to impart some of
the observational skills that directly affect managerial efficiency.
Consider random movements. Everyone is sensitive to blushing, per-
spiring, fidgeting, and doodling, usually without insight. We act on the
vague inference that the other person is trustworthy, shifty, poised or
flustered. Are these "hunches" valid? And can we learn to see even more
in random movements than the ordinary man in the street sees in them?
When one stops to think about it, the truth comes forcibly home that
much of our success and failure in life depends on "reading human na-
ture," on making correct inferences about the character and even the abil-
ity of others on the basis of what we see in ordinary life situations. There
is the task of "sizing up" a witness and settling on a line of examination
that will improve, or break down, the impression that he is trustworthy.
In selecting law clerks, partners and clients, we often have many sources
of information to supplement our unaided guesses. Nevertheless we learn
to depend on our judgment, and our success and usefulness is at stake
on our "disciplined intuition." If we judge incorrectly, we may select,
and unknowingly instigate, a partner who commits suicide at a critical
time in our affairs. On the basis of a "hunch," we may defy the appraisals
of others, and entrust a law clerk with great responsibilities; possibly the
WHO SHALL SURVIVE? A NEWV APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS
(1934); THOMAS AND ZNANIECKI, THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA
(1927); WEB AND WEBB, METHODS OF SOCIAL STUDY (1932).
118. See LINDEMAN, SoCIAL DISCOVERY (1924); MAiE AND HARRISON (eds.), BRIT-
AIN BY MASS OBSERVATION (1939); Kluckbohn, The Participant Observer Technique
in S=all Communities (1940) 46 AM. J. Soc. 331; Mead, More Comprehensive Field
Methods (1933) 35 AM. ANTHROP. 1. On various methods of self-observation consult
ALLPORT, THE USE OF PFRSONAL DOCUMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (1942) ; Hon-
NEY, SELF-ANALYSIS (1942); LAssWELL, A NEW TECHNIQUE OF THINKING (1930)
c. 3.
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outcome will vindicate us. There is the question of how far to trust news-
paper correspondents with "inside stories"; a mutually helpful relation-
ship with columnists and commentators may spell the difference between
public support of one's side and public hostility. No experienced person
banks too much on his "knowledge of human nature." especially when he
has had wide enough experience to find out how complex it often is. Even
those whom we know "like a brother" may turn out to be serious misfits;
a promising and charming young person may suddenly disintegrate into a
compulsive thief. The trusted clerk proves to be a falsifier of accounts;
the conscientious partner has a "nervous breakdown," or becomes suspi-
cious, embittered, uncooperative.
What can be done to improve our "judgment of men?" There is no
royal road, no X-ray eye, no teachable hocus-pocus that gives infallible
results. Two things, however, can be done. The student can be made
explicitly aware of what he sees, and the inferences that he draws;
and he can learn to interpret the possible significance of what spe-
cialists are able to report. Law students do not have time to he ome ex-
perimental psychologists, or mental and aptitude test experts, tsr clinically
competent interviewers.'" But they can learn how to apply some of the
products of scientific research to the daily process of judging men. Actual
experience in recording the random movements of others is excellent self-
discipline. If we meet a new person and talk to him for a while, we may
decide that he is "untrustworthy." Very well; we may practice noting
(in an unobtrusive way) some of his specific acts. Where does he focus
his gaze? Does he look the other person in the eye, or does his gaze wan-
der up and down and around the room? There is popular prejudice against
the "shifty eyed," and physicians have found shiftiness a useful clue, taken
along with others, of neurotic instability. We must keep in mind the
"over-compensatory" reaction of keeping the eyes riveted on the other per-
son; this is often found in slick, bold imposter types. ' hat is significant
in behavior is deviation, which may be toward exaggerating a tendency,
or toward extreme adjustment in the opposite direction.
Random movements may make "physiological sense," even though at
first glance they lack rhyme or reason. Certain levels of fear are often
manifested by an inhibiting effect on some secretions. There is the famous
"dry mouth" of stage-fright, connected with reduced salivation, a symp-
tom upon which the Chinese have traditionally depended in detecting false
testimony. After all, there is a physiological basis for testing truthfulnes
according to capacity to chew a mouthful of rice husks." - Persons may
also indicate anxiety by fingering or picking the nose; the inner lining
often gets dry and irritated under stress. Feelings of helplessness can he
betrayed by what appears to be excessive activity of the tear ducts. Sonme
119. For guidance to the literature consult ALLPoR, PERSONALITY (1937) ; Afunxny,
AND NEWCOmB, EXPERizxNTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1937).
120. See LARSON, LYING AND ITS DmcrioN (1932).
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movements can be better understood in the light of the clinical caricature
of the tendency that finds only limited expression under ordinary condi-
tions. The uptilting of the chin, with its hint of condescension, is present
in many haughty "paranoid" types.1"' A quick, stereotyped smile may be
understood in relation to extreme cases in which excessive fear of being
assaulted by others leads to the propitiatory peace-offering of a quick,
ingratiating smile.
Lawyers and other members of learned professions often overestimate
the creative ability of compulsive and obsessive people.122 The trained
intellectual may have obsessive strains in his own personality; in any
case, seeming sincerity, gravity, orderliness and industry make a favorable
impression, where all these qualities are of obvious value. However, when
these characteristics are not blended with detachment, revealed in a touch
of humor, there is danger that the person in question is too rigid, un-
adaptable, and lacking in improvisation to mature into an individual who
can face new and important responsibility. Often we get disappointing
results from conscientious people when we promote them into better jobs;
they need definite instructions and a set system, and when they have many
alternatives to choose among, the strain is more than they can bear. Sud-
denly the dependable assistant becomes inefficient, irritable with himself
and everyone else, and wholly incapable of smooth adaptation. From the
"clinical caricature" of types who have "nervous breakdowns," we can
learn much about the structure of such characters, noting in particular
how greatly they depend on routine operations to hold in check their hos-
tile, destructive impulses. From this group of rigid characters are often
recruited stern, self-righteous types who have no insight whatever into
the deep, veiled gratifications that they receive from the discomfiture of
others. Here are the judges who gain secret joy from cruelty; in this
category, too, we find petty clerks and officials who annoy, where they do
not more seriously damage, those who depend upon their application of
a rule.123
121. For a view of current psychiatric conceptions see BROWN AND MENNINGER, Tin
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR (1940); MASLOW AND 1[ITTELMANN, PRIN-
CIPLES OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY (1941) ; SULLIVAN, 10C. cit. ,rupra note 43.
122. The distinction between obsessive and hysteric types is succinctly given in MAYO,
HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION (1933) 107, based on the work of
Pierre Janet.
123. In addition to random movements, the flow of words may provide helpful clues
to the mood of the person with whom one has to deal. It is convenient to classify state-
ments according to reference. "Self" references allude to the statement-maker; "other"
references to other persons. Plus references put the referent of the statement in a favor-
able light ("I am a great man") ; minus references do the opposite ("I am a flop").
Furthermore, the standard may be specified; plus or minus may be in terms of "strength-
weakness" or "morality-immorality", for example. See Lasswell, A Provisional Classif-
cation of Symbol Data (1938) 1 PSYCHIATRY: J. OF BIO. AND PATH. OF INTEMPERSONAL
RELATIONS 197.
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For lack of basic information about human personality, many lawyers
have become fruitlessly entangled with ill and even dangerous persons.
To choose a notorious example, there is a type well known to psychiatrists
called a "litigious paranoid," who is continually starting lawsuits, owing
to an exaggerated tendency to feel discriminated against, coupled with the
ability to tell a plausible story. Unhappily, such individuals do not impress
the untutored as ill, and they may go on for years fomenting trouble. Some
other paranoid types are more destructive. They are homicidally inclined;
yet often they arouse no suspicion in the layman's mind. But the lawyer
can be given enough familiarity with the picture to keep his guard up.
By closely observing the interplay among those who participate in
courts, committees and other recurrent situations, we may discover many
valuable facts. Some judges are intimidated by vigorous, bold, outspoken
personalities who challenge opposing counsel constantly and go as far as
possible in challenging the court itself. Usually, of course, judges are
amenable to more flattering modes of allusion, if not to opposing counsel,
at least to the bench. In watching witnesses it is often possible to learn to
forecast accurately the "breaking point" of the liars and even to distin-
guish it from the often clumsy fumbling of an honest man with poor poise.
The observer of court proceedings can actually make a record of the fre-
quency with which given participants refer to themselves and others in
various ways, and provide not only self-training in the study of behavior
but contribute to a body of records valuable for deeper understanding of
what happens in litigation. -4
What is seen and heard can be fitted into the perspective of social struc-
ture as well as personality type. By accent and manner the upper, middle
and lower class person-in terms of "respect" position-may be discerned.
The "upper class" manner. may be found to include an air of gracious de-
tachment that is difficult for the middle or lower class individual to ac-
quire. The clue to a genuinely aristocratic attitude, as has often been
pointed out, is that the aristocrat has no compulsion to allow himself to be
124. Administrators who came in direct contact with clients were directly observed
by Lasswell and Almond, Twisting Relief Rules (1935) 13 Pmaso-,.r. J. 333. The
officials were supposed to apply a definite body of rules, but showed great differences in
practice, some discriminating in favor of the client, and some against him. By careful
study, it is possible to distinguish behveen patterns common to a culture and those per-
taining to a personality. See EFRao, GESTURE AND ENImONMENT (1941), a tentative
study of some of the spatio-temporal and "linguistic" aspects of the gestural behavior of
Eastern Jews and Southern Italians in New York City, living under different environ-
mental conditions. Correlations bet-ween physical type and other characteristie are re-
ported in SHELDON, THE VARiETms OF HUMSAN PHYsIQuE (1940) and Tn VAnIMEES'
OF TEIPERA mENT (1942). See also MuRRAY (ed.), EXPLonuTioNs I.,. PERSoNAUY
(1938), and HoRST. THE PREDICTION OF PERSONAL ADJrsT.IEXT (1942). The scientific
approach to the entire legal process was advocated and exemplified in the pioneer bal!:
of RoBiNsoN, LAW AND THE LAN.YERS (1935).
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measured in terms of proficiency in any particular skill.121 He aristocrati-
cally demands respect, not on the basis of sacrificially-gained attainments,
but solely for "being"; he expects to be deferred to just because he exists,
not because he is "good for something." Part of the code is to maintain
an air of imperviousness to the trials and tribulations of the moment; the
ego must appear to remain unruffled and uncontaminated by momentary
acts of fate. Even enemies may be treated with ceremoniousness. All
this, where it is found, contrasts with the sharp "self" and "other" evalua-
tions that are so often on the tongue of the middle class person, and es-
pecially of the more rivalrous "climbers." It may be found that in negotia-
tion, as well as before some of the higher courts, the near-aristocratic be-
nignity may be a more powerful instrument than the "huffing and puffing"
of the "over-zealous," or at least over-transparent, middle class derivative.
When tribunals are made up of middle class personnel, however, certain
accents and demeanors may be resented, especially if the person in ques-
tion is suspected of being "really" middle class. One of the major points
to watch is which participants assume lower class submissiveness, and
which ones react against an inner tendency to submit. "Class points" and
"personality points" are continually becoming entangled with one another,
sometimes limiting and sometimes reinforcing each other. Middle class
rivalrousness leads to a high frequency level of aspersive remarks; but
from this level may appear conspicuous deviates in the direction of ex-
treme "objectivity," "sweetness and light," or "super-cynicism." The
focalizing of stress within our civilization at the middle layers leads to
great variety in the forms of solution found by middle class youth.
20
In the name of better training for students in these matters it may be
possible for law professors to learn more and more of these facts of life
and to diminish their own danger to students. All of us have seen promis-
ing students fail drastically at some point in their professional training;
often they Were gifted intellectually, but suffered from some distortion of
personality that might have been rectified had their needs been identified
in time and assistance tactfully given by professors who were interested
in them. Industrial plants often assume some measure of responsibility
in providing modern medical and psychiatric facilities for the executive
staff and the working force. Up to the present, however, many professors
in our professional schools apparently feel themselves free to damage
human personalities at will through unnecessary ignorance and arrogant
self-dramatization.2
125. Compare Hobhouse, Aristocracy in 2 ENcyc. Soc. SCIENCES (1930) 183.
126. See especially Warner and Dollard, loc. cit. supra note 42. On one of the ne-
glected layers of the middle class, Spier, The Salaried Employee in Modern Society
(1934) 1 SOCIAL RESEAR H 111. For historical perspective, PALM, THE MIDDLE CLASS
THEN AND Now (1936).
127. A sketch of modern medical and psychiatric services in various institutions is in
the EN cc. Soc. ScixEIcEs under such titles as Psychiatry, Industrial Hygiene, Medicine.
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Many of the problems of management involve large groups of people
rather than specific individuals and hence are problems of public rela-
tions. This is the field which was called ideological policy in the four-
fold analysis of policy above. Other synonyms or closely related charac-
terizations are information or propaganda policy. In any case, the prob-
lem is to modify response by controlling the symbols that come to the
focus of general attention. In operations that concern far-flung govern-
mental, business and other private activities, the time has long since
passed when public relations policies are run entirely by hunch. The mod-
em moulding of the human environment proceeds on a factual basis, quite
as much as economic, military or diplomatic policy. 28 Many procedures
have been developed for describing the distribution of attitudes on which
the future survival of various enterprises depends, and these several pro-
cedures may be relied upon to furnish a factual basis for estimating trends
and evaluating future probabilities on the basis of scientific knowledge of
causal interrelationships. In the field of military policy it has long been a
commonplace that command depends upon adequate intelligence; that is
to say, information about the disposition of enemy forces, the germinating
plans of the enemy, and the ways that the enemy would probably respond
to various counter-measures. The providing of similar facts is what is
involved in establishing a solid intelligence basis for public relations policy.
A quick over-all view of significant responses may often be gained by
the use of existing methods of polling opinion. By means of a sample
that reflects the structure of a large population in correct proportion, it
is possible to obtain a reliable picture of what great numbers of people
think by interviewing a small fraction of the persons concerned. The re-
sults of such polling operations are most easy to interpret when the issue
before the public is one in which there is very active public interest and
with respect to which a few leading alternatives of action are universally
known. Scientific polling operations conducted in the midst of election
campaigns can provide trend data on the basis of which a high batting
average can be scored in forecasting elections. In an election there is
public interest, and alternatives are few; the electorate can vote for or
against the party in power. But we cannot be so sure about the relevance of
polling results when public interest is at a low ebb and when a very
limited number of alternatives have not been crystallized. When people
are questioned about the structure of a post-war world long before the
nature of the leading alternatives is clear, very little can be said about how
people will actually respond in future situations. Under such conditions
128. On propaganda and allied activities of various groups see CuLP, T=n Azn m nz
Lziox (1942); McCAmy, GoiRayn~Er PTUBLICITY (1939) ; McKFUN, PnEr.ssCRs oN' TI=
LzGsmLxu oF NEv JERSEY (1938); SELu, THnE OnGA=ATxoNI m Acivrrms o' Tun
NATIONAL EDuCTIox AssociATioN (1932); Sno-o, ORG.mzFD A_-ri-Sr.nism u;
A M C A (1941) ; WALKm AxD SKLAR, Busixiss FINDS rrs VOICE (1938).
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the brief polling interview tends to become a method of discovering which
words are "plus" words and which words are "minus" words. If the word
"planning," for example, is a "plus" word in the vocabulary of a given
sector of the population, the word may be invoked to justify almost any
of the alternatives eventually presented in the opinion-forming process.1"'
Deeper knowledge of the way people are disposed to respond can be
obtained by the use of other methods of collecting facts, We may, for
example, conduct prolonged interviews with selected persons. 3 In this
way we may discover that people who profess interest in post-war plans
will at the same time evince such active distrust of Britain or Russia that
the idea of placing the control of certain basic raw materials jointly in the
hands of an international agency has little appeal. On the other hand, it
may happen that deep-lying skepticism is encountered about the possibility
of providing jobs for all unless there is some form of world ecQnomic
authority charged with the stimulation and regularization of production
in different regions of the world. There may be great loyalty to certain
leaders who may at some future time take serious initiatives on behalf of
world planning. Skilled workers, unskilled workers, small businessmen,
professional people, government and party employees, owners and top
executives of big businesses may reveal at any given time a tangled pat-
tern of inconsistent and contradictory aspirations, expectations and identi-
fications. By means of prolonged interviewing we may get some of the
facts for forecasting the "priority attitudes" that prevail among the
major social divisions.
The most valuable insight into the structure of collective attitudes may
be obtained not by brief or prolonged interviews of the type just de-
scribed but by the comparative study of the historical background out of
which contemporary attitudes have arisen. In this way it will be possible
to rediscover many past experiences that have dropped out of the minds
of most of the members of the contemporary generation but which would
take on a new birth of vitality under certain future conditions. By exam-
ining the statements and counter-statements made in public and private
circles during the struggle of the United States over the ratification of the
League of Nations, we may arrive at a more realistic sense of the priority
of different factors that may affect adjustment to the post-war environ-
ment. Such fact-gathering operations can be disciplined not only by the
knowledge of historians but by the scientific findings of social scientists
and psychologists.' 31 In the light of the relationships thus explored and
129. See Gosnell and de Grazia, A Critique of Polling Methods (1942) 6 PuD. OIN-
ION Q. 378.
130. On the use of longer interviews to evaluate attitudes see CANThiL, TUE INVASION
FRO M MARS (1940); LAZARSFELD, RADIO AND THE PIUNTED PAGE (1940).
131. The convergence of personality and cultural standpoints is creating "social psy-
chology." See BRowN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THiE SOCIAL Oa DER (1936); H1ORINtY, TiH
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revealed, it would be possible to devise experimental methods both for
probing the structure of current attitudes and pre-testing the pragmatic
effect of alternative lines of propaganda.
In studying predisposition and response it is important tt describe what
appears in the media of communication that reaches the focus of attention
of different groups and thus operates causally in moulding response. The
procedures by which it is possible to describe what is said in speeches,
what is sent over the wires of press associations, or what is depicted in
newsreels, fall within the general field of "content analysis." "02 Public
relations policy, as we have pointed out, consists in managing the streaam
of communication, and if this process is to be understood it is necessary
to evaluate three groups of factors: content, effect, predisposition. In
studying the predispositions we must give special attention to those who
exercise special control over the channels through which news and com-
ment gets to the attention of others. In particular this calls for knowledge
of the attitudes of owners, regulators and contributors to press, radio,
motion picture and all other mass media. One revealing body of data
locates the controllers of communication in the social structure and then
shows the value position of those whom they reach through the network
at their command. In view of the high concentration of governmental
or private ownership control of most of the great modem networks of
mass communication, it is apparent that communication flows chiefly
from those who occupy high positions in the social pyramids to the rest
of the community. Systematic data about the affiliations of those who
own, control or contribute to the mass media are peculiarly important in
evaluating the function that these media may be expected to perform in
future crises." Whether we have to do with a special Hughes or Seabury
investigation, or the conduct of significant and protracted litigation, or
with the hearings before Congressional committees, or with debates on
the floor of legislative bodies, or proceedings before chief executives, de-
partments and agencies, or with presentations to the executive committees
and the boards of directors of private pressure groups, business, or pri-
NEuROTC PERSONALITY OF OUR Trz.i (1937); KARDrNER, TnE INDnDUAL Alm His
SocIErY (1939) ; KLINEBERG, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1940) ; SHEan,, PsYchoLoGY oF So-
cLAL NonRms (1936); Mu.tan AND DoL.ARD, SOCIAL LEARNING AND IITATION (1941);
LINTON, THE STuDY OF MAN (1936).
132. CHILDS AND WrrrON (eds.), PROPAGANDA BY SHORT WAVE (1942); WAtZs
(ed.), PRINT, RADIO, AND FnIM IN A DEmocRAcY (1942), WVAPLES, B=ncioiz AND BrAD-
SHAiv, WHAT READING DOES TO PEOPLE (1940); WooDwARD, FOREIGn NMvs nz AMU-
CAN MORNING NEWSPAPERS (1930); Jones, Quantitative Analysis of Maion Picture Con-
tent (1942) 6 Pvn. OprxioN Q. 411; Lasswell, The Polifcally Significant Conet of tl
Press: Coding Procedures (1942) 19 JORNAx.s1 Q. 12.
133. Representative studies of contributors to media are Rosrn, TnE VASHIZ-GTOI
CORRESPONDENTS (1937) and HouLYwooD (1941). An e.iemplary study of control is
PEP, REPORT ON THE BRITISH PRESS (1938).
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vate cultural organizations-we are engaging in processes that inter-
act with the entire structure of value distribution and condition the ful-
fillment of democratic goals.' 34
Information about control, content and consequence of communication
is necessary to the development of sound strategical and tactical policies.
Although democracies and despotisms alike make use of propaganda, the
line taken by democratic societies in meeting emergencies is most effective
when it adheres to certain differences that distinguish it from despotism.
For one thing, the control of communication is not completely subordi-
nated to detailed dictation. Democracies that adhere to their own ideals
tolerate self-criticism during crises not as a necessary concession to weak-
ness but as a means of mobilizing their natural strength. However, there
are conspicuous dangers in permitting unfavorable presentations of demo-
cratic leaders, institutions and policies unless these are promptly counter-
balanced by favorable material. The basic policy of democracy is neither
intolerance nor passive acquiescence in its own destruction; rather it is
vigorous, positive self-defense and counter-attack.
The psychic potential of democracy is far higher than that of despotism,
since people are at their best when their total energies are released in re-
spected lines of activity. The technique of despotism is to divide and rule;
the masses are divided into echelons that are ordered according to the arro-
gant self-interest of those in each echelon. At every tier individuals are
encouraged to believe that they will gain special privileges by submitting
to the echelon just above. The principal advantage consists in permission
to impose one's will upon those beneath. Democracies, on the other hand,
can maintain a conception of power as a shared pursuit of a common goal
to which everyone contributes according to capacity. In their propaganda
democracies must rule by insight and not by reiteration and imposition,
although they must be alert and vigorous in the reaffirmation of their
basic principles and in preserving confidence in ultimate success. They
'can safely allow far more dissent on ways and means than is compatible
with the structure of despotism. One tacit admission of the power of
democracy is the spurious simulation of a democratic order by despotic
states. This simulation shows itself in the use of democratic symbols, but
it betrays itself by mystical and ambiguous, hence fraudulent, application.
While despotisms offer verbal deference to the masses, they do so on the
express understanding that the masses shall not be trusted to have a voice
in the selection of leaders or in the determination of policy. In short, the
134. On general theory see BARTLETT, POLITICAL PROPAGANDA (1940) ; BLAu, PROPA-
GANDA ALS WAFFE (1937) ; CHAKOTIN, THE RAPE OF THE MASSES (1940); CHILDS AND
WIrro (eds.) loc. cit. supra note 132; DooB, PROPAGANDA (1935); MERMUA, THE
MAKING OF CITIZENS (1931); PINTSCHOVIUS, DIE SEELiscur WIDERSTANDSKRAFT IM
MODERNEN KRIEG (1936); TAYLOR, STrYTGY OF TERROR (1940). See also BRADWAY,
THE BAR AND PUBLIC RELATIONS (1934).
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masses are to be flattered without being trusted. It is of vital importance
for those who participate in the making of democratic policy to make full
use of the enormous potentialities of the fundamental ideological doc-
trine of a free society, which is deference for the dignity and worth of
the individual.
BEYOND THE CLASSROOM
In the foregoing discussion we have taken it for granted that the class-
room will remain the most conspicuous pedagogical device in the environ-
ment of the students of the future law school. Hence it will be incumbent
upon the professors to make of the classroom a more powerful instrument
for transmitting not only the skills in legal technicality that constitute the
indispensable core of the lawyer's professional equipment but the addi-
tional skills that promise to mould the policy-makers capable of fulfilling
the aims and realizing the opportunities of the years ahead. We have,
however, recognized from time to time in these suggestions about curri-
cular reconstruction that other parts of the law school environment can be
deliberately remodelled into more effective instruments for supplementing
the classroom.
Among these supplementary instruments we give special emphasis to
the seminar. By the seminar we mean a comparatively small group of
professors and students engaged in creative analysis and research on prob-
lems. Now there is nothing new about the seminar any more than there
is about the classroom-the problem is to refill it with content appropriate
to the professed objectives of our curricular reconstruction. The special
advantages of the seminar are well known. In the intensive work that
goes forward skills may be perfected in the organization and presentation
of material. In particular the seminar lends itself to the discovery of new
problems and to the patient exploration of new sources and even new
skills marginal to the central apparatus of legal technicality with which the
student becomes familiarized in connection with the classroom. In the
law school of the future there should be ample opportunity for seminar
work, since it seems very plausible to the writers, as to many reformers
of law school education, that sufficient grounding in legal syntax and
procedure can be gained by a full year of classroom instruction. Addi-
tional work directly looking toward the mastery of legal doctrine and pro-
cedure, as well as in the acquisition of general policy skills, can be more
productively carried on in seminars."
Without concerning ourselves too greatly with revising the seminar
formula itself, we may nevertheless urge the advantages of seminars in
135. There is merit in Hall's suggestion that legal technicality precede intensive work
in the social sciences. However, the courses in legal technicality should not be relegated
to the status of drill hours in syntactics devoid of semantic content. Hall, A1 2-2-2 Plan
for College-Law Education (1942) 56 HAv. L. REv. 245.
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which several men of established professional competence take an active
hand. Too often the seminar is exploited by a single dominating personal-
ity as an instrument for riding his special hobby. This tendency can be
'held in check by colleagues. The idea here is not to turn seminars into
little bullpens, where men of incompatible view and temperament are
supposed to conduct interminable jousts with one another. On the con-
trary, the idea is to create seminars among people who share not only
quite general values but specific concern with the achievement of rather
restricted objectives.
It is particularly advantageous if seminars can grow into productive
centers of continuing research from year to year. In many ways there
are advantages if the seminar becomes, even in name, an institute. In
addition to the professors in the law school and in other departments of
universities, such seminar-institute staffs can be recruited from research
fellows who devote most of their time for a period of years to work in a
special field. These fellows should be recruited from the regular teach-
ing staff of law schools; from men who can spend a year or more away
from their regular teaching duties whipping into shape some fruitful con-
tribution to the literature of law and policy. To a certain extent, more-
over, fellowships may become available to law school graduates who
have but a limited interest in teaching but who have great aptitude for
fundamental inquiry. Men of this type often have difficulty in making
their most distinctive and useful contributions to society, since often they
mature into effective classroom teachers late in life when they have the
poise that comes from confident mastery of a special field. One of the pur-
poses of the institute-seminar system can be to adapt the whole institu-
tional structure of legal research, teaching and practice to various patterns
of individual skill and aptitude. It is difficult to overemphasize the prac-
tical importance of making adequate provision for the encouragement of
research along margins of the traditional field of accepted technicality.
Only too often in the past brave new worlds of integrated law and social
science have been proposed; but a short time afterwards it has been pain-
fully apparent that the high aspirations of the founding fathers had come
to little because of the practical difficulties of providing adequate financial
and honorific inducements to enable people to "take the long chance" of
cultivating marginal problems and skills.'3
One principle of professional -training is to project the student into
situations that resemble as closely as possible the circumstances of his
future career. One well-established pattern of this type can, in the re-
136. A seminar is a convenient pivot around which can revolve the work of prepar-
ing and revising such materials as we have referred to as skill book or trend book. The
collaboration of many specialists on different varieties of economic, governmental, psy-
chological and allied forms of data is required for the successful execution of such a
project.
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formed law school, be turned into a more productive instrument of legal
education. We refer to the moot court. It is common in some places to
conduct various "autopsies" on the performance of students be-
fore these tribunals. What we propose is that the appraisal should be
conducted not only in terms of legal technicality but for the purpose of
revealing the total effectiveness of the participant in handling himself in
the situation. By the use of modern recording devices it is feasible to record
the speaker's voice and to enable the individual to achieve objectivity
toward that all-important instrument. With the aid of motion picture
equipment it becomes feasible to present the total demeanor of the indi-
vidual to the subject himself. In connection with the law school, it is
practicable to provide technical facilities of many kinds in order to enable
the individual to overcome difficulties of trait and skill. Through proper
testing facilities, unsuspected aptitudes may be revealed and the source of
many inhibitions on effective expression may be exposed, understood and
eliminated. In some cases it is wise to take advantage of special analytic
procedures developed as an adjunct of modern clinical psychology. For
many students intensive coaching in writing is quite as vital as in speak-
ing.
Still another well-established institutional practice is to conduct investi-
gations in the field. Very often it has been pointed out that the training
of modern students deflects their attention from the factual contexts in
which legal technicalities are made functional and that this cannot receive
entirely satisfactory correction by providing more fact books. The
recommendation is that opportunities be provided for direct contact
with courts, administrative agencies and other parts of our social process.
It is desirable that at least brief periods of field experience should occur
at different times.137
So much for the possibilities of the influence, value and skill principle,
in reconstructing the law curriculum for systematic training for policy-
making. In bringing these proposals to a close, we repeat that they are pre-
pared from the point of view of the needs of a nation that professes deep
regard for the dignity of man and that in practice relies to an extraordi-
nary degree upon the advice of professional lawyers in the formation and
execution of policy. In our view the democratic values of our society can
only be effectively fulfilled if all who have an oppurtunity tu participate
significantly in the forming of policy share certain ways of thinking,
observing and managing. It has been our purpose to deal with some ex-
plicitness with those changes in the existing pattern of the law school
that will increase the probability that the lawyers of the future will be
137. Proposals for "clinical" law schools or "internships" have been increasingly promi-
nent in recent years.
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more effective instruments for the achievement of the public good than
they have been in the past. We have chosen this moment, when the law
schools are in a state of abeyance for the duration of the war and while
crisis compels people to clarify their objectives, to outline these suggestions,
not for the purpose of speculating about some unobtainable future but in
the hope of guiding responsible discussion toward the choice of effective
means of making the reopened law schools of the post-war world a place
where people who have risked their lives can wisely risk their minds.
APPENDIX
(The following citations are intended to illustrate what is meant by each main cate-




xl. Momentum of world population growth, 1650-1930. SNYDER, CAPITALISM
THE CREATOR (1940) 25, chart 2.
x2. Population of the United States, 1850-1920, and estimates of population
1930-2000 A. D. BAKER, BoasoDr, AND WILSON, AGRICULTURE IN MODERN
LIFE (1939) 20, fig. 3.
B. Biological Traits (and Families)
x3. Growth of population of the United States by age groups 1930-1980. AN-
DERsoN, TNEC REP., TAXATION, RECOVERY AND DEFENSE, Monograph 20
(1941) 284, chart 5.







x5. Employment and unemployment, 1920-1938. GILL, WASTED MANPOWER
(1939) 21, chart 1.
2. Output
x6. Index numbers of world agricultural and industrial production, 1925-
1933. Woytinsky, Social Consequences of the Economic Deprcsrion,
in STUDIES AND REPORTS, Series C, No. 21, International Labor Office
(1936) 21, diagram V.
3. Units (for convenience combined with III, B, 1).
4. Efficiency.
x7. Travel time in days from Boston, 1790-1798. STALEY, WORLD ECON-
OMY IN TRANSITION (1939) 8, chart II.
x8. World travel time in days from Boston, 1938. Id. facing p. 10, chart
III.
x9. Progress of efficiency in the consumption of fuel by large industrial
consumers in the United States. LORWIN, TNEC Rzp., TECHNOLOGY
IN OUR EcONOty, Monograph 22 (1941) 104, chart VI.
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5. Consumption and Depletion
xl0. Average per capita consumption of principal agricultural products,
1920-37. MEYERS, TNEC REP., AGRICULTTRE IN TIlE NATIONAL EcoN00-
o y, Monograph 23 (1940) 3, table 1.
xli. Coal resources of the U. S. (showing original tonnage, amount pro-
duced, and estimated waste as of Jan., 1936). NAT. RrsoncLs Coms-
mI=E, ENERGY RESOURCES AND NATIO.NAL POLICY (1939) 283,
table 3.
6. Invention
x12. Number of British patents granted from 1449 to 1921. 2 Soromcx.,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1941) 168, fig. S.
B. Monetary
1. Output
x13. Value of all construction, 1919-1939. STONE, TNEC RFP., TowAnD
MoE HOUSING, Monograph 8 (1940) 3, chart 1.
2. Price levels
x14. Long term movements of various price series. MACAULAY, SoME
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS SUGGESTED BY 'MOVEMENTS OF IN1T:.EsT RATES,
BONa YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES 1- TIIR U. S. SINCF 1856 (193S)
230, chart 29.
3. Income and Outlay (expenditures for consumption, investment)
x15. Gross national product, capital formation, and consumers! outlay,
1919-1940. ALTMAN, TNEC REP., SAVINGS, I.,ESTMW.:TS AND NA-
TIONTAL INCOME, Monograph 37 (1941) 68, table 16.
x16. Governmental expenditures, federal, state and local, 1923-1938. A!.mn-
soN, op. cit. supra x3, at 52-55, tables 20, 21, charts 3, 4.
4. Cost
x17. Indexes of output per man-hour, average hourly earnings and unit
labor cost, United States, 1923-1939. LoRwin, op. cit. supra xQ, at
153, chart XII.
5. Activity levels
x1S. Percentage distribution of business cycles in various countries and
various periods according to their approximate duratin in year.
THoRP, BusrNEss ANNALS (1926) 56-59, chart IV.
III. Values
A. Total (Relation of an organized group to several values)
x19. Political control of the world's population and land surface by em-
pires. CLARx, A PLACE IN TIHE SUN (1936) charts at 81.
B. Deference
1. Power (units, activity, composition)
a. Government
(1) Interstate
x20. Membership of the League of Nations, 1920-1940. 'mID.E-
BUSH AND HILL, ELEMI.NTS OF I!TERNATIONAL RFLrATous
(1940) 204, chart II.
(2) State
x21. Class, skill and attitude analysis of governmental and party
leaders of Fascist Italy. Lasswell and Sereno, Govern-
nental and Party Leaders in Fascist Italy (1937) 31 An.
POL. Scr. REv. 914, tables 1-3.
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x22. Age composition of the National Socialist Party in per-
centages of the total in the years 1931, 1932, and 1935, aq
compared with age composition of the Social Democratic
party in 1931 and of the total population over eighteen
years of age in 1933. Gerth, The Nazi Party: Its Leader-
ship and Composition (1940) 45 AMr. J. oF Soc. 530, table 2.
(3) Intrastate
x23. Number of local units of government in the United States.
GROVES, FiNANciNG GOVERNMENT (1939) 636, table 42.
x24. Distribution according to occupation of all members of
thirteen lower chambers and twelve senates during 1925-
1935. Hyneman, Who Makes Our Law? (1940) 55 PoL.
Sci. Q. 557, table 1.
b. Private pressure associations
x25. Table of meetings of private international organizations, 1840-1914,
POTTER, AN INTRoDUcTIoN TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION (4th ed. 1935) 48, n. 3.
x26. List of national organizations with headquarters at Washington
(modifying earlier list by Herring). BLAISDELL, TNEC REP., Eco-
NO.IC POWER AND POLITCAL PRESSURES, Monograph 26 (1941)
197-201.
c. Business
x27. Indexes of U. S. business population, 1900-1938, Anderson, op. cit.
supra x3, at 318, table 24 (appendix).
x28. Intercorporate holdings of voting stock by the John D. Rockefeller
and J. P. Morgan and connected interests in companies having sub-
stantial holdings in the natural gas and natural gas pipeline Indus-
tries of the United States as of Jan. 1, 1939. FEDERAL TRADF CoM-
MISSION, TNEC REP., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON NATURAL
GAS, Monograph 36 (1940) exhibit 3, facing p. 89.
x29. Growth in the average size of establishments in all manufacturing
industries, 1914-37. THORP, TNEC REP., STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY,
Monograph 27 (1941) 4, table 2.
2. Respect
x30. A measurement of the interconnectedness of the several classes In
their associational relations. WARNER AND LUNT, TiE SOCIAL Lin-
OF A MODERN COMMUNITv (1941) 125, table 1.
3. Insight.
x31. Regional variations in high school enrollment. ODUM AND MOORE,
AMERICAN REGIONALISM (1938) 534.
C. Income (distribution)
x32. Shares of total individual income received by selected proportions
of income recipients, 1918-37. GOLDENTHAL, TNEC REP., CoNcEN-
TRATION AND COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL INCOME, 1918-1937, Mono-
graph 4 (1940) 22, table 2.
D. Safety
x33. Percentage of casualties in four countries from the twelfth to the
twentieth century. 3 SOROKIN, op. cit. supra x12, at 33, table 17.
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IV. Methods
A. Symbols
x34. Volume of newspaper and periodical advertising revenue, per capita ex-
penditures in these media, and ratio of expenditures to national income,
selected years, 1865-1937. BORDEN, THE Eco.ohic EFFects or ADVER-
TisIN (1942) 48, table I.
B. Goods (and Services)
.35. Federal expenditures for grants-in-aid, 1910, 1918, 1928, 1936 (in
thousands of dollars). BrrTEr.Ax.-, STATE AND FED RAL GnA-rs--Am
(1938) 132ff.
C. Violence
x36. Relative indicators of war activities by century periods for nine Euro-
pean countries. 3 SoRox.'€, op. cit. supra x12, at 341, table 18.
D. Diplomacy (offer, counter-offer, acceptance, rejection by authorized group
spokesmen)
x37. Work of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1922 to June 15,
1939, showing chronologically the number of judgments, orders having
the force of judgments, and advisory opinions of the Court. MnIDLEDUSTI
AND HILL, op. cit. mipra x20, at 457, table VII.
V. Groups (The value position and methods of groups that are not as a rule inclusive-
ly organized. Governments, private associations, and business organizations are,
for convenience, described under II, B, 1).
A. Class
(Cross reference here the table on "Class Analysis" in x21).
B. Skill
(Cross reference here the table on "Skill Analys s" in x21).
C. Personality
x38. Distribution of ideational, mixed, and sensate types among popes and
kings. 1 SoRoxiN, op. cit. supra x12, at 106, table 2.
D. Attitude (data concerning the distribution of symbols at a given time is re-
corded here, and changes of distribution).
x39. Shifts in attitude patterns, May to September, 1940. Cantrill, Rugg and
Williams, America Faces the War: Shilts in Opinion (1940) 4 Pmr.
Op. Q. 652, chart 1.
1943]
